- Slurring Perspectives.Elisabeth Camp - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.details
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Magic, Alief and Make-Believe.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Willpower as a metaphor.Polaris Koi - 2024 - In David Shoemaker, Santiago Amaya & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 8: Non-Ideal Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.details
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Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.details
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Responsibility for implicitly biased behavior: A habit‐based approach.Josefa Toribio - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):239-254.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Melioristic genealogies and Indigenous philosophies.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2022 - Philosophical Forum (4):1-18.details
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Discovering the virtue of hope.Michael Milona - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):740-754.details
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"How Propaganda Works": An Introduction.Dan Zeman - 2018 - Disputatio 51 (X):275–288.details
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How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):210-223.details
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Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias.Katherine Puddifoot - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):73-93.details
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The Problem of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabó Gendler & Shen-yi Liao - 2015 - In Noël Carroll & John Gibson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. New York: Routledge. pp. 405-418.details
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What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should it Be?David Chalmers - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.details
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Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
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Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):664-682.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 36-57.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.details
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The content of aliefs.Laura Danón - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8503-8520.details
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Reply to Abell’s and Gilmore’s comments on Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: the Shape of Fiction.Greg Currie - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):215-222.details
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Interpretivism and norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.details
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Foundations of a we-perspective.Katja Crone - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-18.details
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Foundations of a we-perspective.Katja Crone - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11815-11832.details
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Moral motivation and the affective appeal.Jennifer Corns & Robert Cowan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):71-94.details
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Replies to: Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):343-352.details
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Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):1-14.details
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On depicting social agents.Herbert H. Clark & Kerstin Fischer - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e51.details
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We believe the error theory.John Alton Christmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):632-644.details
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Two modes of givenness of pre-reflective self-consciousness.Dionysis Christias - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):15-30.details
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Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.details
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Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions?Dario Cecchini - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):31-40.details
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Unconscious Racial Prejudice as Psychological Resistance: A Limitation of the Implicit Bias Model.Lori Gallegos de Castillo - 2018 - Critical Philosophy of Race 6 (2):262-279.details
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False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.details
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Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
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A tese da mente estendida à luz do externismo ativo: Como tornar Otto responsivo a razões?Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2020 - Trans/Form/Ação 43 (3):143-166.details
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Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism.Douglas I. Campbell - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1139-1161.details
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What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.details
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Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):1-28.details
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Rational Inference: The Lowest Bounds.Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):697-724.details
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In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.details
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Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.details
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Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.details
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Implicit biases in visually guided action.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):S3943–S3967.details
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Ethical Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):68-98.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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