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Wondering and Epistemic Desires.Richard Teague - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Wittgenstein's Artillery: Philosophy as Poetry, by James C. Klagge.Julia Tanney - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Why reasons may not be causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.details
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Why Reasons May Not Be Causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1‐2):105-128.details
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Doznania estetyczne Głuchych i słyszących osób dorosłych oglądających interaktywne instalacje w galerii sztuki. Raport z badań pilotażowych.Magdalena Szubielska & Agata Sztorc - 2021 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 12 (3).details
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Pretend play with objects: an ecological approach.Agnes Szokolszky & Catherine Read - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1043-1068.details
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The Abstraction/Representation Account of Computation and Subjective Experience.Jochen Szangolies - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):259-299.details
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Are concepts mental representations or abstracta?John Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1159-1178.details
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Social-Computation-Supporting Kinds.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):862-877.details
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Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.details
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Organisations as Computing Systems.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (2):211-236.details
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Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.details
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Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory?Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):35-71.details
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Why reason? Hugo Mercier's and Dan Sperber's The Enigma of Reason: A New Theory of Human Understanding.Kim Sterelny - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):502-512.details
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Untangling the Knot of Intentionality: Between Directedness, Reference, and Content.Pierre Steiner - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):83-104.details
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The imagery debate.Kim Sterelny - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (December):560-83.details
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Stage models of mental processing and the additive-factor method.Saul Sternberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):82-84.details
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Supermachines and superminds.Eric Steinhart - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (1):155-186.details
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Radical constructivism in biology and cognitive science.John Stewart - 2001 - Foundations of Science 6 (1-3):99-124.details
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Quel Arrière-plan pour l'esprit?Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):419-444.details
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Operant analysis of problem solving: Answers to questions you probably don't want to ask.Robert J. Sternberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605-605.details
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Mental representation: What language is brainese?Kim Sterelny - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (May):365-82.details
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Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science.David G. Stern - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):203-18.details
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Fodor's nativism.Kim Sterelny - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (February):119-41.details
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From folk psychology to cognitive science.Kim Sterelny - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):510 – 519.details
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Davidson on truth and reference.Kim Sterelny - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):95-116.details
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Davidson on Truth and Reference.Kim Sterelny - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):95-116.details
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Connectionist Sentence Processing in Perspective.Mark Steedman - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (4):615-634.details
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Can a reductionist be a pluralist?Daniel Steel - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):55-73.details
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Species, languages, and the horizontal/vertical distinction.David N. Stamos - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (2):171-198.details
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Rule-governed behavior in computational psychology.Edward P. Stabler - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):604-605.details
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Can affordances be reasons?Tobias Starzak & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Buffon, Darwin, and the non-individuality of species – a reply to Jean Gayon.David N. Stamos - 1998 - Biology and Philosophy 13 (3):443-470.details
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The Language of Thought: A New Philosophical Direction, by Susan Schneider.Mark Sprevak - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):555-564.details
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Chinese Rooms and Program Portability.Mark D. Sprevak - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):755-776.details
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Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of What babies know.Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1336-1350.details
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Seizing the Hedgehog by the Tail: Taylor on the Self and Agency.Ronald De Sousa - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):421 - 432.details
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In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):815-837.details
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Evidence for the embodiment of the automatic approach bias.Johannes Solzbacher, Artur Czeszumski, Sven Walter & Peter König - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.details
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The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.details
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Two outbreaks of lawlessness in recent philosophy of biology.Elliott Sober - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):467.details
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The evolution of rationality.Elliott Sober - 1981 - Synthese 46 (January):95-120.details
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Parsimony and predictive equivalence.Elliott Sober - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (2):167 - 197.details
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Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.details
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Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):135-174.details
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