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Moral dilemmas

New York: Oxford Uiversity Press (1987)

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  1. Moral dilemmas.Terrance McConnell - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (1 other version)Deontic logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Introduction to: Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science.Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken - 1999 - In Henry Prakken & Paul McNamara (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. Amsterdam/Oxford/Tokyo/Washington DC: IOS Press. pp. 1-14.
    (See also the separate entry for the volume itself.) This introduction has three parts. The first providing an overview of some main lines of research in deontic logic: the emergence of SDL, Chisholm's paradox and the development of dyadic deontic logics, various other puzzles/challenges and areas of development, along with philosophical applications. The second part focus on some actual and potential fruitful interactions between deontic logic, computer science and artificial intelligence. These include applications of deontic logic to AI knowledge representation (...)
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  • Experimental Design: Ethics, Integrity and the Scientific Method.Jonathan Lewis - 2020 - In Ron Iphofen (ed.), Handbook of Research Ethics and Scientific Integrity. Springer. pp. 459-474.
    Experimental design is one aspect of a scientific method. A well-designed, properly conducted experiment aims to control variables in order to isolate and manipulate causal effects and thereby maximize internal validity, support causal inferences, and guarantee reliable results. Traditionally employed in the natural sciences, experimental design has become an important part of research in the social and behavioral sciences. Experimental methods are also endorsed as the most reliable guides to policy effectiveness. Through a discussion of some of the central concepts (...)
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  • Commitment and states of mind with mood and modality.Alex Silk - 2018 - Natural Language Semantics 26 (2):125-166.
    This paper develops an account of mood selection with attitude predicates in French. I start by examining the “contextual commitment” account of mood developed by Portner and Rubinstein Proceedings of SALT 22, CLC Publications, Ithaca, NY, pp 461–487, 2012). A key innovation of Portner and Rubinstein’s account is to treat mood selection as fundamentally depending on a relation between individuals’ attitudes and the predicate’s modal backgrounds. I raise challenges for P&R’s qualitative analysis of contextual commitment and explanations of mood selection. (...)
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  • THE SNAKE AND THE ROUNDABOUT: ETHICAL PARTICULARISM AND THE PATTERNS OF NORMATIVE INDUCTION.R. Kellogg Frederic - 2016 - DUC IN ALTUM CADERNOS DE DIREITO 8 (16).
    Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless particularist context (...)
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  • The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal.Michael Cholbi - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.
    The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism (...)
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  • Moral dilemmas.Shyam Nair - 2015 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions.
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  • Blaming Agents in Moral Dilemmas.Byron Williston - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):563-576.
    Some philosophers – notably Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum and Ruth Barcan Marcus – argue that agents in moral dilemmas are blameworthy whatever they do. I begin by uncovering the connection these philosophers are presupposing between the agent’s judgement of wrongdoing and her tendency to self-blame. Next, I argue that while dilemmatic choosers cannot help but see themselves as wrongdoers, they both can and should divorce this judgement from an ascription of self-blame. As I argue, dilemmatic choosers are morally sui generis (...)
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  • A paradox concerning Frankfurt examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):87-103.
    The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence: ‘Ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible.’ OIC: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ implies ‘can refrain from.’ BRI: Necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if it is overall morally impermissible for one to do it. Since Equivalence seems unassailable, one can escape the inconsistency by renouncing any one of the other (...)
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  • Moral Understandings: Alternative “Epistemology” for a Feminist Ethics.Margaret Urban Walker - 1989 - Hypatia 4 (2):15-28.
    Work on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral “epistemology,” identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.
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  • Conflicting reasons, unconflicting ‘ought’s.Shyam Nair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
    One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2006 - In Dov Gabbay & John Woods (eds.), The Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 7: Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century. Elsevier Press. pp. 197-288.
    Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic.
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  • Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations.Shyam Nair - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):753-790.
    Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...)
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  • A Dispositional Account of Conflicts of Obligation.Luke Robinson - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):203-228.
