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  1. Moral Error Theory, Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt.Silvan Wittwer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, epistemic facts would be just as (...)
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  • Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.
    Philosophers have long theorised about which things make people’s lives go well (and why) and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation of how exactly it functions and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, (...)
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  • Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt.Daan Evers - 2019 - In Richard Rowland & Christopher Cowie (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.
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  • What’s Left for the Companions in Guilt Argument?Patrick Clipsham - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1):137-151.
    Companions in guilt arguments respond to moral error theory by pointing out that its philosophical rationale mandates the rejection of all categorical normative reasons, including epistemic reasons. A number of philosophers have recently been engaging in a dialogue about the strength of this argumentative strategy and the significance of the criticisms that has been raised against it. In this paper, I identify a specific argument, which I dub the ‘bullet-biting response’ as a crucial element in some recent attacks on the (...)
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  • Companions in Guilt Arguments.Christopher Cowie - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12528.
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