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Epistemology's psychological turn.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 1992 - Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):47-56.details
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Taking ‘know’ for an answer: A reply to Nagel, San Juan, and Mar.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):662-665.details
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Relevant alternatives, contextualism included.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65.details
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On the “content” and “relevance” of information-theoretic epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):79-81.details
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Relevant possibilities.Joshua Allen Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.details
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Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Western Skeptic vs Indian Realist. Cross-Cultural Differences in Zebra Case Intuitions.Krzysztof Sękowski, Adrian Ziółkowski & Maciej Tarnowski - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):711-733.details
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The Cohen problem of informed consent.William Simkulet - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (9):617-622.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.details
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Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138-155.details
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Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.details
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From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.details
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Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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Some untoward consequences of Dretske's “causal theory” of information.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-79.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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A virtude do saber-como.Felipe Rocha L. Santos - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):483-499.details
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Justification Upgrading and the Knowledge Baseline.Kateryna Samoilova - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):512-523.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions.Patrick Rysiew - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):477–514.details
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Rationality disputes – psychology and epistemology.Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.details
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Motivating the relevant alternatives approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.details
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Knowledge by indifference.Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.details
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The sufficiency of information-caused belief for knowledge.Bede Rundle - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-78.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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Can information be de-cognitized?William W. Rozeboom - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):76-77.details
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Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.details
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Maddy and Mathematics: Naturalism or Not.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):423-450.details
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Kitcher, mathematics, and naturalism.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):481 – 497.details
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Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702.details
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Concept grounding and knowledge of set theory.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):179-193.details
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A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher’s Epistemology of Science.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205-223.details
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Inner Achievement.Guy Rohrbaugh - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1191-1204.details
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Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):29-53.details
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Crença verdadeira mais informação adequada: Fortalecendo a visão de Foley.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs (nº 3):548-565.details
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Brandom, Hegel and inferentialism.Tom Rockmore - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (4):429 – 447.details
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A simple theory of conditionals.Adam Rieger - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):233-240.details
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Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.details
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A Pragmatist Theory of Evidence.Julian Reiss - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):341-362.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Accidental truth and accidental justification.Baron Reed - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):57-67.details
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A new argument for skepticism.Baron Reed - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.details
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Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.details
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