- Perception, discrimination, and knowledge.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):39-53.details
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Perception and evidence.Alex Byrne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170:101-113.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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Rigor or rhetoric: philosopher and public in dialogue.Deven Burks - 2018 - Perspectives 8 (1):4-13.details
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Disjunctivism again.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.details
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Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education.Luke A. Buckland - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):103-110.details
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Gettier Made ESEE.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (3):368-383.details
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Purifying impure virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.details
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Knowledge, safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.details
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Is Safety In Danger?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):1-19.details
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Is lucky belief justified?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.details
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Anti-luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):733-754.details
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A robust enough virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck.Adam Michael Bricker - 2019 - Synthese (8):1-18.details
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I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):24-43.details
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“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking.Michael H. Brill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):23-24.details
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Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
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Truth and weak knowledge in goldman’s veritistic social epistemology.Elke Brendel - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):3-17.details
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Contextualist approaches to epistemology: Problems and prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.details
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Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation.Gwen Bradford - 2014 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):97-116.details
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Epistemological contextualism: Problems and prospects.Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):161-171.details
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A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems.Darren Bradley - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (7):379-393.details
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What Realism Implies and What it Does Not.Richard Boyd - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1‐2):5-29.details
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Testifying understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):103-127.details
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Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.details
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Environmental luck and the structure of understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):73-87.details
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Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism.Kenneth Boyd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1907-1927.details
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Knowledge from Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):283 - 297.details
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Traditional epistemology and naturalistic replies to its skeptical critics.James Bogen - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):195 - 224.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Determining what is perceived.Radu J. Bogdan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):66-67.details
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The relevant alternatives theory and missed clues.T. Black - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):96 – 106.details
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RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.details
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Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.details
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II—E pistemic V alue, A chievements, and Q uestions.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.details
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In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.details
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II—Martijn Blaauw: Epistemic Value, achievements, and Questions.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.details
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A Moorean response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism.T. Black - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):148 – 163.details
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A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology.Tim Black - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):85-97.details
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Knowledge Second.Adam Bjorndahl - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):471-487.details
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Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.details
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Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind.Sven Bernecker - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):1-34.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness.Sven Bernecker - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1623-1638.details
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Justified Evidence Resistance.Sven Bernecker - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-12.details
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Against global method safety.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116.details
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Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):225-237.details
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