*Honorable Mention for the 2024 American Association of Philosophy Teachers (AAPT) Lenssen Prize*: In recent years, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ [PWOL] courses have emerged as an exciting new pedagogical approach. I explain what a PWOL-course is. Next, I argue that the standard method for teaching such courses—what I call the ‘Smorgasbord Model’—presents us with a basic problem: viz., the challenge of how to enable students in the context of the modern university to truly experience what a PWOL even (...) is. I propose a solution to this problem by exploring a PWOL that most teachers and students alike already find themselves immersed in, what I describe as political liberalism applied to the university classroom context. I show how this overlooked fact not only offers us a novel resource for teaching PWOL-courses. It also helps philosophy teachers—in a meta-pedagogical sense—to become more self-reflective about and appreciative of our fundamental ethical commitments when teaching philosophy. (shrink)

پی‌‌یر آدو فیلسوفِ فرانسوی معاصر‌‌، با ارائه مدلِ فلسفه به مثابه روشِ زندگی که حاصل سال‌ها پژوهش او در زمینۀ فلسفۀ باستان است‌‌، پویایی و حیاتِ حقیقی فلسفه را در زندگیِ روزمرۀ فیلسوف نشان می‌دهد. در این مقاله با استفاده از این مدلِ فلسفی به بررسی رابطۀ علم و عمل در حکمتِ اشراق خواهیم پرداخت. یکی از عناصر مهم در این مدلِ، گفتارِ فلسفی است. ارزشِ گفتار در مکاتبِ فلسفی‌‌، از نظرِ آدو در خدمتی است که به بهبودِ کیفیت زندگی (...) و عملکرد و رفتارِ انسان می‌کند. سهروردی نیز به اهمیت حکمتِ نظری به عنوان مقدمه و راهنما در برگزیدن شیوۀ زندگی اشراقی تأکید می‌کند. به همین دلیل در این مقاله ابتدا به بررسی جایگاهِ گفتار در مکاتبِ فلسفیِ دورانِ باستان - با استفاده از مدلِ فلسفه به مثابه روشِ زندگی - می‌پردازیم تا تصویری واضح از ارتباط میانِ گفتار و عمل در مکاتبِ فلسفی ارائه دهیم و در نهایت‌‌، بتوانیم دیدگاه آدو را نسبت به ارتباطِ میان گفتار و عمل نشان دهیم. در پایان به بررسی اهمیتِ گفتار در حکمتِ اشراق سهروردی و کاربردِ آن - به عنوان مقدمه‌ای ضروری برای ورود و انتخاب ِزندگیِ اشراقی و هدایت سالکِ اشراقی در مسیر زندگی و درکِ حکمتِ عملی و کسبِ آن - خواهیم پرداخت. (shrink)

سیمون وی بیش از هر فیلسوف و عارفی به توجه التفات داشته است. تفکرات او درباره توجه صرفاً یک مسئله شناختی، علمی یا روان‌شناختی نیست، بلکه تأثیرات مستقیم و دامنه‌داری در آموزش، الهیات و حتی سیاست دارد. او توجه را به عنوان یک روش زندگی چه در سطح فردی و چه در سطح سیاسی-اجتماعی معرفی می‌کند. به باور سیمون وی، هرچند انسان چیزی را با توجه کردن خلق یا ایجاد نمی‌کند، اما موجب حیات بخشیدن به چیزی می‌شود که مورد توجه (...) واقع شده است، و البته آن توجهی به امور پیرامون حیات می‌بخشد که «ناب» باشد. توجه ناب عاری از هر گونه دلبستگی است و انسان از طریق آن خود را از امور تخیلی و توهمی می‌رهاند و به حقیقت نائل می‌گردد. به همین خاطر آنچه آدمی را به توجه ناب رهنمون می‌سازد تمنای بدون مقصود است. از سوی دیگر سیمون وی از تعلیق اندیشه به عنوان وضعیتی از توجه ناب نام می‌برد که همان تاب آوردن خلأ و در انتظار نشستن است. در نظر سیمون وی، توجه ناب می‌تواند به مثابۀ عشق در نظر آید، زیرا همان طور که توجه رضایت دادن به چیزی غیر از خود است، عشق نیز نیازمند شناسایی واقعیت با روی‌گردانی از خود است. سیمون وی اخلاق مبتنی بر توجه را مطرح می‌کند و با معطوف کردن توجه به سمت پروردگار، نه تنها اخلاق فردی، بلکه معرفت‌شناسی و فلسفه سیاسی-اجتماعی‌اش را بنا می‌کند و توجه را، در کنار لطف الهی، همچون پادزهری برای نجات انسان ضروری می‌داند. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has been charged with being unable to provide solutions to practical moral issues. In response, the defenders of virtue ethics argue that normative virtue ethics exists. The debate is significant on its own, yet both sides of the controversy approach the issue from the assumption that moral philosophy has to tell us what we should do. In this essay, I would like to examine the question regarding the practicality of virtue ethics in a different way. Virtue ethics is (...) an ancient approach shared by both ancient Greek philosophers and classic Chinese Confucians, and indeed, ancient Greeks call ethics practical science. How, then, do the ancients themselves view the issue of practicality? This essay shows that there is a notion of practicality which is prominent in both ancient Greek and ancient Chinese virtue ethics but is neglected in today’s ethics. According to this notion, ethics is to transform one’s life. The essay also raises a prospect of the revival of this notion. (shrink)

In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’ courage is not that of the martyr, grounded on a belief in divine reward; his is the courage of the philosopher who knows that he does not know. In his self-reflexive striving to be a person who strives for wisdom, Socrates dissipates the fear of death by dissolving the presumption on which this fear is based, and reframing death as an opportunity for (...) knowledge. Socrates’ courage is therefore founded on an epistemic hope that is embodied in the very activity of philosophy. (shrink)

The idea of philosophy as a kind of therapy, though by no means standard, has been present in metaphilosophical reflection since antiquity. Diverse versions of it were also discussed and applied by more recent authors such as Wittgenstein, Hadot and Foucault. In order to develop an explicit, general and systematic model of therapeutic philosophy a relatively broad and well-structured account provided by Martha Nussbaum is subjected to analysis. The results obtained, subsequently, form a basis for a new model constructed around (...) the set of notions intrinsically connected with any, philosophical, psychological, or medical, form of therapy. The conceptual framework of: disease and its symptoms, the health ideal, the process of treatment with its techniques, therapeutic theory, physician, patient, and the physician-patient relationship is constructed and investigated in the context of its possible metaphilosophical use. An illustrative application of this scheme to philosophical therapy developed by Stoicism is, then, discussed. Finally, the issue of the therapeutic metaphilosophy's scope as well as the problem of therapeutic philosophy's specificity and integrity are briefly indicated. (shrink)

This essay develops an intercultural approach to the skeptical way of life through an interpretation of two classical traditions: the Pyrrhonian tradition of ancient Greece and the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition of classical India. The skeptical way of life is characterized by several important features, including a goal of tranquility or of freedom from disturbance and suffering, a philosophical strategy of dialectical argument that terminates in the suspension of judgment or the abandonment of views, a purgative philosophic therapy, and life without (...) belief. A constellation of practical questions that emerge from the skeptical way of life are also considered, including the skeptic’s character, conformity, and care. One of the principal aims of the essay will be to develop this intercultural account of the skeptical way of life and to show by way of this illustrative example how our understanding of skepticism and ancient philosophy is enhanced through an intercultural approach. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot has discussed the deep connections between ancient Western philosophy and spiritual exercises. The author appreciates these connections, but he explains why he explored a different path. He began to write haiku as a form of spiritual practice. He wanted to use these short verses to become more mindful, present, and responsive – in his life and in his work in bioethics. After comparing traditional haiku and modern haiku, the author gives some examples from classical sources. Then he considers (...) how reading and writing haiku might help bioethics to focus less on deliberation and choice, and more on attention and perception. Haiku might help bioethics to attend to the contexts, life conditions, and lifeworlds that shape and situate people’s lives. These short poems might even illuminate some of the backgrounds and existential grounds of ethical life. At the end, the author presents some haiku that he wrote about modern life, young children, older adults, illness, medicine, and death. (shrink)

Between History and Philosophy is the first book-length study in English to focus on the rhetorical functions and forms of anecdotal narratives in early China. Edited by Paul van Els and Sarah A. Queen, this volume advances the thesis that anecdotes—brief, freestanding accounts of single events involving historical figures, and occasionally also unnamed persons, animals, objects, or abstractions—served as an essential tool of persuasion and meaning-making within larger texts. Contributors to the volume analyze the use of anecdotes from the Warring (...) States Period to the Han Dynasty, including their relations to other types of narrative, their circulation and reception, and their central position as a mode of argumentation in a variety of historical and philosophical literary genres. (shrink)

Massimiliano Simons provides the first systematic study of Serres' work in the context of late 20th-century French philosophy of science. By proposing new readings of Serres' philosophy, Simons creates a synthesis between his predecessors, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Louis Althusser as well as contemporary Francophone philosophers of science such as Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers. Simons situates Serres' unique contribution through his notion of the quasi-object, a concept, he argues, organizes great parts of Serres' work into a promising philosophy (...) of science as well as a challenge to the narrower field of French epistemology, to which it has often been limited. Simons highlights how the concept encompasses Serres' commitment to positive relations between science and culture and his rejection of pleas to purify the scientific self from imaginative and cultural elements. It helps to situate Serres between the distinct traditions of Bachelard and Latour as well as progressing the innovative aspects of Serres' philosophy for current debates in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science. Showing how Serres' philosophy can serve as a normative approach to science and technology, Michel Serres and French Philosophy of Science takes in themes of materiality, religiosity, modernity and ecology to advance a timely alternative to philosophy of science for contemporary life. (shrink)

This article presents a discussion of key aspects of knowledge in Sufism through an analysis of the film Bab’Aziz: The Prince Who Contemplated His Soul. The dominant Western pe...

In Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8, Aristotle defends a striking view about the good for human beings. According to Aristotle, the single happiest way of life is organized around philosophical contemplation. According to the narrowness worry, however, Aristotle's contemplative ideal is unduly Procrustean, restrictive, inflexible, and oblivious of human diversity. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the narrowness worry, and that his contemplative ideal can take due account of human diversity.

Self-cultivation—taking pedagogical action to educate oneself—is an integral part of non-formal adult education. Ever since Greek antiquity, it has been a central ingredient in the western philosophical and educational tradition. However, we argue that the global challenges that have emerged in the present era of the ecological crisis call for a new kind of understanding of this basic educational phenomenon. Based in particular on recent work in dark ecology and its central concept of the ‘uncanny’, we outline a few key (...) features of our time in relation to the contemporary challenge of self-cultivation. We then review extant literature on self-cultivation to ascertain whether the theoretical resources that have been used to conceptualise it in the past are capable of addressing these new aspects of self-cultivation. We conclude that each of the theoretical resources analysed here offer valuable insights into the novel challenges facing self-cultivation, though not all important questions can be answered. By specifying the contributions and limitations of these theoretical resources, we pave the way for future work on conceptualising self-cultivation for our times. (shrink)

The article deals with philosophical questions on the “art of living” in philosophy in recent decades. It provides an overview of the conceptions that continue to resonate in philosophy, covering the basic approach to conceptions of the “art of living” found in the work of theorists such as P. Hadot, J. Kekes, A. Nehamas, Z. Bauman, A. MacIntyre, R. Veenhoven, W. Schmid, and J. Dohmen.The basic framework of the “art of living” can, we believe, be imagined as a square, where (...) each side represents an essential component : 1. value system; 2. integrity of life; 3. meaning of life; 4. authenticity of life. The art of living therefore presupposes that there is a value system the individual can use as a navigational guide and to make decisions in the world. It also presupposes an ability to integrate one’s life within a meaningful whole and to seek out and find the meaning of one’s life. Finally the art of living depends on the ability to lead an authentic life. (shrink)

Books and journal articles have become the dominant modes of presentation in contemporary philosophy. This historically contingent paradigm prioritises textual expression and assumes a distinction between philosophical practice and its presented product. Using Socrates and Diogenes as exemplars, we challenge the presumed supremacy of the text and defend the importance of ways of life as modes of practiced presentation. We argue that text cannot capture the embodied activity of philosophy without remainder, and is therefore limited and incomplete. In particular, we (...) contend that a static text is essentially alienated from our practices of philosophising, words cannot unambiguously represent lives, and practiced presentation enriches our understanding beyond words alone. After discussing some pedagogical implications, we conclude with a plea for a pluralistic approach that recognises lives as legitimate and valuable modes of philosophical presentation. (shrink)

The source of the following considerations is the observation that academic philosophy at universities does not fit well with philosophy education processes, e.g., those at school. Both sides seem to be separate from each other. I assume that the two areas rely on two very different concepts of philosophy. To work out a concept of philosophy more appropriate to the educational context, I methodically apply the practical turn to our philosophising in very different contexts. Moreover, I elaborate that it is (...) precisely the modern scientific paradigm that underlies philosophy as scientific practice and that the former represents a problematic con-striction of philosophising in educational contexts. For where the ideal is objective scientific knowledge — from which everything subjective has been removed — there can be no deeper transformation of the subject through philosophy. My thesis is that philosophy is better suited to the educational context as transformative and not as scientific practice. As a consequence, the question arises as to whether the study of philosophy on teacher training courses needs a new impulse in the direction of philosophy as transformative practice. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue both that philosophy as a way of life is a tradition worth reviving and that environmental philosophy is a promising branch of philosophy to enact this revival. First, I sketch what constitutes philosophy as a way of life, which includes both some conception of the good life and an array of spiritual exercises that assists one in living according to that conception. I then discuss a connection between possessing virtue and leading the good life, a (...) connection of great importance to ancient and modern practitioners of philosophy as a way of life. Next, I offer an argument for why this tradition of philosophy is worth reviving at the present time. The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring the prospects for a distinctively environmental approach to philosophy as a way of life. (shrink)

In responding to the three creative interpretive discussions in the symposium on my book Philosophy and the Art of Writing, this paper explores the different styles of philosophical discourse and their role in the practice of philosophy as a way of life that extends beyond the discursive and that combines self-cultivation with care for others in the ethical-aesthetic pursuit of living beauty. In advocating this aesthetic model of philosophical life over a purely therapeutic model, I suggest how the former can (...) incorporate the latter's concerns for spiritual health and liberation. In developing my response to the symposiasts while elaborating on the themes of my book, I consider issues of ineffability, creative performance, embodiment, truth, heroism, vulnerability, possession, art, spirituality, love, and liberation. (shrink)

The concept of dramatization represents a rhetorical and conceptual tension in Deleuze's philosophy in that it refers both to autopoietic ontological processes and to a critical philosophical method. Commentators are wont to refer to either one or the other, saying little about how or if these two fundamentally distinct usages can be thought together; that is what we aim to do here. By unravelling the conceptual transformations of the term, we can gain an appreciation for the double characterisation of dramatization (...) and its centrifugal nature. We begin with the hypothesis that dramatization is linked to actualisation in the first sense and counteractualisation in the second. The fundamental question that we would like to address is: how are these two views to be reconciled? Addressing this question leads us to the conclusion that dramatization becomes an ethical imperative for philosophical subjects to perform certain philosophical exercises, that is, to become worthy of the event. The particular philosophical exercise that is emphasised is the dramatization of a paradoxical thought of death. Ultimately, we suggest that dramatization can be galvanised for both an emancipatory politics and an ethico-aesthetic life practice. (shrink)

This paper examines the seemingly unlikely rapport between the ‘Christian existentialist’, radically Protestant thinker, Søren Kierkegaard and French classicist and historian of philosophy, Pierre Hadot, famous for advocating a return to the ancient pagan sense of philosophy as a way of life. Despite decisive differences we stress in our concluding remarks, we argue that the conception of philosophy in Hadot as a way of life shares decisive features with Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true ‘religious’ life: as something demanding existential engagement (...) from its proponent, as well as the learning or recitation of accepted doctrines. The mediating figure between the two authors, the paper agrees with Irina, is Socrates and his famous irony. In order to appreciate Kierkegaard’s rapport with Hadot, then we first of all consider Hadot’s treatment of the enigmatic ‘old wise man’ who remains central to Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. However, to highlight Hadot’s Socratic proximity to Kierkegaard, we set up Hadot’s Socrates against the contrasting portrait readers can find in John M. Cooper’s recent work on Socrates and philosophy as a way of life. Part II of the essay turns back from Hadot’s and Kierkegaard’s Socrates towards Hadot’s own work, and argues—again moving beyond both Gregor and Irina’s works on Hadot and Kierkegaard—that the shape of Hadot’s ‘authorship’, including his remarkably classical style, can be understood by way of Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication. In our concluding remarks, in the spirit of Kierkegaard, we pinpoint the fundamental difference between the two thinkers, arguing that for Hadot in contrast to Kierkegaard, a stress on existential commitment in no way speaks against the philosophical defence of a form of rational universalism. Reading Hadot via Kierkegaard allows us to appreciate Hadot’s novelty as attempting to ‘squaring the circle’ between an emphasis on subjectivity and, as it were, the subjective dimensions of philosophers’ pursuit of rational universality. (shrink)

Albert Camus repeatedly denied the label “existentialist,” and pointed to his formative experiences of natural beauty and his early introduction to classical Greek thought and culture as determinative of his philosophy. Pierre Hadot, famous for his post-1970 work on philosophy as a way of life in classical antiquity, continued throughout his life to work on the history of Western conceptions of nature. In Le voile d’Isis, Hadot excavated a second strain of Western attitudes towards nature, alongside the instrumental or “Promethean” (...) approach dominant in modernity: this is that of the contemplative Orphic perspective, closely tied in antiquity to philosophical regimens of spiritual exercises to transform philosophers’ ways of seeing. This paper will argue that Camus and Hadot should be read as two twentieth century “Orphic” figures in this sense, in a way that at once singles them out against almost all other European contemporaries, as well as speaking to our ecological concerns today. Yet the only comparative piece on the two thinkers to date, by Matthew Lamb, misses this shared contemplative, Orphic core to their positions. This paper aims to redress this shortcoming in the reception of the two figures. (shrink)

Does the rise of artificial intelligence pose a threat to human sources of meaning? While much ink has been spilled on how AI could undercut meaningful human work, John Danaher has raised the stakes by claiming that AI could “sever” human beings from non-work-related sources of meaning—specifically, those related to intellectual and moral goods. Against this view, I argue that his suggestion that AI poses a threat to these areas of meaningful activity is overstated. Self-transformative activities pose a hard limit (...) to AI’s impingement on meaningful human activities. Contra Danaher, I suggest that a wider range of sources for meaning will continue to exist in a world dominated by AI. (shrink)

This essay proposes that Socrates practiced various spiritual exercises, including meditation, and that this Socratic practice of meditation was habitual, aimed at cultivating emotional self-control and existential preparedness. Contemporary research in neurobiology supports the view that intentional mental actions, including meditation, have a profound impact on brain activity, neuroplasticity, and help engender emotional self-control. This impact on brain activity is confirmed via technological developments, a prime example of how technology benefits humanity. Socrates attains the balanced emotional self-control that Alcibiades describes (...) in the Symposium because of the sustained mental effort he exerts that directly impacts his brain and his emotional and philosophical life. The essay concludes that Socratic meditative practices aimed at manifesting true dignity as human beings within the complexities of a technological world offer a promising model of self-care worthy of embracing today. (shrink)

This article examines parallel challenges and avenues for progress I have observed in my efforts to introduce improvisation in classical music studies, and meditation in music and overall academic settings. Though both processes were once central in their respective knowledge traditions—improvisation in earlier eras of European classical music, meditation and contemplative disciplines in Western philosophy—as well as being globally prominent, they nonetheless occupy marginalised roles in the contemporary academy. Other parallels include the challenges and benefits inherent in the interplay between (...) tradition-specific and trans-traditional engagement, where grounding in a musical lineage such as jazz promotes informed trans-idiomatic musical exploration and synthesis, and grounding in a contemplative lineage provides foundations for navigating the often-turbulent waters of the contemporary spiritual smorgasbord. I argue that a more critical look at integrity of practice, consisting in not only methodologies but also views of consciousness and human development, is key to the future progress of the contemplative studies movement and the contributions it may make to education and society at large. (shrink)

In nontheistic moral traditions, there is a typical ethical conundrum concerning the relation between cosmic order and human agency. Within those traditions, it is generally recognized that the universe has its own order and history that are independent of human will. A moral discourse has to find space to accommodate human agency in the midst of the iron grid of cosmic law. Both Confucius and Aurelius use the concept of timeliness (kairos) to resolve the difficult issue. But their philosophies take (...) on divergent paths. By studying their resolutions of the issue, we will be able to appreciate the distinctive nature of their nontheistic moral narratives. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTaking its point of departure in an enigmatic passage from the Analects, in which the interlocutor is likened by the master to a sacrificial vase, the essay explores how this teaching can be read as a indirect commentary on the proper way of inhabiting and communicating tradition. The relation to the ancestors and the proper way of handling the rites for the dead is shown to reveal a more basic hermeneutic argument in Confucian thinking, opening the text to its own (...) future transformation. (shrink)

This paper is an initial effort preparatory for a more thorough “theology of joys.” I distinguish joys from other kinds of pleasure and argue that joy can be seen as the form of all the so-called positive emotions. So joy is properly treated in the plural: joys come in a variety of kinds. I distinguish canonical from non-canonical joys. The worthiness of joys is primarily a function of their objects—what the joys are about. I look at a few examples of (...) joys that appear in the New Testament and sketch the relation of joys to happiness. (shrink)

Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethicist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and (...) salvation entirely to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character ethics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot, a contemporary French philosopher, illustrated the dynamics and essence of philosophy in a philosopher’s everyday life by offering the model of philosophy as a way of life, which was the result of many years of research on ancient philosophy. Using this philosophical model, the present paper studies the relationship between knowledge and practice in Illuminationist Philosophy. Philosophical discourse is one of the important components of this model. According to Hadot, the value of discourse in philosophical schools lies in (...) the service it provides to improve the quality of life and man’s function and behaviour. Sohrevardi also puts emphasis on the importance of theoretical philosophy as the prelude and guide in choosing the Illuminationist way of life. Thus, the paper first studies the status of discourse in ancient philosophical schools to provide a clear picture of the relationship between discourse and practice in philosophical schools using the model of philosophy as a way of life, and then addresses Hodot’s view about this relationship. Finally, it studies the importance of discourse in Sohrevardi’s Illuminationist Philosophy and its application as a necessary prelude to enter into and choose an illuminationist life; to lead the Illuminationist wayfarer in the way of life; and to understand and acquire practical reason. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a reclusive and enigmatic philosopher, writing his most significant work off campus in remote locations. He also held a chair in the Philosophy Department at Cambridge, and is one of the university’s most recognized even if, as Ray Monk says, ‘reluctant professors’ of philosophy. Paradoxically, although Wittgenstein often showed contempt for the atmosphere at Cambridge and for academic philosophy in particular, it is hard to conceive of him making his significant contributions without considerable support from his academic (...) colleagues, his research fellowship and later teaching career at Cambridge. It is this conflicted relationship we explore, between the revolutionary thinker and his base within an educational institution. Starting from a brief biographical sketch of Wittgenstein’s academic life at Cambridge, including his involvement as a student and faculty member in the Moral Sciences Club, we look at how he reconceived the role of philosophy throughout this... (shrink)

I shall examine in this paper the distinctive way in which the prominent Indian philosopher Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya engaged with Advaita Vedānta during the terminal phase of the colonial period. I propose to do this by looking, first, at ways in which Krishnachandra understood the role of his own philosophizing within the colonial predicament. I will call this his agenda in ‘confrontative’ philosophy. I shall proceed, then, by sketching out the unique manner in which this agenda was successfully enacted through his (...) engagement with the Advaitic notion of self-knowledge. Finally, I will suggest that putting K. C. Bhattacharyya’s thought into the historical perspective of cross-cultural philosophy will reveal a number of shortcomings that need to be revised in a postcolonial setup. (shrink)

Mario Victorino Africano representa elocuentemente el encuentro entre el cristianismo y el pensamiento platonista en el ambiente latino del siglo IV. En una de la obras de Victorino, el De Generatione Divini Verbi Victorino utiliza un aparato filosófico plotiniano para acercarse mejor a la teología cristiana en función de la solución de este problema trinitario: ¿Cómo genera algo el Uno sin dejar de ser Uno? El objetivo de este texto es analizar la convivencia del pensamiento teológico trinitario con la metafísica (...) platonista plotiniana en el De Generatione Divini Verbi en función de dos temas principales: 1) los modos de ser, y 2) la explicación de la vida del Uno más allá de la substancia. Primero 1) daremos una breve semblanza de la vida de Mario Victorino, 2) después, analizaremos por qué el problema cristológico arriano necesita de una metafísica madura y sistemática para resolverse, 3) luego, repasaremos las soluciones que da Victorino en función del problema cristológico enfocándonos en los dos ejes mencionados, y 4) finalmente veremos las conclusiones de esta interacción entre teología y filosofía platonista mencionando la novedades que Victorino aporta a la comprensión de la metafísica platonista plotiniana. (shrink)

Following the Introduction, the second section of this essay lays out Tom Cavanaugh’s helpful and convincing account of the enduring significance of the Hippocratic Oath in terms of how it responds to the problem of iatrogenic harm. The third section discusses something underemphasized in Cavanaugh’s account, namely, the key role of the virtue of piety within the Oath and the profession it establishes, and argues that this virtue should be regarded as integral to an authentic Hippocratic ethic. The fourth and (...) final section briefly examines the connection between medicine and philosophy, focusing on how both should be seen as wisdom-seeking ways of life, and shows the relevance of this for regarding the virtue of piety as the key virtue of medical practice. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

This article examines the recent work of the sociologist Arpad Szakolczai as he attempts to conceptualize the programme of ‘reflexive historical sociology’ in the ‘life-works’ of Max Weber, Eric Voegelin and Michel Foucault as well as Norbert Elias, Lewis Mumford and Franz Borkenau. Particular attention is paid to the innovative manner in which the work of the anthropologist Victor Turner is used to explore the biographies of these social theorists as in effect performative life-works in which crucial liminal periods and (...) experiences are seen as facilitating new understandings. It is suggested that the life-work approach to social theory adds an important reflexive dimension to the analysis of social thought. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two interrelated questions. First, a broad question: in what sense is Skepticism a philosophy− or in what sense is it “philosophy” (as we will see, these are not identical questions)? Second, a narrow one: how should we understand the process whereby ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) emerges out of epochē (suspension of judgment)? The first question arises because Skepticism is often portrayed as anti-philosophy. This depiction, I contend, surreptitiously turns a Skeptical method into a so-called Skeptical (...) doctrine which is then either condemned for being self-refuting or salvaged as a plausible (albeit odd) epistemological theory. Instead, philosophy, for the Skeptics, is a matter of practice. Skepticism is not so much a philosophy that has a worldview to proclaim as it is a philosophy that invites us to perform something. (shrink)

У статті здійснюється історико-філософський розгляд контроверсійних підвалин комунікативних стратегій, де під контроверсіями розуміється принцип суперечності діалогу як такого, а під комунікативними стратегіями – діалог як «раціональна комунікація», тобто комунікація з наперед заданою метою. Показано зв’язок між морально-етичною настановою історичних періодів та принципом діалогу, притаманного цій добі. Виявлено, що принцип діалогу, запроваджений ще у добу Античності як спосіб знаходження порозуміння, знайшов своє продовження у диспутах середньовічних університетів та жанру діалогу доби Відродження. Водночас індивідуалізм доби Відродження, раціональна настанова Просвітництва та наукові дослідження (...) Нового часу усталили суб’єкт-об’єктний принцип взаємин; відновлення принципу діалогу як засобу порозуміння, пов’язується, зокрема, із працями представників комунікативної філософії. Акцентується увага на значущості критичного мислення та безперервної освіти як засобу подолання маніпулятивних впливів, зокрема у ситуації названою «добою постправди», що актуалізує дане дослідження. (shrink)

