- 'Could have done otherwise', action sentences and anaphora.Helen Steward - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):95–101.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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Artificial virtuous agents: from theory to machine implementation.Jakob Stenseke - 2021 - AI and Society:1-20.details
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Artificial virtuous agents: from theory to machine implementation.Jakob Stenseke - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (4):1301-1320.details
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What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway).Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.details
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The impertinence of Frankfurt-style argument.Daniel James Speak - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.details
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Papistry: Another defense.Daniel Speak - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):262-268.details
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PAPistry: Another Defense.Daniel Speak - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):262-268.details
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Guest Editor’s Introduction: Leading the Way.Daniel Speak - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):123-128.details
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Causation & Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio.Horacio Spector - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):299-307.details
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Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control.Beatriz Sorrentino Marques - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (1).details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Moral responsibility: The difference of Strawson, and the difference it should make.Andrew Sneddon - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.details
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Alternative motivation and lies.Andrew Sneddon - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):46-52.details
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Subjective rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.details
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Syntactic liars.B. H. Slater - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):107-109.details
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The Two tragedies argument.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (5):304-308.details
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The Moral Significance of Abortion Inconsistency Arguments.William Simkulet - 2021 - Asian Bioethics Review 14 (1):41-56.details
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Possibilites for divine freedom.Simon Kittle - 2016 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4):93-123.details
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Freedom from what? Separating lay concepts of freedom.Claire Simmons, Paul Rehren, John-Dylan Haynes & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103318.details
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Abortion, Property, and Liberty.William Simkulet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):373-383.details
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Author’s Reply: Negligence and Normative Import.Katrina L. Sifferd & Tyler K. Fagan - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):353-371.details
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The real challenge to free will and responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.details
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Revising the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Max Siegel - 2013 - Stance 6 (1):15-20.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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What kinds of alternative possibilities are required of the folk concept(s) of choice?Jason Shepard & Aneyn O’Grady - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:138-148.details
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Short review of Varieties of Meaning, R. G. Millikan. [REVIEW]Nicholas Shea - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):127-130.details
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What must a proof of incompatibilism prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.details
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Why free will remains a mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.details
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The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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Review of Peter van Inwagen's Thinking about Free Will. [REVIEW]Seth Shabo - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):554-557.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.details
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Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.details
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Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe.Seth Shabo - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.details
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Fischer and Ravizza on history and ownership.Seth Shabo - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):103-114.details
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Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement.Elizabeth Shaw - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):1-20.details
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Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.details
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Why causal facts matter: a critique of Jeppsson’s hard-line reply to four-case manipulation arguments.Samantha L. Seybold - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Androids, Oracles and Free Will.Maria Sekatskaya - 2021 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):359-378.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271-283.details
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Vasubandhu, reactive attitudes, and attentional freedom.Aaron Schultz - 2021 - Asian Philosophy 31 (2):178-194.details
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The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts.Sonja Schierbaum - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):171-181.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition.Daniel Schneider - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (5):753-773.details
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Moral responsibility and tourette syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.details
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Kant’s Reply to the Consequence Argument.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):135-158.details
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