Proper attention to the theme of corporeality is crucial for understanding Derrida’s analysis of Hegel in “The Pit and the Pyramid.” This article argues that Derrida’s essay compels us to face the impossibility of giving a wholly coherent account of embodiment. The _Aufhebung_ supposedly unites the exteriority of the corporeal with interiority in a higher unity that cancels and preserves them both; Hegel’s own text reveals, however, that meaning is primordially absent from the body that was thought to incarnate it. (...) And it is this absence of ideal meaning that is originary: Differance conditions the body as it conditions speech, rendering the body other than itself such that it is not categorizable as flesh that is the self or as an object that is not the self. I am and am not my body because the dichotomy between interiority and exteriority breaks down even at the level of the body. Indeed, I am and am not my self; the embodied self is disrupted from the start, never self-contained. Thus embodiment always already testifies to the other. (shrink)

Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the possibility of a (...) particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars. (shrink)

Kirjoituksessa argumentoin, että metafysiikka on ollut valistusta, vaikka se edelleen kaipaa lisää valistumista, kun valistus ymmärretään avoimena prosessina, joka ei ole ajasta ja paikasta riippuvaista. Käsittelen ensin sitä, mitä metafysiikka ja valistus ovat. Sitten lausun länsimaisen metafysiikan historiasta hyvin lyhyesti. Päätän esseen argumentoimalla, että metafysiikka on valistunutta siinä mielessä, että klassisen substanssi-ominaisuus-skeeman sokeasta seuraamisesta on pitkälti päästy eroon. Metafysiikka kaipaa kuitenkin lisää valistusta ja kriittistä tarkastelua, jotta vapaudumme täysin kyseisen skeeman ja modernin predikaatti-logiikan johdatuksen aiheuttamasta kolmesta ongelmallisesta suositusta (tausta)oletuksesta: (1) (...) perustavat partikulaariset yksilöoliot ovat (periaatteessa) laskettavia, (2) ne eivät ole relationaalisia ja (3) ominaisuudet ovat ontologisesti riippuvaisia kantajistaan. (shrink)

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank’s early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank’s theory of a “personal absolute”, exploring its surprising parallels with the religious philosophy of I. (...) H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel’s absolute, before finally turning to Schelling’s immediate intuition of subject-object identity. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s opus magnum, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, synthesises his impressive work of the last half century. His thesis is that the modern project of the normativity of “rational freedom” can be reconstructed as a learning process of the conflictual dialogue between reason and faith, philosophy and religion in the West. Furthermore, under conditions of a world society, cross-cultural communication across lifeworlds, based on such normative principles, is possible. I argue that Habermas’s argument recapitulates a claim first made in (...) The Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel, who presented the normativity of modernity through a narrative unfolding between two epistemological standpoints, namely, that of consciousness and “we.” Just like Hegel, in order to defend the idea of a Lernprozess, Habermas too must presuppose a unified subject called “we;” furthermore the development of such subjectivity unfolds in a homogeneous temporal process that is then assumed to be the same for all mankind. I call this a form of “historicism,” and juxtapose recent historical writing that presents the narrative of modernity and the emergence of world-society as a much more diverse and fractured process than Hegel’s and Habermas’s methodology. “Die Einbeziehung der Anderen,” I argue, must involve including the voices of those others who do not experience the normative of modernity as a process like the one unfolding between faith and reason in the West. Nevertheless, I conclude that this plea for a more complex narrative that “provincialises Europe,” is not a rejection of the normative legacy of modern rationality and freedom that are based on the ideals of fallibilism, refutability and revisability through a rational community of inquirers. (shrink)

This paper discusses the epistemic status of biology from the standpoint of the systemic approach to living systems based on the notion of biological autonomy. This approach aims to provide an understanding of the distinctive character of biological systems and this paper analyses its theoretical and epistemological dimensions. The paper argues that, considered from this perspective, biological systems are examples of emergent phenomena, that the biological domain exhibits special features with respect to other domains, and that biology as a discipline (...) employs some core concepts, such as teleology, function, regulation among others, that are irreducible to those employed in physics and chemistry. It addresses the claim made by Jacques Monod that biology as a science is marginal. It argues that biology is general insofar as it constitutes a paradigmatic example of complexity science, both in terms of how it defines the theoretical object of study and of the epistemology and heuristics employed. As such, biology may provide lessons that can be applied more widely to develop an epistemology of complex systems. (shrink)

For years, Robert B. Brandom has been working on a book on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Earlier versions of its chapters were available for scrutiny at Brandom’s website. But the book itself is...

Populism and degradation are closely related. Not only is the insulting and slandering of political opponents part of the standard repertoire of populists, but the experience of degradation is also one of the most important sociopsychological conditions for the emergence of contemporary populism. Accordingly, the populist politics of degradation must be understood as a response to their own experiences of degradation. However, this strategy leads into an aporia because it systematically undermines the solidarity and recognition it seeks. I will therefore (...) ask what a political solution to the challenge of populism might look like and argue that radical democratic republicanism is a remedy for populism because it allows the experience of degradation that underlies it to be both taken seriously and kept at a critical distance. (shrink)

This paper investigates the compatibility of Hegel’s analyses of the mechanization of work in industrial society with Hegel’s notion of freedom as rational self-determination. Work as such is for Hegel a crucial moment on the way to a more complete realization of human freedom, but, as I maintain with Adorno, the technological developments of the last two centuries raise the question of whether the nature of work itself has changed since the industrial revolution. In his Jena lectures, Hegel recognized significant (...) problems that the mechanization of work poses for human freedom that—on my assessment—his later, mature thought does not sufficiently address. One finds, however, a more comprehensive depiction of the same worries that Hegel mentioned in his Jena lectures in Adorno’s critique of the dominant forms of labor in contemporary society and his understanding of technological rationality, which according to Adorno, dominates the contemporary world. I suggest, furthermore, that juxtaposing Hegel’s and Adorno’s thoughts on technology and the mechanization of work reveals Adorno’s philosophy of technology to be an extension, rather than a critique, of the spirit of Hegel’s own philosophical project as immanent critique of the necessary entailments of any given concept. (shrink)

Metaethical constructivism aims to explain morality’s authority and relevance by basing it in agency, in a capacity of the creatures who are in fact morally bound. But constructivists have struggled to wring anything recognizably moral from an appropriately minimal conception of agency. Even if they could, basing our reasons in our individual agency seems to make other people reason-giving for us only indirectly. This paper argues for a constructivism based on a social conception of agency, on which our capacity to (...) recognize ourselves as having reasons ties us inescapably to others. It argues that mutual recognition is a pervasive feature of linguistic concepts, and builds this into a view called transformative expressivism. (shrink)

One of the central strengths of Salem's analysis of Nasserism is that she recognizes both its world-historical significance as a progressive nationalist movement, and its severe limitations. In the first section of this paper, I discuss Salem's notion of the "afterlives" of the Nasserist project by drawing attention to one of the most debilitating legacies of that project, namely the transformation of Egyptian politics into petty bourgeois politics. In the second section, I argue that while Salem does not explicitly draw (...) on Hegel's understanding of tragedy in her account of Nasserism, her analysis of Nasserism essentially amounts to depicting it as a Hegelian tragedy. By placing Salem's book in conversation with Hegel (and his philosophy of action), we can make explicit what I take to be one of the central claims made by Salem, namely that when passing judgment on past and present national liberation movements we should remember that innocence is "only non-action, like the mere being of a stone" [nur das Nichttun wie das Sein eines Steines] (Hegel 1986, 346). In the third section of this paper, I raise some critical points about Salem's characterization of the nationalism that was associated with the Nasserist project, as well as about the deployment of the concept of modernity in her analysis. I argue that her account of modernity in the book does not distinguish between the concept of modernity as it refers to a certain kind of normative philosophical discourse, and modernization theory qua theory of development. Finally, I draw on Salem's use of the concept of hegemony in order to pose a question regarding the political significance of the contemporary cultural hegemony of Islamist movements in Egypt. (shrink)

This paper develops a dialectical methodology for assessing technoscience during the Anthropocene. How to practice Hegelian dialectics of technoscience today? First of all, dialectics is developed here in close interaction with contemporary technoscientific research endeavours, which are addressed from a position of proximity and from an ‘oblique’ perspective. Contrary to empirical research, the focus is on how basic concepts of life, nature and technology are acted out in practice. Notably, this paper zooms in on a synthetic cell project called BaSyC (...) as a concrete instantiation of converging views of life, nature and technology currently at work in technoscience. While dialectics is used to explore the significance of this project, the synthetic cell as a case study also allows us to demonstrate the remarkable relevance of dialectics for understanding contemporary research, notably because it incites us to see the synthetic cell project as a concrete exemplification of life under Anthropocenic conditions. Should we assess the synthetic cell as the ultimate realisation of the technoscientific will to control and optimise life, or rather as an effort to bridge the disruptive collision between technoscience and nature, or both? (shrink)

The way we experience, investigate and interact with reality changes drastically in the course of history. Do such changes occur gradually, or can we pinpoint radical turns, besides periods of relative stability? Building on Oswald Spengler, we zoom in on three styles in particular, namely Apollonian, Magian and Faustian thinking, guided by grounding ideas which can be summarised as follows: “Act in accordance with nature”, “Prepare yourself for the imminent dawn and “Existence equals will to power”. Finally, we reach the (...) present. How to characterise the new era we entered round the year 2000? (shrink)

De moderne filosofie lijdt aan muziekvergetelheid. Opvallend is echter dat filosofen, wanneer ze toch aandacht schenken aan muziek, hun aandacht bij voorkeur op één bepaald genre richten, namelijk de opera. Filosofen zoals Søren Kierkegaard en Friedrich Nietzsche lieten hun gedachten over Don Giovanni, Parsifal en Carmen gaan, terwijl omgekeerd de filosofie van Arthur Schopenhauer de opera heeft beïnvloed via Wagner. Diens werk lijkt zich op het snijpunt van het grensverkeer tussen moderne filosofie en moderne muziek te bevinden. Het was zijn (...) ambitie de menselijke existentie en de menselijke geschiedenis in één panoramisch oeuvre te vatten, vanaf het primordiale begin tot en met de dramatische finale die ophanden leek: een catastrofale apotheose die een geheel nieuwe toekomst mogelijk zou maken. Dat is althans de verhaallijn van zijn meesterwerk Der Ring des Nibelungen. Aan het slot van Götterdämmerung lijkt zich een algehele verwoesting te hebben voltrokken: ‘Everything is destroyed and there is an enigmatic kind of hovering over the scene of destruction’ (Badiou 2010, p. 106), een ambivalente stemming van hoop en destructie zette Wagner op muziek. Voor Wagner is dan ook een hoofdrol in deze studie weggelegd: voor zijn muziektheoretische geschriften (waarin hij over een ‘muziek van de toekomst’ filosofeerde), maar meer nog voor de muzikale totaalkunstwerken die hij daadwerkelijk componeerde. (shrink)

Within the variety of subjects considered by Heidegger after Being and time, the notion of ‘thinking’ stands out for its constant presence and for the central place it occupies in a large part of his later work. In fact, as a path towards overcoming metaphysics and as a means of rethinking the relationship between humans and being, distorted in the world of technique, Heidegger uses the exercise of thinking that is not only the heritage of philosophers, but is latent in (...) many of the habitual practices of individuals. This article aims to elaborate this notion in line with the concepts of forgetting and remembering, which are both human experiences and constitutive elements of being in its happening. The outlined thesis is thus that, in a world dominated by the entity, Heidegger ascribes to the ‘reminiscent thinking’ the task of restoring our relationship with being and thus widening the possibilities of meaning of our existence. (shrink)

Friedrich Engels’ dialectical assessment of modern science resulted from his fascination with the natural sciences in combination with his resurging interest in the work of “old Hegel.” Engels became especially interested in what he saw as the molecular essence of life, namely proteins or, more specifically, albumin, seeing life as the mode of existence of these enigmatic substances. Hegelian dialectics is crucial for a dialectical materialist understanding of contemporary technoscience. The dialectical materialist understanding of technoscience as a research practice builds (...) on Engels, but also on later authors who were inspired by his writings, e.g., life scientists such as Haldane and Bernal. Considering the criticism raised against Engels’ dialectics by 20th-century Marxists, a dialectical diagnostic of contemporary technoscience can be achieved, which shifts the focus from artificial albumin as “living matter” to contemporary research on synthetic cells. (shrink)

Worlds are always in motion; what kind of movement is at stake? In this essay, I will argue that Heidegger moves beyond Hegel by making the concept of world central to phenomenology. But how do wor...

Although written in Japanese, this article deals with what the gender theory is all about by reference to Beauvoir's Le Deuxième Sexe. Sartre's works are also heavily cited to clarify the background of Beauvoir's philosophy.

The relation of "God" and "human being" as two fundamental concepts in philosophy is considered in the trdition of Western philosophy: Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger ...

This paper subjects Dan Brown’s most recent novel Origin to a philosophical reading. Origin is regarded as a literary window into contemporary technoscience, inviting us to explore its transformative momentum and disruptive impact, focusing on the cultural significance of artificial intelligence and computer science: on the way in which established world-views are challenged by the incessant wave of scientific discoveries made possible by super-computation. While initially focusing on the tension between science and religion, the novel’s attention gradually shifts to the (...) increased dependence of human beings on smart technologies and artificial intelligence. Origin’s message, I will argue, reverberates with Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, which aims to outline a morphology of world civilizations. Although the novel starts with a series of oppositions, most notably between religion and science, the eventual tendency is towards convergence, synthesis and sublation, exemplified by Sagrada Família as a monumental symptom of this transition. Three instances of convergence will be highlighted, namely the convergence between science and religion, between humanity and technology and between the natural sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

Resumen: Varios comentaristas han sostenido que la ontología de la concepción hegeliana de “alma bella” se funda en la determinación conocida como “mal infinito”, desarrollada en la Doctrina del Ser. En correlación con lo antedicho, comentaristas como Paha, Hinchman, Solomon y Harris sostienen que Hegel pensaba en el sistema filosófico fichteano al momento de desarrollar su concepción de “alma bella”. Sin embargo, esta hipótesis de lectura adolece de algunas falencias que serán desarrolladas a continuación. En primer lugar, es necesario realizar (...) una breve exposición de la figura del Espíritu conocida como “alma bella”; en segundo lugar, se describirá la determinación denominada “mal infinito”; en tercer lugar, se desarrollarán los problemas que conlleva la mencionada exégesis; en cuarto lugar, se expondrán las objeciones a la inclusión de la filosofía de Fichte como ejemplo de la concepción hegeliana de “alma bella”. Finalmente, se expondrán las conclusiones.: Many scholars have stated that the ontology of the Hegelian notion of “beautiful soul” is grounded in the category known as “bad infinite”, developed in the Doctrine of Being. Regarding this, scholars like Paha, Hinchman, Solomon and Harris state that Hegel was thinking of the Fichtean philosophical system as He developed his own notion of “beautiful soul”. However, this interpretation has some issues, which will be developed below. First, we give a short explanation about the shape of the Spirit known as “beautiful soul”. Second, we describe the category called “bad infinite”. Third, we show the issues related to the interpretation. Fourth, we present the objections to the inclusion of the Fichtean philosophy as an example of the Hegelian notion of “beautiful soul”. Finally, we present the conclusions. (shrink)

Cloning research caught a great deal of attention when Dolly the sheep was born (§4). While some fear surrounded the attainment (§§14-15), Wilmutʼs research itself has grown well, providing a less vicious manner to gain ES cells (§12). In this article, we review the progress of cloning research along with the concern of medical circles about its application to reproductive cloning, that is to say, making replicas of human beings (§§16-21). Note that all the content is ascribed to the author (...) alone, not to Musashino University. (shrink)

One can work for another person, probably for all the others in an ethical way, and not for money. This is the main idea pursued in this article. When it comes to labour, we are inclined to deal with Marx. But even Marx apparently did not notice this ethical side of labour, because his focus was mainly on the creation of value, which was common among thinkers at that time, such as Locke and Smith. In contrast, Hegel consistently tackled the (...) same issue from another angle: ethics. In terms of this, he went so far as to say the dignity of humans should be located in labour. We shed light on this very aspect of Hegel’s philosophy by reference to Alexandre Kojève’s famous commentary, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. (shrink)

This paper analyses the technoscientific objective of building a synthetic cell from a Jungian perspective. After decades of fragmentation and specialisation, the synthetic cell symbolises a turn towards restored wholeness, both at the object pole and at the subject pole. From a Jungian perspective, it is no coincidence that visual representations of synthetic cells often reflect an archetypal, mandala-like structure. As a symbol of restored unity, the synthetic cell mandala compensates for technoscientific fragmentation via active imagination, providing a visual aid (...) for the technoscientific turn towards reintegration. Although the biotechnological desire to reconstruct life in vitro has been compared to alchemy before, a Jungian analysis allows us to make this comparison more specific and precise. The problem of archetypal images, however, is that alluring prospects of reintegration may underestimate and obfuscate the deficiencies and tensions at work in the current situation. As a projection of a future wholeness, it fosters optimism, but may also function as a misleading façade, covering up collisions and complexities. This can be averted by the conscious employment of the mandala as a symbolic scaffold fostering processes of individuation and working through. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to synthesize as well as to analyze the conceptual evolution of 1860s Russian nihilism in general and its notion of negation in particular. The fictitious characters that traditionally have been informing the popular notion of “Russian nihilism” mainly refer to an antinihilistic genre. By analyzing nihilism also on the basis of primary sources, the antinihilistic notion of nihilism is nuanced, enabling a more comprehensive analysis of the movement’s different aspects. In some instances, Russian nihilism (...) has been taken out of context and portrayed as a monolith; its pursuit of “negation” interpreted literally. In this essay, a dialectical relation emerges, between affirmation and negation on the one hand as well as between the nihilist “children” and their idealist “fathers” on the other. Despite its radical stance, nihilism consists of a reconciliation of opposites. Although nihilists fought for autonomy, revolution and a new society, the movement was ironically stuck in a continuous negation of its inspirers and forerunners. (shrink)

The architect who plans and designs our living environment in town and country can neither think exclusively technologically nor act completely independently. Rather, his designs and actions are always in moral relation to the environment, i. e. to nature and landscape as well as to the city/town or the people who live daily with and within the built space and thus have a kind of effective group affiliation. But to what extent does architecture – in the sense of Hegel’s phrase (...) the “sensuous in the meaningful” – already possess ethical implications? (shrink)

Eine der frühesten Schriften des jungen Karl Marx — die Dissertationsschrift „Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie“ — legt wichtige Fundamente für das gesamte Marx’sche Denken. In der Dissertationsschrift versucht Marx anhand des Vergleichs der antiken Naturphilosophien Demokrits und Epikurs grundlegende Erkenntnisse der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie in einem komplexen, von Hegel inspirierten ontologischen System zu verbinden. Aus dieser kritischen Synthese antiker Naturphilosophien entsteht so eine auf Hegelschen Begriffen basierende, aber gleichzeitig reformierte Idee der Praxis. Auf diesen Grundlagen sowie mit (...) Hilfe des über die Kritik an Epikur und Hegel gewonnenen Begriffs der Entfremdung entwickelt Marx den dialektischen Materialismus der Naturphilosophie. Dem inhaltlichen Aufbau der Dissertationsschrift folgend wird in dem Aufsatz die Marx’sche Naturphilosophie diskutiert. Dabei werden die wichtigsten Begriffe des Marx‘schen Denkens, wie etwa Materialismus, Dialektik, Entfremdung oder Einheit von Theorie und Praxis in der Dissertationsschrift von Karl Marx ausgearbeitet. (shrink)

La filosofía feuerbachiana supone un relevante paso en la superación de cierta tradición filosófica basada en categorías meramente especulativas y metafísicas, y ello a partir de una concepción ética y antropológica que enraíza directamente con la perspectiva del reconocimiento recíproco. No obstante, el peso que adquiere la dimensión afectiva en la propuesta ética de Feuerbach problematiza, de hecho, la posibilidad de considerar la perspectiva del reconocimiento como contenido normativo de la moral a la hora de formular pretensiones de universalidad. En (...) este sentido, el presente trabajo trata de reflexionar sobre la actualidad del pensamiento feuerbachiano a partir de la reconstrucción de dicha perspectiva recognoscente, teniendo en cuenta tanto sus límites como posibilidades. (shrink)

Hegel afirma que la perspectiva del “alma bella” es sostenida por seguidores de Fichte que confunden el Yo absoluto con el yo psicofísico. Estos pensadores y literatos son reconocidos como miembros del Romanticismo alemán. Curiosamente, Hegel no menciona la obra de Jean Paul Richter entre estos casos. Jean Paul sostiene la identificación entre el Yo absoluto fichteano y la conciencia individual. Además, el autor de Hesperus define a los personajes principales de su novela como “almas bellas” y les atribuye cualidades (...) similares a las expuestas por Hegel en la concepción de su figura del Espíritu. El objetivo del presente artículo es demostrar la coincidencia entre la noción hegeliana de “alma bella” y la representación de la subjetividad expuesta por Jean Paul Richter en Hesperus. (shrink)

Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. -/- A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is (...) it different? What sorts of properties do social groups have? Can they have beliefs or intentions? Can they perform actions? And if so, what does it take for a group to believe, intend, or act? -/- Other entities investigated in social ontology include money, corporations, institutions, property, social classes, races, genders, artifacts, artworks, language, and law. It is difficult to delineate a precise scope for the field (see section 2.1). In general, though, the entities explored in social ontology largely overlap with those that social scientists work on. A good deal of the work in social ontology takes place within the social sciences (see sections 5.1–5.8). -/- Social ontology also addresses more basic questions about the nature of the social world. One set of questions pertains to the constituents, or building blocks, of social things in general. For instance, some theories argue that social entities are built out of the psychological states of individual people, while others argue that they are built out of actions, and yet others that they are built out of practices. Still other theories deny that a distinction can even be made between the social and the non-social. -/- A different set of questions pertains to how social categories are constructed or set up. Are social categories and kinds produced by our attitudes? By our language? Are they produced by causal patterns? And is there just one way social categories are set up, or are there many varieties of social construction? -/- The term ‘social ontology’ has only come into wide currency in recent years, but the nature of the social has been a topic of inquiry since ancient Greece. As a whole, the field can be understood as a branch of metaphysics, the general inquiry into the nature of entities. (shrink)

The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. (...) To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a possible object of questioning. In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ultimately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two, I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I develop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage. (shrink)

‘Universalist’ moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant’s specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate (...) judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant’s Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant’s Critical principles and methods in connection with ‘practical anthropology’ and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community. (shrink)

This monograph contributes to the scientific misconduct debate from an oblique perspective, by analysing seven novels devoted to this issue, namely: Arrowsmith by Sinclair Lewis (1925), The affair by C.P. Snow (1960), Cantor’s Dilemma by Carl Djerassi (1989), Perlmann’s Silence by Pascal Mercier (1995), Intuition by Allegra Goodman (2006), Solar by Ian McEwan (2010) and Derailment by Diederik Stapel (2012). Scientific misconduct, i.e. fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, but also other questionable research practices, have become a focus of concern for academic communities (...) worldwide, but also for managers, funders and publishers of research. The aforementioned novels offer intriguing windows into integrity challenges emerging in contemporary research practices. They are analysed from a continental philosophical perspective, providing a stage where various voices, positions and modes of discourse are mutually exposed to one another, so that they critically address and question one another. They force us to start from the admission that we do not really know what misconduct is. Subsequently, by providing case histories of misconduct, they address integrity challenges not only in terms of individual deviance but also in terms of systemic crisis, due to current transformations in the ways in which knowledge is produced. Rather than functioning as moral vignettes, the author argues that misconduct novels challenge us to reconsider some of the basic conceptual building blocks of integrity discourse. (shrink)

This paper is a revised version of the essay that won the Zapffe Prize in 2017. -/- In «The Last Messiah» and On the tragic, Peter Wessel Zapffe suggests that humankind should cease to reproduce, as the meaning of life cannot be found and human life at its best is tragic. The theory has been criticized for assuming that the meaning of life must be explained by an external cause and implicitly asks for an infinite causal chain. In this paper, (...) I argue that it is possible to escape this critique by adding a new element to the definition of the tragic: namely, the insight that the tragic cannot come into existence if the subject does not demonstrate its greatness. Precisely because a human, on Zapffe’s understanding, must prove its brilliance if tragedy is to arise, I argue that the tragic cannot be devoid of meaning. In contrast, the individual seems to be provided with a tragic meaning of life, rather than being deprived of it. Furthermore, the new definition of the tragic affects Zapffe’s antinatalism, because a tragic meaning of life does not necessitate that humankind should cease to reproduce. Yet, the definition does not suggest that humans should reproduce either. Instead, it confronts us with the following question: Should one bring new life into the world, when the meaning of life only can be found in the tragic? (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel developed the concept of institutionalized education, which reflected public schooling and its legitimacy in the context of rapid transformation of European feudal societies to modern societies. The concept of school reflects the Hegelian theory of Bildung and the concept of modern society. What makes Hegel’s philosophy interesting is his conviction that the processes of Bildung can take place only in the context of social institutions and in the highly organized forms of human interaction regulated by those (...) institutions. Hence the development of an individual, according to Hegel, depends exclusively on institutionalized forms of interaction. In modern society, pedagogical institutions have a specific function: on the one hand, schooling is essentially an institutional form of initiating the process of Bildung in which an individual acquires culture and applies it to life—a life which consequently becomes consciously led by an individual self; on the other, schooling is essentially a way for modern society to ensure its self-preservation by preparing the individual to respond to the demands of civic society so that she or he can take part in the economic production and reproduction of modern society. (shrink)

