- Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.details
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Monuments as commitments: How art speaks to groups and how groups think in art.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):971-994.details
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Games and the art of agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.details
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For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology (2):1-11.details
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Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):1-14.details
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Cultural appropriation and the intimacy of groups.C. Thi Nguyen & Matthew Strohl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):981-1002.details
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Normativity in joint action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):97-120.details
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Corporate Agency -- The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 249-59.details
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Consciousness Incorporated.Philip Pettit - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):12-37.details
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Alignment and commitment in joint action.Matthew Rachar - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):831-849.details
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Constitutive responsibility: Taking part, being part.Robert E. Goodin - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):40-45.details
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How I Learned to Worry about the Spaghetti Western: Collective Responsibility and Collective Agency.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):anx067.details
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The Curious Case of Collective Experience: Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Communal Experience and a Spanish Fire-Walking Ritual.Burns Timothy - 2016 - The Humanistic Psychologist 44 (4):366-380.details
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Sharing the dance – on the reciprocity of movement in the case of elite sports dancers.Jing He & Susanne Ravn - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):99-116.details
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Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.details
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A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.details
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How does it really feel to act together? Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency.Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):449-470.details
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Solitary social belief.John D. Greenwood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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The Normative Significance of Forgiveness.Brandon Warmke - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):687-703.details
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Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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Assertions, joint epistemic actions and social practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.details
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Interpersonal Communication as Social Action.Antonella Carassa & Marco Colombetti - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):407-423.details
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Promises.Allen Habib - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Morality, Friendship, and Collective Action.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Journal of Social Ontology 10.details
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Epistemology of Conversation: First essays.Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.) - forthcoming - Cham: Springer.details
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A group identification account of collective epistemic vices.Rie Iizuka & Kengo Miyazono - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-21.details
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Pluralism About Group Knowledge: A Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (1):39-45.details
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The Logical Structure of Normative Attitudes.José Giromini - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1271-1291.details
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We Believe: Group Belief and the Liturgical use of Creeds.Joshua Cockayne - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3).details
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Commitment engineering: conceptual engineering without representations.Guido Löhr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13035-13052.details
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We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):1-20.details
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Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7003-7030.details
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Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 171-184.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Foundations of a we-perspective.Katja Crone - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-18.details
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Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology.J. Adam Carter & Dario Mortini - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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The Moral Agency of Group Agents.Christopher Thompson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):517-538.details
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The Existential Quality Issue in Social Ontology: Eidetics and Modifications of Essential Connections.Francesca De Vecchi - 2016 - Humana Mente (16):187-204.details
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Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.details
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Second person thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.details
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Intellectual arrogance: individual, group-based, and corporate.Alessandra Tanesini - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-20.details
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First-Person Plural Indexicals.Arthur Sullivan & Robert J. Stainton - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (66):271-304.details
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Group belief reconceived.Jeroen de Ridder - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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(1 other version)Motor representation in acting together.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-16.details
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Entre Nous: Charles Taylor’s Social Ontology.Arto Laitinen - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (5):723-737.details
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Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (1):63-83.details
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Statistically responsible artificial intelligences.Smith Nicholas & Darby Vickers - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):483-493.details
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