- Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.details
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Evidentialism and belief polarization.Emily C. McWilliams - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7165-7196.details
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Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Refining the Bayesian Approach to Unifying Generalisation.Nina Poth - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (3):1-31.details
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How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oup Usa. pp. 56–73.details
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The Bayesian approach to the philosophy of science.Michael Strevens - 2006 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition. pp. 495--502.details
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Confirmation Theory.Patrick Maher - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed.details
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Hawking radiation and analogue experiments: A Bayesian analysis.Radin Dardashti, Stephan Hartmann, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 67:1-11.details
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State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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On bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.details
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Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.details
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Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.details
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Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.details
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What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.details
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Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):173-185.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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“The Ravens Paradox” is a misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.details
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Predictivism for pluralists.Eric Christian Barnes - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):421-450.details
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Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):129-138.details
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Approaching Truth in Conceptual Spaces.Gustavo Cevolani - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1485-1500.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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The Likelihood Ratio Measure and the Logicality Requirement.Otávio Bueno & Yukinori Onishi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):459-475.details
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Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color.Peter Brössel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):721-741.details
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.details
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Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.details
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Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson.Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann & Josh Snyder - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539-563.details
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Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):29-72.details
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Revamping Hypothetico-Deductivism: A Dialectic Account of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Gregor Betz - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):991-1009.details
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Wofür sprechen die daten?Thomas Bartelborth - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):13-40.details
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The Requirement of Total Evidence: A Reply to Epstein’s Critique.Martin Barrett & Elliott Sober - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (1):191-203.details
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Transitivity and Partial Screening Off.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2012 - Theoria 79 (4):294-308.details
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Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.details
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How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2021 - Erkenntnis (1):1-13.details
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A New Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):253-265.details
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Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition.Matt Jones & Bradley C. Love - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):169-188.details
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Inductive Logic.James Hawthorne - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Plenty of room left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.details
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Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2009 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.details
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Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
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Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.details
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Evidential Reasoning.Marcello Di Bello & Bart Verheij - 2011 - In G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 447-493.details
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Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.details
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Normativität und Bayesianismus.Stephan Hartmann & Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - In Bernward Gesang (ed.), Deskriptive oder normative Wissenschaftstheorie. ontos-Verlag. pp. 177-204.details
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Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.details
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