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  1. Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Husserl Studies 26 (2):83-106.
    The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to (...)
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  • Enacting Productive Dialogue: Addressing the Challenge That Non-Human Cognition Poses to Collaborations Between Enactivism and Heideggerian Phenomenology.Marilyn Stendera - 2016 - In Jack Reynolds & Richard Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 69-85.
    This chapter uses one particular proposal for interdisciplinary collaboration – in this case, between early Heideggerian phenomenology and enactivist cognitive science – as an example of how such partnerships may confront and negotiate tensions between the perspectives they bring together. The discussion begins by summarising some of the intersections that render Heideggerian and enactivist thought promising interlocutors for each other. It then moves on to explore how Heideggerian enactivism could respond to the challenge of reconciling the significant differences in the (...)
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  • Enactivism, From a Wittgensteinian Point of View.Daniel D. Hutto - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):281-302.
    Enactivists seek to revolutionize the new sciences of the mind. In doing so, they promote adopting a thoroughly anti-intellectualist starting point, one that sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. In advocating the so-called embodied turn, enactivists touch on recurrent themes of central importance in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. More than this, today's enactivists characterize the nature of minds and how they fundamentally relate to the world in ways that not only echo but (...)
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  • Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  • Tchnąć nowe życie w kognitywistykę.Tom Froese - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1).
    [Przekład] W artykule tym opowiadam się za zunifikowaną kognitywistyką, przyjmując dla swej argumentacji niecodzienny punkt wyjścia: stanowisko określane czasem jako „teza o kontinuum życia-umysłu”. Zamiast więc traktować jako pewnik powszechnie akceptowane założenia początkowe, a następnie proponować odpowiedzi na pewne dobrze określone pytania, muszę najpierw dowieść, że koncepcja kontinuum życia-umysłu może w ogóle stanowić właściwy punkt startowy. Zacznę zatem od oceny pojęciowych narzędzi, odpowiednich do budowania teorii umysłu na tej podstawie. Czerpiąc spostrzeżenia z wielu różnych dziedzin – szczególnie z połączenia egzystencjalistycznej (...)
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  • Human Distributed Cognition From an Organism-in-Its-Environment Perspective.Jaime F. Cárdenas-García & Tim Ireland - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (2):265-278.
    The organism-in-its-environment is recognized as the basic unit of analysis when dealing with living beings. This paper seeks to define the fundamental implications of the concept of the organism-in-its-environment in terms of the biosemiotic concept of human distributed cognition. Human distributed cognition in a biosemiotic context is defined as the ability of a self-referencing organism-in-its-environment to interact with its environment to satisfy its physiological and social needs to survive and sustain itself. The ontogenetic development of the organism-in-its-environment serves as the (...)
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  • Absent Aspects, Possible Perceptions and Open Intersubjectivity: A Critical Analysis of Dan Zahavi’s Account of Horizontal Intentionality.Gunnar Declerck - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (4):321-341.
    ABSTRACTThe aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, (...)
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  • On the Role of Social Interaction in Social Cognition: A Mechanistic Alternative to Enactivism.Mitchell Herschbach - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):467-486.
    Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism’s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with an (...)
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  • Dynamic Embodied Cognition.Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  • Enactivism, Second-Person Engagement and Personal Responsibility.Janna van Grunsven - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):131-156.
    Over the course of the past few decades 4E approaches that theorize cognition and agency as embodied, embedded, extended, and/or enactive have garnered growing support from figures working in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Correspondingly, there has been a rising interest in the wider conceptual and practical implications of 4E views. Several proposals have for instance been made regarding 4E’s bearing on ethical theory, 505–526, 2009; Cash, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 645–671 2010). In this paper I contribute (...)
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  • Pre-Reflective Ethical Know-How.Nigel DeSouza - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):279-294.
    In recent years there has been growing attention paid to a kind of human action or activity which does not issue from a process of reflection and deliberation and which is described as, e.g., ‘engaged coping’, ‘unreflective action’, and ‘flow’. Hubert Dreyfus, one of its key proponents, has developed a phenomenology of expertise which he has applied to ethics in order to account for ‘everyday ongoing ethical coping’ or ‘ethical expertise’. This article addresses the shortcomings of this approach by examining (...)
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  • Recurrences and Human Agential Meaning Grounding: Laying a Path in Walking.Sergio Rodríguez - 2016 - Biosemiotics 9 (2):169-184.
    This article addresses the semiotic problem of how meaning is agentially grounded: how actual meaning is possible and is justifiably supported by agents’ capabilities and purposes. This article is particularly focused on human agential grounding; however, to a great degree, insights presented here can be extended to other living beings. Specifically, agential meaning is examined here inside the framework of agentive semiotics and embodied, situated and enactive cognition theories, in line with the mind-life continuity general thesis. To offer clarity and (...)
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  • Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology and the Deep Continuity Between Life and Mind.Paulo De Jesus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):265-289.
    In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism. These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not (...)
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