This paper aims to provide hyperintensional foundations for mathematical platonism. I examine Hale and Wright's (2009) objections to the merits and need, in the defense of mathematical platonism and its epistemology, of the thesis of Necessitism. In response to Hale and Wright's objections to the role of epistemic and metaphysical modalities in providing justification for both the truth of abstraction principles and the success of mathematical predicate reference, I examine the Necessitist commitments of the abundant conception of properties endorsed by (...) Hale and Wright and examined in Hale (2013), and demonstrate how a two-dimensional approach to the epistemology of mathematics is consistent with Hale and Wright's notion of there being non-evidential epistemic entitlement rationally to trust that abstraction principles are true. A choice point that I flag is that between availing of intensional or hyperintensional semantics. The hyperintensional semantic approach that I advance is a topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics. I countenance a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. I suggest that observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make abstraction principles recursively enumerable. Epistemic and metaphysical states and possibilities may thus be shown to play a constitutive role in vindicating the reality of mathematical objects and truth, and in providing a conceivability-based route to the truth of abstraction principles as well as other axioms and propositions in mathematics. (shrink)

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, (...) and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter 2 argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal and hyperintensional cognitivism and modal and hyperintensional expressivism. I also develop a novel, topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develop a novel, dynamic two-dimensional semantics grounded in two-dimensional hyperintensional Turing machines. Chapter 3 provides an abstraction principle for epistemic (hyper-)intensions. Chapter 4 advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter 5 applies the fixed points of the modal μ-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal μ-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal μ-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter 6 advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter 7 provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters 2 and 4 are availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters 8-12 provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter 8 examines the interaction between my hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of Ω-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter 9 examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. I countenance a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. I suggest, too, that higher observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter 10 examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional Ω-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter 11 provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter 12 avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between interpretational and objective modalities and the truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. I invent a new mathematical trick in which first-order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals in the category of Set in category theory. Chapter 13 examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter 14 examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

This paper proves the finite model property and the finite axiomatizability of a class of normal modal logics extending K4.3. The frames for these logics are those for K4.3, in each of which every point has a bounded number of irreflexive successors if it is after an infinite ascending chain of (not necessarily distinct) points.

A deductive system is said to be structurally complete if its admissible rules are derivable. In addition, it is called hereditarily structurally complete if all its extensions are structurally complete. Citkin (1978) proved that an intermediate logic is hereditarily structurally complete if and only if the variety of Heyting algebras associated with it omits five finite algebras. Despite its importance in the theory of admissible rules, a direct proof of Citkin’s theorem is not widely accessible. In this paper we offer (...) a self-contained proof of Citkin’s theorem, based on Esakia duality and the method of subframe formulas. As a corollary, we obtain a short proof of Citkin’s 2019 characterization of hereditarily structurally complete positive logics. (shrink)

This paper studies modal logics whose extensions all have the finite model property, those whose extensions are all recursively axiomatizable, and those whose extensions are all finitely axiomatizable. We call such logics FMP-ensuring, RA-ensuring and FA-ensuring respectively, and prove necessary and sufficient conditions of such logics in $$\mathsf {NExtK4.3}$$. Two infinite descending chains $$\{{\textbf{S}}_{k}\}_{k\in \omega }$$ and $$\{{\textbf{S}} _{k}^{*}\}_{k\in \omega }$$ of logics are presented, in terms of which the necessary and sufficient conditions are formulated as follows: A logic in (...) $$\mathsf {NExtK4.3}$$ is FMP-ensuring iff it extends $${\textbf{S}}_{k}$$ for some $$k\in \omega $$, it is RA-ensuring iff it extends $${\textbf{S}}_{k}^{*}$$ for some $$k\in \omega $$, and it is FA-ensuring iff it is finitely axiomatizable and extends $${\textbf{S}}_{k}^{*}$$ for some $$k\in \omega $$. (shrink)

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions (...) of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4. (shrink)

The Kuznetsov-Index of a modal logic is the least cardinal such that any consistent formula has a Kripke-model of size if it has a Kripke-model at all. The Kuznetsov-Spectrum is the set of all Kuznetsov-Indices of modal logics with countably many operators. It has been shown by Thomason that there are tense logics with Kuznetsov-Index . Futhermore, Chagrov has constructed an extension of K4 with Kuznetsov-Index . We will show here that for each countable ordinal there are logics with Kuznetsov-Index (...) . Furthermore, we show that the Kuznetsov-Spectrum is identical to the spectrum of indices for -theories which is likewise defined. A particular consequence is the following. If inaccessible (weakly compact, measurable) cardinals exist, then the least inaccessible (weakly compact, measurable) cardinal is also a Kuznetsov-Index. (shrink)

We construct a normal extension of K4 with the finite model property whose minimal tense extension is not complete with respect to Kripke semantics.

