- Are Algorithms Value-Free?Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2023 - Journal Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):1-35.details
|
|
Epistemology and Radically Extended Cognition.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):459-478.details
|
|
Knowledge and normality.Joachim Horvath & Jennifer Nado - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11673-11694.details
|
|
Diachronic agency and practical entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.details
|
|
Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.details
|
|
The New Evil Demon Problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
Sosa on the New Evil Demon Problem.Peter J. Graham - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (2):295-310.details
|
|
Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
|
|
Perceptual entitlement and basic beliefs.Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):467-475.details
|
|
Formulating reductionism about testimonial warrant and the challenge from childhood testimony.Peter J. Graham - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3013-3033.details
|
|
Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.details
|
|
Against transglobal reliabilism.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.details
|
|
Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.details
|
|
The real epistemic problem of cognitive penetration.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1457-1475.details
|
|
Norman and truetemp revisited reliabilistically: A proper functionalist defeat account of clairvoyance.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Episteme 13 (1):89-110.details
|
|
How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.details
|
|
The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
|
|
Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):3-25.details
|
|
Outsourced cognition.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.details
|
|
Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
|
|
A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism.Mikkel Gerken - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):259-275.details
|
|
The presumption of assurance.Paul Faulkner - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6391-6406.details
|
|
Rationalizing Socrates’ daimonion.Bridger Ehli - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):225-240.details
|
|
‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
|
|
Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.details
|
|
Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs (4):867-890.details
|
|
Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.details
|
|
Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
|
|
Dodging the Perils of Dogmatism: A Response to Crispin Wright.Tim Butzer - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):549-569.details
|
|
Entitlement, calamities and content: an objection to Tyler Burge's perceptual epistemology.Tim Butzer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Over What Range Should Reliabilists Measure Reliability?Stefan Buijsman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
|
|
Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2259–2276.details
|
|
A robust enough virtue epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
|
|
In Defense of Proper Functionalism: Cognitive Science Takes on Swampman.Kenny Boyce & Andrew Moon - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2987–3001.details
|
|
Knowledge and Attributability.Cameron Boult - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):329-350.details
|
|
Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4065-4081.details
|
|
Excuses, exemptions, and derivative norms.Cameron Boult - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):150-158.details
|
|
Tracking Eudaimonia.Paul Bloomfield - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (2).details
|
|
What Logical Evidence Could not be.Matteo Baggio - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2559–2587.details
|
|
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism.Matteo Baggio - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-27.details
|
|
The Function of Perception.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Synthese Library. pp. 13-31.details
|
|
Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?Milena Ivanova - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Cham: Synthese Library. pp. 207-226.details
|
|
Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Ernest Sosa & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge. pp. 121-144.details
|
|
Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
|
|
Function, Fitness, Flourishing.Paul Bloomfield - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 264-292.details
|
|
What's Wrong With Testimony? Defending the Epistemic Analogy between Testimony and Perception.Peter Graham - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.details
|
|
A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
|
|