    I address a question in moral metaphysics: How are conflicts between moral obligations possible? I begin by explaining why we cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question simply by positing that such conflicts are conflicts between rules, principles, or reasons. I then develop and defend the “Dispositional Account,” which posits that conflicts between moral obligations are conflicts between the manifestations of obligating dispositions (obligating powers, capacities, etc.), just as conflicts between physical forces are conflicts between the manifestations of (certain) (...)
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  • Moral Compromise and Personal Integrity: Exploring the Ethical Issues of Deciding Together in Organizations.Jerry D. Goodstein - 2000 - Business Ethics Quarterly 10 (4):805-819.
    Abstract:In this paper I explore the topic of moral compromise in institutional settings and highlight how moral compromise may affirm, rather than undermine, personal integrity. Central to this relationship between moral compromise and integrity is a view of the self that is responsive to multiple commitments and grounded in an ethic of responsibility. I elaborate a number of virtues that are related to this notion of the self and highlight how these virtues may support the development of individuals who are (...)
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  • Idealizing Morality.Lisa Tessman - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (4):797 - 824.
    Implicit in feminist and other critiques of ideal theorizing is a particular view of what normative theory should be like. Although I agree with the rejection of ideal theorizing that oppression theorists (and other theorists of justice) have advocated, the proposed alternative of nonideal theorizing is also problematic. Nonideal theorizing permits one to address oppression by first describing (nonideal) oppressive conditions, and then prescribing the best action that is possible or feasible given the conditions. Borrowing an insight from the "moral (...)
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  • Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
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  • Tragic-remorse–the anguish of dirty hands.Stephen De Wijze - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):453-471.
    This paper outlines and defends a notion of tragic-remorse. This moral emotion properly accompanies those actions that involve unavoidable moral wrongdoing in general and dirty hands scenarios in particular. Tragic-remorse differs both phenomenologically and conceptually from regret, agent-regret and remorse. By recognising the existence of tragic-remorse, we are better able to account for our complex moral reality which at times makes it necessary for good persons to act in ways that although justified leave the agent with a moral stain and (...)
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  • Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...)
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  • The debate over the so-called reality of moral dilemmas.Daniel Statman - 1990 - Philosophical Papers 19 (3):191-211.
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  • Ought but Cannot.Wayne Martin - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):103 - 128.
    I assess a series of arguments intended to show that 'ought' implies 'can'. Two are rooted in uses of 'ought' in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources of deontic logic. I show that, in each case, the arguments leave scope for forms of infinite moral consciousness—forms of moral consciousness in which a moral obligation retains its authority even in the face of the conviction that the obligation is impossible to fulfil. In this respect the (...)
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  • Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
    Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of prudence: perhaps (...)
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  • Breaking ties: The significance of choice in symmetrical moral dilemmas.Carla Bagnoli - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):157–170.
    In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, but it does not really resolve the moral (...)
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  • (1 other version)VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.
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  • Slote on rational dilemmas and rational supererogation.Joe Mintoff - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):111-126.
    The so-called optimising conception of rationality includes (amongst other things) the following two claims: (i) that it is irrational to choose an option if you know there is a better one, and (ii) there are no situations in which an agent, through no practical fault of her own, cannot avoid acting irrationally. As part of his ongoing attempt to explain why we need to go beyond the optimising conception, Michael Slote discusses a number of examples in which it seems that (...)
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  • Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  • Institutionally Driven Moral Conflicts and Managerial Action: Dirty Hands or Permissible Complicity?Rosemarie Monge - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 129 (1):161-175.
    This paper examines what managers ought to do when confronted with apparent moral conflicts between their managerial responsibilities and the general requirements of morality, specifically when those conflicts are driven by the institutional environment. I examine Google’s decision to enter the Chinese search engine market as an example of such a conflict. I consider the view that Google’s managers engaged in justifiable moral compromise in making the choice to engage in self-censorship and show how this view depends on the idea (...)
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  • Constitutional Conflicts, Moral Dilemmas, and Legal Solutions.Silvina Alvarez - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (1):59-74.
