Switch to: References

Citations of:

Why reasons may not be causes

Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126 (1995)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (3):237 - 258.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Philosophie der Soziologie.Simon Lohse & Jens Greve - 2017 - In Simon Lohse & Thomas A. C. Reydon (eds.), Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften. Hamburg, Deutschland: pp. 543-582.
    Die Einleitung unseres Kapitels bietet eine grundsäzliche Charakterisierung der Soziologie und zeichnet einige wichtige historische Entwicklungslinien der Philosophie der Soziologie (PdS) nach. Im Hauptteil werden zentrale ontologische sowie ausgewählte explanatorische Themen der PdS vorgestellt. Im Schlussteil sollen einige aktuelle Diskussionen umrissen werden.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mindlessness Bibliography.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    This file contains the Bibliography of my book Mindlessness.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mindlessness.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dretske on the Causation of Behavior.Constantine Sandis - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
    In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that intentional human behavior is triggered by electro-chemical events but structured by representational facts. In this paper I argue that while this underrated causalist position is considerably more persuasive than the standard causalist alternative, Dretske’s account fails to provide us with a coherent analysis of intentional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Remarks on the “Thickness” of Action Description: With Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Anscombe.Julia Tanney - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):170-177.
    This paper considers insoluble difficulties for the supposition that intentions, “acts of will”, and reasons for acting, construed as mental events, could be the special ingredient that would render bodily movements into voluntary or intentional actions. Yet, the distinction between mere bodily movements and actions is often made by introducing intentions, acts of will, and reasons for acting. How is this to be reconciled? Criticising the tendency to view the “thick descriptions” of everyday discourse through a metaphysical scheme that relies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Belief, Experience and the Act of Picture-Making.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):1-14.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 17, Issue 1, Page 35-48, March 2014.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Critical Notices.[author unknown] - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):253-282.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson’s Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.
    ABSTRACT This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry About Causal Deviance.Karsten R. Stueber - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):24-45.
    This essay will defend a causal conception of action explanations in terms of an agent’s reasons by delineating a metaphysical and epistemic framework that allows us to view folk psychology as providing us with causal and autonomous explanatory strategies of accounting for individual agency. At the same time, I will calm philosophical concerns about the issue of causal deviance that have been at the center of the recent debates between causalist and noncausalist interpretations of action explanations. For that purpose, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rethinking The “Strong Programme” In The Sociology Of Knowledge.Adrian Haddock - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.
    It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations