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Mental representation from the bottom up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.details
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Real narrow content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.details
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Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable?Jeffrey C. King - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):53-75.details
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The Semantics Latent in Shannon Information.M. C. Isaac Alistair - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):103-125.details
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What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation.Melinda Hogan - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):307-27.details
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Information and the holism of intentional content.Robert Van Gulick - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.details
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Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-50.details
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In the beginning there was information?Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 80:101239.details
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Indication and adaptation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):283-312.details
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Causal Theories of Mental Content: Where is the "Causal Element" and How Does it Make Intentionality Relational?Mindaugas Gilaitis - 2015 - Problemos 87:19-30.details
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Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning.Martha Gibson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.details
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Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge.Marco Facchin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5479-5508.details
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Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology.Eric Dietrich - 1989 - Synthese 79 (April):119-41.details
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Mad dog nativism.Fiona Cowie - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):227-252.details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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Propositional Content in Signalling Systems.Jonathan Birch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.details
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Polytopes as vehicles of informational content in feedforward neural networks.Feraz Azhar - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):697-716.details
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Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.details
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“X” means X: Semantics Fodor-style. [REVIEW]Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (2):175-83.details
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Narrow content: Fodor's folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.details
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Teleosemantics without natural selection.Marshall Abrams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.details
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Philosophy of Language.Walter Ott - 2014 - In Daniel Kaufman (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 354-382.details
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Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.details
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Biomorphism and Models in Design.Cameron Shelley - 2015 - In Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii: Western & Eastern Studies. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Talking about Talking : an Ecological-Enactive Perspective on Language.J. C. Van den Herik - 2019 - Erasmus University Rotterdam.details
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Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Miguel Biscaia Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.details
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Getting a Moral Thing Into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 140-169.details
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Causal theories of mental content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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