In this article I interpret John Rawls’s concept of the original position as a spiritual exercise. In addition to the standard interpretation of the original position as an expository device to select principles of justice for the fundamental institutions of society, I argue that Rawls also envisages it as a “spiritual exercise”: a voluntary personal practice intended to bring about a transformation of the self. To make this argument, I draw on the work of Pierre Hadot, a philosopher and classicist, (...) who introduced the idea of spiritual exercises as central to ancient and modern conceptions of philosophy. By reading Rawls alongside Hadot, this article portrays Rawls as a thinker deeply concerned with the question of how subjects can lead more just and fulfilling lives. It also proposes that the original position as a spiritual exercise can help defend liberalism as a social and political doctrine. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophers are often uncomfortable with the notion that a conception of the good life can be developed out of liberalism. Liberalism, they say, should remain neutral out of respect for pluralism. Early liberals of the nineteenth century, however, understood their project as a vindication of the good life, along with a diagnosis of what threatens it. This article attempts to build a conception of the good life from liberal values and sensibilities, yet not run afoul of the need (...) to respect pluralism. It draws on early and contemporary liberals, as well as popular culture, to sketch a way of life that is fulfilling and available for us today. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical appraisal of the recent turn in comparative religious ethics to virtue theory; it argues that the specific aspirations of virtue ethicists to make ethics more contextual, interdisciplinary, and practice-centered has in large measure failed to match the rhetoric. I suggest that the focus on the category of the human and practices associated with self-formation along with a methodology grounded in “analogical imagination” has actually poeticized the subject matter into highly abstract textual studies on normative voices (...) within traditions, largely in isolation from considerations of socio-historical context, political and institutional pressures, and the lived ethics of non-elite moral actors. I conclude with some programmatic suggestions for how the field of comparative religious ethics can move forward. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ‘Knowing’ has a crucial role in Buddhist explanations about the determination of individual realities. According to these explanations particular modes of knowing are connected to specific ways of perceiving and, even, constituting reality. As the ideal state of reality according to Buddhist doctrine is that of an unconditioned liberation, numerous traditions have examined and described the mode of knowing which characterizes such a state. Among these, we find several traditions that related such a mode with a claim (...) concerning the innateness of an unconditioned state. This paper is meant to discuss some of these traditions, mainly ‘The Great Perfection’, a Tibetan non-dual tradition that asserted a mode of primordial knowing which is present in each moment of awareness. By discussing the intuitive qualities of this mode, we aim to show how an inherent mode of non-dual awareness can be explained through a comprehensive description of the basic aspects of lived experience. (shrink)

The author justifies the need to return to an analysis of the meaning of such words as “philosophy” and “philosopher” in the Kyivan Rus’ written sources of the 11th–14th centuries. In the author’s view, this is explained not only by the inaccuracies the earlier research committed but also by the necessity to take contemporary achievements of Byzantine philosophical historiography into account. The author concludes that the preserved Kyivan Rus’ written sources reflect certain Byzantine interpretations of the words “philosopher” and “philosophy” (...) as understood within particular interpretive frameworks: philosophy may refer to a specifically “Christian” or “external” philosophy, presuppose rational or mystical comprehension of divine wisdom, become verbalized or not. Some sources probably espouse an understanding of philosophy as a practice of true life. The word “philosopher” had different connotations, as well. It referred to advisers or officeholders at the court of the Byzantine emperor, wise princes, church intellectuals, connoisseurs of biblical books, etc. The author invalidates the idea that in Kyivan Rus’, there existed a holistic understanding of philosophy and philosophers. Instead, one should interpret these words as having a limited plurality of meanings. (shrink)

Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing suggests something vital about the tension between philosophical discourses that cannot capture or be the full meaning of living a life in relation to wisdom, and lived philosophies that cannot do away with discourses to deepen a lived experience beyond them: that philosophy as “an embodied way of life” is a sub-creation that emerges from the tension between them. This paper uses several different moments and ideas from Philosophy and the Art of (...) Writing as points of departure for further inquiry. Some “memories,” repurposed, reorganized, and manipulated, take up these starting points to further the investigation. The present work was a spiritual exercise for the author and, one hopes, will be for the reader in what it means to practice philosophy as a way of life. By doing so, we may find more forgiveness and appreciation for our philosophical vocation that creates something more than what we say or are now. (shrink)