- Information and explanation: an inconsistent triad and solution.Mark Povich - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-17.details
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Memory as Triage: Facing Up to the Hard Question of Memory.Nikola Andonovski - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):227-256.details
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Against neuroclassicism: On the perils of armchair neuroscience.Alex Morgan - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (3):329-355.details
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Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective.Lauren N. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):640-662.details
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Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology.Marek Pokropski - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):869-889.details
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Psychology and Neuroscience: The Distinctness Question.Brice Bantegnie - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1753-1772.details
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When the Sound Becomes the Goal. 4E Cognition and Teleomusicality in Early Infancy.Andrea Schiavio, Dylan van der Schyff, Silke Kruse-Weber & Renee Timmers - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Mechanistic Abstraction.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):686-697.details
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Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science.Marcin Miłkowski - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):13–33.details
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(1 other version)Can Desires Be Causes of Actions?D. A. Browne - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):145-158.details
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(1 other version)Critical notice. [REVIEW]Robert Ware - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):149-168.details
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(1 other version)Mind the Adaptation.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:23-41.details
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Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1037-1059.details
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Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior.John Collins - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625-658.details
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Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):662-673.details
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Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212.details
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Livelli di realtà e descrizioni del mondo.Achille C. Varzi - 2013 - Giornale di Metafisica 35 (2/3):387–404.details
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Introduction: Philosophy in and Philosophy of Cognitive Science.Andrew Brook - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):216-230.details
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Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.details
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The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.details
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(1 other version)Semantic Eliminativism and the Theory-Theory of Linguistic Understanding.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):159-199.details
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Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III: Cross-Categorical Reduction.C. A. Hooker - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (3):496-529.details
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Mind, Brain and Mental Illness.Leslie Stevenson - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (199):27 - 43.details
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Frankenstein's children: Artificial intelligence and human value.Dan Lloyd - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (4):307-318.details
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The (multiple) realization of psychological and other properties in the sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Theoretical problems of cognitive science.Jeff Coulter - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):3 – 26.details
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Computational modeling vs. computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):93 – 115.details
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The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis.James R. Beebe - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.details
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More on Fodor's distinction between strong and weak simulations.Yorick Wilks - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (4):408-411.details
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The supervenience of biological concepts.Alexander Rosenberg - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):368-386.details
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On mechanical recognition.R. J. Nelson - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (1):24-52.details
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Hypothetical identities and ontological economizing: Comments on Causey's program for the unity of science.Robert N. McCauley - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):218-227.details
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In defense of convergent realism.Clyde L. Hardin & Alexander Rosenberg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615.details
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Function attributions and functional explanations.Berent Enç - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (3):343-365.details
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Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function.Jennifer Mundale & William Bechtel - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.details
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Language and psychological reality: A discussion of Rudolf Botha's study.Peter Slezak - 1981 - Synthese 49 (December):427-439.details
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A reply to Jerry Fodor on how the mind works.Steven Pinker - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):33-38.details
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Parallel computation and the mind-body problem.Paul Thagard - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (3):301-18.details
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On Fodor's distinction between strong and weak equivalence in machine simulation.A. Rosenberg & N. J. Mackintosh - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (March):118-120.details
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Strong, weak and functional equivalence in machine simulation.A. Rosenberg & N. J. Mackintosh - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (December):412-414.details
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(1 other version)Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.details
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Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.details
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Functionalism and reductionism.Robert C. Richardson - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):533-58.details
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Is T hinker a Natural Kind?Paul M. Churchland - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (2):223-38.details
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The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.details
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The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.details
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Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar.David Balcarras - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):18-48.details
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Junk, Numerosity, and the Demands of Epistemic Consequentialism.Michal Masny - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Methodological considerations for the mechanistic explanation of illusory representations in the context of psychopathology.Farshad Nemati - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.details
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