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  1. Epistemic Oppression and Ableism in Bioethics.Christine Wieseler - 2020 - Hypatia 35 (4):714-732.
    Disabled people face obstacles to participation in epistemic communities that would be beneficial for making sense of our experiences and are susceptible to epistemic oppression. Knowledge and skills grounded in disabled people's experiences are treated as unintelligible within an ableist hermeneutic, specifically, the dominant conception of disability as lack. My discussion will focus on a few types of epistemic oppression—willful hermeneutical ignorance, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic imperialism—as they manifest in some bioethicists’ claims about and interactions with disabled people. One of (...)
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  • Disability and the Goods of Life.Stephen M. Campbell, Sven Nyholm & Jennifer K. Walter - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):704-728.
    The so-called Disability Paradox arises from the apparent tension between the popular view that disability leads to low well-being and the relatively high life-satisfaction reports of disabled people. Our aim in this essay is to make some progress toward dissolving this alleged paradox by exploring the relationship between disability and various “goods of life”—that is, components of a life that typically make a person’s life go better for her. We focus on four widely recognized goods of life (happiness, rewarding relationships, (...)
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  • What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but…” Reasoning?Jason Marsh - 2020 - In Adam Cureton & David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. Oxford University Press.
    Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are happy are worrisome because they threaten everyone’s well-being (...)
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  • Prostitution, disability and prohibition.Frej Klem Thomsen - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (6):451-459.
    Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and analyses three (...)
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  • Health, Disability, and Well-Being.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge.
    Much academic work (in philosophy, economics, law, etc.), as well as common sense, assumes that ill health reduces well-being. It is bad for a person to become sick, injured, disabled, etc. Empirical research, however, shows that people living with health problems report surprisingly high levels of well-being - in some cases as high as the self-reported well-being of healthy people. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between health and well-being. I argue that although we have good reason to believe (...)
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  • Why Intellectual Disability is Not Mere Difference.James B. Gould - 2022 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (3):495-509.
    A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall—any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes’s Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad—by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (...)
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  • Well-being, Disability, and Choosing Children.Matthew J. Barker & Robert A. Wilson - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):305-328.
    The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...)
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  • A life worth giving? The threshold for permissible withdrawal of life support from disabled newborn infants.Dominic James Wilkinson - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (2):20 - 32.
    When is it permissible to allow a newborn infant to die on the basis of their future quality of life? The prevailing official view is that treatment may be withdrawn only if the burdens in an infant's future life outweigh the benefits. In this paper I outline and defend an alternative view. On the Threshold View, treatment may be withdrawn from infants if their future well-being is below a threshold that is close to, but above the zero-point of well-being. I (...)
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  • A critical view on using “life not worth living” in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.Agnes Elisabeth Kandlbinder - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (2):189-203.
    This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be (...)
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  • Disability, Epistemic Harms, and the Quality-Adjusted Life Year.Laura M. Cupples - 2020 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 13 (1):46-62.
    Health policymakers employ utility measures to inform resource allocation decisions. They often rely on a conceptual tool called the quality-adjusted life year that discounts the value of years lived in a state of disability relative to years lived in full health. A representative sample of the general public is asked to place values on hypothetical health states as part of a standard gamble or time trade-off task. Policymakers use the resulting values to calculate the number of QALYs gained through particular (...)
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  • A Disability Critique of the Comparative View.Rebecca Mueller, Amber Knight, Sandy Sufian & Rosemarie Garland-Thomson - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (8):40-42.
    Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 40-42.
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  • Is disability mere difference?Greg Bognar - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):46-49.
    Some philosophers and disability advocates argue that disability is not bad for you. Rather than treated as a harm, it should be considered and even celebrated as just another manifestation of human diversity. Disability is mere difference. To most of us, these are extraordinary claims. Can they be defended?
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  • How Disability Activism Advances Disability Bioethics.Joseph A. Stramondo - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):335-349.
    In this paper, I argue that, even when disability rights activists are most clearly acting as activists, they can advance the scholarly activity of disability bioethics. In particular, I will argue that even engaging in non-violent direct action, including civil disobedience, is an important way in which disability rights activists directly support the efforts of disability bioethics scholars. I will begin by drawing upon Hilde Lindemann’s work on relational narrative identity to describe how certain damaging master narratives about disability hinder (...)
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  • Adaptive preferences: merging political accounts and well-being accounts.Rosa Terlazzo - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):179-196.
    Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, (...)
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  • Operationalizing the Intolerable Suffering Criterion in Advance Requests for Medical Assistance in Dying for People Living with Dementia in Canada.Hayden P. Nix - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-7.
    In Canada, there is interest in expanding medical assistance in dying (MAID) to include advance requests (AR) for people living with dementia (PLWD). However, operationalizing the intolerable suffering criterion for MAID in ARs for PLWD is complicated by the Canadian legal context—in which MAID is understood as a medical intervention and suffering is conceptualized as subjective—and the degenerative nature of dementia. ARs that express a wish to receive MAID when the PLWD develops pre-specified impairments are problematic because people are unlikely (...)
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  • Disability bioethics and the commitment to equality.Laura Guidry-Grimes - 2022 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 43 (4):209-220.
    Robert Veatch’s The Foundations of Justice: Why the Retarded and the Rest of Us Have Claims to Equality delves into deep questions of justice through the case of a child with disabilities. I describe what is basically right about this vision, as well as what is problematic from the standpoint of contemporary disability bioethics. From there, I dive into the notion of vulnerability that is at play in his work. He describes disability as necessarily a condition of weakness, lesser-than existence, (...)
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  • Obscured Social Construction as Epistemic Harm.Melinda C. Hall - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (3):344-358.
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  • Perception of Value and the Minimally Conscious State.Stephen Napier - 2015 - HEC Forum 27 (3):265-286.
    The “disability paradox” is the idea that for those who become severely disabled, their own quality of life assessment remains at or slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. I argue here that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the minimally conscious state. For rather simple means of sustaining an MCS patient’s life, the cost of being wrong that the patient would not (...)
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