- On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Revisionary Epistemology.Davide Fassio & Robin McKenna - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):755-779.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.details
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Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.details
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Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.details
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Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.details
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Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.David Enoch - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):21-48.details
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Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.details
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A noncontextualist account of contextualist linguistic data.Mylan Engel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.details
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Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology.Nicholas Emmerson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (2):264-268.details
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Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.details
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Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
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Reliable group belief.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S23):5653-5677.details
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Epistemological motivations for anti-realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.details
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Ethical Vagueness and Practical Reasoning.Billy Dunaway - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):38-60.details
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Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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Epistemic Norms. [REVIEW]Trent Dougherty - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):224-232.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.details
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Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):395-403.details
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A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.details
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Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Knowing against the odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.details
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Describing Law.Raff Donelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1):85-106.details
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Thought experiments without possible worlds.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):363-384.details
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A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Confusion about concessive knowledge attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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The Occasion-Sensitivity of Thought.Tamara Dobler - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):487-497.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.details
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Skeptical pragmatic invariantism: good, but not good enough.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2577-2593.details
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Relativism and Conservatism.Alexander Dinges - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):757-772.details
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Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly.Alexander Dinges - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3541-3556.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.details
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Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’.Paul Dimmock - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015.details
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Knowledge, belief, and egocentric bias.Paul Dimmock - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3409-3432.details
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Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics.Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.details
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Closure and the Lottery.Simon Dierig - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):405-419.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.details
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