    The article focuses on the definition of constitutional conflicts as moral dilemmas. It discusses the conception of tragic conflicts by which “loss” is a distinctive feature that identifies both moral and constitutional dilemmas. It also asserts the peculiarity of constitutional conflicts vis-à-vis moral dilemmas, as well as the possibility of legal solutions to constitutional conflicts.
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  • Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'.Lou Goble - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):450-489.
    On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and (...)
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  • Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness.Chris Bessemans - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (4):563-587.
    By making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist (...)
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  • Layered Constructivism: The Plural Sources of Practical Reasons.Laura Engel - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1721-1744.
    Constructivism as a distinct metaethical position has garnered significant interest in recent years due in part to Sharon Street’s theory, Humean metaethical constructivism. According to Street’s account, practical reasons are constructed by individual valuing entities. On this view, then, whether a particular reason applies to an individual is completely contingent upon what that individual actually values. In this article I argue for the recognition of multiple sources of practical reasons and values, including both individuals and communities. The resulting view, which (...)
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  • No Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics.András Szigeti - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):845-862.
    Many believe that values are crucially dependent on emotions. This paper focuses on epistemic aspects of the putative link between emotions and value by asking two related questions. First, how exactly are emotions supposed to latch onto or track values? And second, how well suited are emotions to detecting or learning about values? To answer the first question, the paper develops the heuristics-model of emotions. This approach models emotions as sui generis heuristics of value. The empirical plausibility of the heuristics-model (...)
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  • 'Ought' and Ability.Peter A. Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):337-382.
    A principle that many have found attractive is one that goes by the name “'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” According to this principle, one morally ought to do something only if one can do it. This essay has two goals: to show that the principle is false and to undermine the motivations that have been offered for it. Toward the end, a proposal about moral obligation according to which something like a restricted version of 'Ought' Implies 'Can' is true is floated. Though (...)
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  • Moral Ambivalence, Relativism, and Pluralism.Agustín Vicente & Agustín Arrieta - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):207-223.
    David Wong has introduced the notion of moral ambivalence in the philosophical debate. In this paper, we focus on the nature of moral ambivalence and on its interpretation. We hold that moral ambivalence is not a phenomenon that provides evidence for relativism, as Wong claims, and as relativism is usually understood. Rather, ambivalence denotes a pluralist attitude, an attitude characterized by the thought that two different, even incompatible, courses of action can both be permissible when considered from a single perspective. (...)
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  • For example. On the methodological status of case studies in applied ethics.Bert Heinrichs - 2008 - Ethik in der Medizin 20 (1):40-52.
    Case studies, both with a view to didactical and argumentative purposes, are widely used in applied ethics. However, case studies are often used without methodological considerations concerning the premises and limitations of these kind of studies as methodological tools within ethics. The present paper critically examines the recourse to – real or fictitious – case studies. Important suggestions will be taken from Kant’s philosophy. Kant himself occasionally uses case studies in his ethical writings. Yet, he also discusses the relevance as (...)
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  • Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.
    The focus of this study is cognitive choice: the selection of one cognitive option (a hypothesis, a theory, or an axiom, for instance) rather than another. The study proposes that cognitive choice should be based on the plausibilities of states posited by rival cognitive options and the utilities of these options' information outcomes. The proposal introduces a form of decision theory that is novel because comparative; it permits many choices among cognitive options to be based on merely comparative plausibilities and (...)
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  • Political ethics in illiberal regimes: A realist interpretation.Zoltán Gábor Szűcs - 2023 - Manchester University Press.
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  • Methodological dilemmas and emotion in science.James W. McAllister - 2014 - Synthese 191 (13):3143-3158.
    Inconsistencies in science take several forms. Some occur at the level of substantive claims about the world. Others occur at the level of methodology, and take the form of dilemmas, or cases of conflicting epistemic or cognitive values. In this article, I discuss how methodological dilemmas arise. I then consider how scientists resolve them. There are strong grounds for thinking that emotional judgement plays an important role in resolving methodological dilemmas. Lastly, I discuss whether and under what conditions this reliance (...)
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  • Is the Self-Interest Theory Self-Defeating?Joseph Mintoff - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (1):35-.
    Derek Parfit is surely right when he says, at the beginning of Reasons and Persons, that many of us want to know what we have most reason to do. Several theories attempt to answer this question, and Parfit begins his discussion with the best-known case: the Self-interest Theory, or S. When applied to actions, S claims that “ What each of us has most reason to do is whatever would be best for himself, and It is irrational for anyone to (...)
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  • Deep moral dilemmas.Douglas Odegard - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):73-86.
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  • Expressivism and Moral Dilemmas: A Response to Marino.Carl Baker - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):445-455.
    Simon Blackburn’s expressivist logic of attitudes aims to explain how we can use non-assertoric moral judgements in logically valid arguments. Patricia Marino has recently argued that Blackburn’s logic faces a dilemma: either it cannot account for the place of moral dilemmas in moral reasoning or, if it can, it makes an illicit distinction between two different kinds of moral dilemma. Her target is the logic’s definition of validity as satisfiability, according to which validity requires an avoidance of attitudinal inconsistency. Against (...)
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  • Jefte w tarapatach: Moralne dylematy a teizm.William E. Mann - 2017 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (4):351-381.
    Artykuł omawia zjawisko dylematów moralnych z perspektywy teistycznej. Teiści przyjmują często, że (1) opatrznościowy Bóg nigdy nie postawiłby stworzonej przez siebie istoty przed taką sytuacją wyboru, w której owa istota nie jest w stanie uniknąć czynu niesłusznego, bądź że (2)jeśli istota staje przed taką sytuacją wyboru, to jest to wynikiem pewnego niesłusznego działania, którego dokonałajuż wcześniej. Wielu komentatorów przypisuje tę drugą opcję Tomaszowi z Akwinu. Autor argumentuje, że taka interpretacjajest błędna, przytaczając między innymi przeprowadzoną przez Akwinatę analizę ślubowania Jeftego opisanego (...)
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  • Zum Beispiel. Über den methodologischen Stellenwert von Fallbeispielen in der Angewandten Ethik.Dr Bert Heinrichs - 2008 - Ethik in der Medizin 20 (1):40-52.
    Die Verwendung von Fallbeispielen, sowohl in didaktisch-illustrativer als auch in systematisch-argumentativer Absicht, ist in der Angewandten Ethik eine weitverbreitete Praxis. Die Inanspruchnahme erfolgt jedoch vielfach ohne eine angemessene Reflexion über die Voraussetzungen und Grenzen des Einsatzes von Fallbeispielen als methodischem Werkzeug innerhalb der Ethik. Im vorliegenden Beitrag soll daher der Rekurs auf konkrete – reale oder fiktive – Handlungsszenarien kritisch untersucht werden. Wichtige Hinweise werden dabei der Philosophie Kants entnommen, der selbst in seinen moralphilosophischen Schriften gelegentlich Beispiele verwendet, der aber (...)
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  • It's good to talk: Deliberative institutions for environmental policy.Jonathan Aldred - 2002 - Philosophy and Geography 5 (2):133 – 152.
    Most applications of cost-benefit analysis in environmental policy, and almost all the controversial cases, involve the use of contingent valuation (CV) surveys. There is now a relatively well-developed critique of CV as a method of public consultation on environmental issues. Theories of deliberative democracy have been invoked which question the individualistic, preference-based calculus of CV. A particular deliberative institution which has recently received much attention is the citizens' jury (CJ). While CJs and other deliberative institutions have come to be regarded (...)
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  • Constitutional Dilemmas and Balancing.David Martínez Zorrilla - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (3):347-363.
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  • Is Justice Binary?: A Free-Will-Related Exploration.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):476-487.
    This article asks whether justice is binary, whether matters are either-or with respect to it. This question has been inexplicably neglected, and the elementary conceptual work has not been done. We consider this question through exploring the implications of free-will-related justice. We see that there are actually two questions of very different scope here, and that two distinct notions of binarity need to be distinguished. In the process, the plausibility of considering justice as a binary notion is evaluated.
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