- Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics.Damian Szmuc, Bruno Da Re & Federico Pailos - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):712-746.details
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(1 other version)What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.details
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To Reduce Nothingness into a Reference by Falsity.Hazhir Roshangar - manuscriptdetails
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Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities.Susanne Bobzien - 2017 - In Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University. pp. 71-113.details
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How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.details
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
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Finite Circular Definitions.Anil Gupta - 2008 - In Thomas Bolander (ed.), Self-reference. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 79-93.details
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On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.details
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On Pathological Truths.Damian Szmuc & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):601-617.details
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Maximally Consistent Sets of Instances of Naive Comprehension.Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi - 2017 - Mind 126 (502).details
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(1 other version)Presuppositions, Logic, and Dynamics of Belief.Slavko Brkic - 2004 - Prolegomena 3 (2):151-177.details
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The truth is sometimes simple.Philip Kremer - manuscriptdetails
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More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.details
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On revision operators.P. D. Welch - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):689-711.details
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Property theory and the revision theory of definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.details
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Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.details
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Paradoxes and the limits of theorizing about propositional attitudes.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 5):1075-1094.details
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Sentential Truth, Denominalization, and the Liar: Aspects of the Modest Account of Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (3):527-537.details
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Self-referential propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5023-5037.details
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The pathology of validity.James A. Woodbridge & Bradley Armour-Garb - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):63-74.details
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Supervaluation on Trees for Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):46-74.details
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Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.details
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The foundational problem of logic.Gila Sher - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (2):145-198.details
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Antithetical Arts. [REVIEW]Jenefer Robinson - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):139-143.details
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On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.details
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A guide to truth predicates in the modern era.Michael Sheard - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):1032-1054.details
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Theories of truth and convention T.Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-16.details
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Expresabilidad, validez y recursos lógicos.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2014 - Critica 46 (138):3-36.details
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Truth, Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes.Francesco Orilia & Gregory Landini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):113-136.details
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In Defence of Radical Restrictionism.David Liggins - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):3-25.details
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Truth, Hierarchy and Incoherence.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - In Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University.details
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Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.details
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Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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(1 other version)Contre la déflation de la vérité.François Rivenc - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):517-528.details
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Proving Unprovability.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1):92–115.details
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Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.details
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Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.details
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Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.details
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On the Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-20.details
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The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics.Hendrik Lorenz - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):119-122.details
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Ultimate truth vis- à- vis stable truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.details
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(1 other version)Intuitive consequences of the revision theory of truth.Michael Kremer - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):330–336.details
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Articulation and Liars.Sergi Oms - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):383-399.details
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The Complexity of the Dependence Operator.P. D. Welch - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):337-340.details
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Truth, logical validity and determinateness: A commentary on field’s saving truth from paradox.P. D. Welch - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):348-359.details
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Burge on Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.details
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Remarks on the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property for k-valued clones.José Martínez-Fernández - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):118-131.details
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Modality and axiomatic theories of truth I: Friedman-Sheard.Johannes Stern - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):273-298.details
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Modality in Brandom's Incompatibility Semantics.Giacomo Turbanti - 2011 - In María Inés Crespo, Dimitris Gakis & Galit Weidman-Sassoon (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Conference - Truth, Meaning, and Normativity. ILLC Publications.details
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Too Good to be “Just True”.Marcus Rossberg - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.details
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