In this paper we define the notion of frame based formulas. We show that the well-known examples of formulas arising from a finite frame, such as the Jankov-de Jongh formulas, subframe formulas and cofinal subframe formulas, are all particular cases of the frame based formulas. We give a criterion for an intermediate logic to be axiomatizable by frame based formulas and use this criterion to obtain a simple proof that every locally tabular intermediate logic is axiomatizable by Jankov-de Jongh formulas. (...) We also show that not every intermediate logic is axiomatizable by frame based formulas. (shrink)

This paper investigates (modal) extensions of Heyting-Brouwer logic, i.e., the logic which results when the dual of implication (alias coimplication) is added to the language of intuitionistic logic. We first develop matrix as well as Kripke style semantics for those logics. Then, by extending the Gö;del-embedding of intuitionistic logic into S4, it is shown that all (modal) extensions of Heyting-Brouwer logic can be embedded into tense logics (with additional modal operators). An extension of the Blok-Esakia-Theorem is proved for this embedding.

This paper concerns modal logics appearing from the temporal ordering of domains in two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime. As R. Goldblatt has proved recently, the logic of the whole plane isS4.2. We consider closed or open convex polygons and closed or open domains bounded by simple differentiable curves; this leads to the logics:S4,S4.1,S4.2 orS4.1.2.

Given a normal (multi-)modal logic a characterization is given of the finitely presentable algebras A whose logics L A split the lattice of normal extensions of . This is a substantial generalization of Rautenberg [10] and [11] in which is assumed to be weakly transitive and A to be finite. We also obtain as a direct consequence a result by Blok [2] that for all cycle-free and finite A L A splits the lattice of normal extensions of K. Although we (...) firmly believe it to be true, we have not been able to prove that if a logic splits the lattice of extensions of then is the logic of an algebra finitely presentable over ; in this respect our result remains partial. (shrink)

We show that (contrary to the parallel case of intuitionistic logic, see [7], [4]) there does not exist a translation fromS42 (the propositional modal systemS4 enriched with propositional quantifiers) intoS4 that preserves provability and reduces to identity for Boolean connectives and.

This paper is a survey of results concerning the disjunction property, Halldén-completeness, and other related properties of intermediate prepositional logics and normal modal logics containing S4.

The Gödel translation provides an embedding of the intuitionistic logic$\mathsf {IPC}$into the modal logic$\mathsf {Grz}$, which then embeds into the modal logic$\mathsf {GL}$via the splitting translation. Combined with Solovay’s theorem that$\mathsf {GL}$is the modal logic of the provability predicate of Peano Arithmetic$\mathsf {PA}$, both$\mathsf {IPC}$and$\mathsf {Grz}$admit provability interpretations. When attempting to ‘lift’ these results to the monadic extensions$\mathsf {MIPC}$,$\mathsf {MGrz}$, and$\mathsf {MGL}$of these logics, the same techniques no longer work. Following a conjecture made by Esakia, we add an appropriate version (...) of Casari’s formula to these monadic extensions (denoted by a ‘+’), obtaining that the Gödel translation embeds$\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$into$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$and the splitting translation embeds$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$into$\mathsf {MGL}$. As proven by Japaridze, Solovay’s result extends to the monadic system$\mathsf {MGL}$, which leads us to a provability interpretation of both$\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$and$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$. (shrink)

Our investigation is concerned with the finite model property with respect to admissible rules. We establish general sufficient conditions for absence of fmp w. r. t. admissibility which are applicable to modal logics containing K4: Theorem 3.1 says that no logic λ containing K4 with the co-cover property and of width > 2 has fmp w. r. t. admissibility. Surprisingly many, if not to say all, important modal logics of width > 2 are within the scope of this theorem–K4 itself, (...) S4, GL, K4.1, K4.2, S4.1, S4.2, GL.2, etc. Thus the situation is completely opposite to the case of the ordinary fmp–the absolute majority of important logics have fmp, but not with respect to admissibility. As regards logics of width ≤ 2, there exists a zone for fmp w. r. t. admissibility. It is shown that all modal logics A of width ≤ 2 extending S4 which are not sub-logics of three special tabular logics have fmp w.r.t. admissibility. (shrink)

This paper proves the finite axiomatizability of transitive modal logics of finite depth and finite width w.r.t. proper-successor-equivalence. The frame condition of the latter requires, in a rooted transitive frame, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different sets of proper successors. The result generalizes Rybakov’s result of the finite axiomatizability of extensions of$\mathbf {S4}$of finite depth and finite width.

This paper presents a generalization of Fine’s completeness theorem for transitive logics of finite width, and proves the Kripke completeness of transitive logics of finite “suc-eq-width”. The frame condition for each finite suc-eq-width axiom requires, in rooted transitive frames, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different proper successors. The paper also presents a generalization of Rybakov’s completeness theorem for transitive logics of prefinite width, and proves the Kripke completeness of transitive logics of prefinite “suc-eq-width”. The (...) frame condition for each prefinite suc-eq-width axiom requires, in rooted transitive frames, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points that have a finite lower bound of depth and have different proper successors. We will construct continuums of transitive logics of finite suc-eq-width but not of finite width, and continuums of those of prefinite suc-eq-width but not of prefinite width. This shows that our new completeness results cover uncountably many more logics than Fine’s theorem and Rybakov’s theorem respectively. (shrink)

We prove some embedding theorems for classical conditional logic, covering 'finitely cumulative' logics, 'preferential' logics and what we call 'semi-monotonic' logics. Technical tools called 'partial frames' and 'frame morphisms' in the context of neighborhood semantics are used in the proof.

In this paper we use “generic submodels” to prove that each normal extension of G.3 (K4.3W) has the finite model property, by which we establish that each proper normal extension of G.3 is G.3Altn for some n≥0.

This paper investigates the structure of lattices of normal mono- and polymodal subframelogics, i.e., those modal logics whose frames are closed under a certain type of substructures. Nearly all basic modal logics belong to this class. The main lattice theoretic tool applied is the notion of a splitting of a complete lattice which turns out to be connected with the “geometry” and “topology” of frames, with Kripke completeness and with axiomatization problems. We investigate in detail subframe logics containing K4, those (...) containing polymodal Altn and subframe logics which are tense logics. (shrink)

Recent studies in semantics of modal and superintuitionistic predicate logics provided many examples of incompleteness, especially for Kripke semantics. So there is a problem: to find an appropriate possible- world semantics which is equivalent to Kripke semantics at the propositional level and which is strong enough to prove general completeness results. The present paper introduces a new semantics of Kripke metaframes' generalizing some earlier notions. The main innovation is in considering "n"-tuples of individuals as abstract "n"-dimensional vectors', together with some (...) transformations of these vectors. Soundness of the semantics is proved to be equivalent to some non- logical properties of metaframes; and thus we describe the maximal semantics of Kripke- type. (shrink)

Let us consider multimodal logics and. We assume that is characterised by a class of connected frames, and there exists an -frame with a so-called -starting point. Similarly, the logic is characterised by a class of connected frames, and there exists an -frame with a -starting point. Using isomorphic copies of the frames and, we construct a connected frame which characterises the fusion. The frame thus obtained has some useful properties. Among others, is countable if both and are countable, and (...) there is a special world of the frame such that any formula is valid in the frame if and only if it is valid at the point. We also describe a similar construction where we assume the existence of two classes consisting of rooted frames only. Using those classes and frames with so-called -roots, we construct a rooted frame adequate for the fusion of modal logics characterised by the classes under consideration. Both constructions can be used interchangeably. The selection of the construction depends on... (shrink)

We develop a method for showing that various modal logics that are valid in their countably generated canonical Kripke frames must also be valid in their uncountably generated ones. This is applied to many systems, including the logics of finite width, and a broader class of multimodal logics of ‘finite achronal width’ that are introduced here.

We show that some common varieties of modal K4-algebras have finitary unification type, thus providing effective best solutions for equations in free algebras. Applications to admissible inference rules are immediate.

We show that—unlike products of ‘transitive’ modal logics which are usually undecidable—their ‘expanding domain’ relativisations can be decidable, though not in primitive recursive time. In particular, we prove the decidability and the finite expanding product model property of bimodal logics interpreted in two-dimensional structures where one component—call it the ‘flow of time’—is • a finite linear order or a finite transitive tree and the other is composed of structures like • transitive trees/partial orders/quasi-orders/linear orders or only finite such structures expanding (...) over time. The decidability proof is based on Kruskal’s tree theorem, and the proof of non-primitive recursiveness is by reduction of the reachability problem for lossy channel systems. The result is used to show that the dynamic topological logic interpreted in topological spaces with continuous functions is decidable if the number of function iterations is assumed to be finite. (shrink)

We prove that if a modal formula is refuted on a wK4-algebra ( B ,□), then it is refuted on a finite wK4-algebra which is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a relativization of ( B ,□). As an immediate consequence, we obtain that each subframe and cofinal subframe logic over wK4 has the finite model property. On the one hand, this provides a purely algebraic proof of the results of Fine and Zakharyaschev for K4 . On the other hand, it (...) extends the Fine-Zakharyaschev results to wK4. (shrink)