Was the philosophy of Early German Romanticism, as we understand it today, nothing but a milder variety of Early German Idealism? Not at all! One has only to note the radical differences between the two. Friedrich von Hardenberg and Friedrich Schlegel, the two most significant thinkers of the Early Romantic movement, decisively broke with what Reinhold’s critical disciples had called a “philosophy from the highest principle [Grundsatzphilosophie].” Instead of adopting Reinhold’s and Fichte’s idea of subjectivity as the principle of a (...) deductively unfolding system of knowledge, they replaced it with the idea of “philosophy as an unending longing for the Infinite.” Who only aspires to the Absolute cannot pretend to “possess” or capture it in an absolute knowledge as Fichte and Hegel did, but Schelling did not. Underlying Hegel’s and Fichte’s denial that the Absolute transcends knowability is the temptation to make existence itself dependent upon the grasp of thoughts or concepts, a temptation firmly rejected by the Early Romantics. This is why Early Romanticism should not be considered as a species of one or the other kind of Idealism, as most German and American researchers would like it to be. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a Lacanian approach to bioethics. Point of departure is the fact that both psychoanalysis and bioethics are practices of language, combining diagnostics with therapy. Subsequently, I will point out how Lacanian linguistics may help us to elucidate the dynamics of both psychoanalytical and bioethical discourse, using the movie One flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest and Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone as key examples. Next, I will explain the ‘topology’ of the bioethical landscape with the help of Lacan’s (...) three dimensions: the imaginary, the symbolical and the real. This will culminate in an assessment of the dynamics of bioethical discourse with the help of Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses. Bioethics, I will argue, is not a homogeneous discourse. Rather, four modalities of bioethical discourse can be distinguished, all of them displaying specific weaknesses and strengths, opportunities and threats. This will be elucidated with the help of two case studies, namely the debates on human reproductive technologies and on the use of animals as biomedical research models. (shrink)

Finding truth is an art that was learned and unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for independent confirmation of our beliefs, by reality. This methodology is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. A completely different social order is implied and the one keeps running the other into the ground like a tectonic plate. Philosophical Modernism showed us how dualism works, before Post-Modernism challenged it, regressing (...) to monism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper intends to build a dialogue between Nāgārjuna and Schelling on Self, world, and standpoints, taking as main references Nāgārjuna's The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way and Schelling's Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. Whereas Nāgārjuna criticizes the substantialization of beings by resorting to the discourse of the dependent co-origination in order to overcome suffering, Schelling, on his turn, refutes the fanaticism based on dogmatism's tenets in favor of the criticism interpreted according to its spirit, and not (...) according to its letter, in order to emancipate humanity. Starting with a succint contextualization of the Eastern and Western philosophical discourse, proceeding further to discuss the philosophies of both thinkers, the paper is concluded by assessing their theories. RESUMO O artigo pretende construir as linhas gerais do diálogo entre Nāgārjuna e Schelling sobre o eu, o mundo e os pontos de vista sobre eles, tomando como referência seus respectivos textos: Versos fundamentais sobre o caminho do meio e cartas filosóficas sobre dogmatismo e criticismo. Enquanto Nāgārjuna critica a substancialização dos entes em favor da explicação destes por meio do discurso calcado na cooriginação dependente tendo em vista a superação do sofrimento, Schelling, por seu turno, rejeita o delírio fanático ancorado nas teses do dogmatismo em favor de uma filosofia crítica, interpretada segundo seu espírito e não de acordo com sua letra, tendo em vista emancipar a humanidade. Iniciando com uma sucinta contextualização do discurso filosófico oriental e ocidental, passando, posteriormente, para a apresentação do pensamento dos dois autores, o artigo é encerrado com uma avaliação de suas teorias. (shrink)

What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of the various ways in which something could be socially constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism and what, if anything, unifies all social construction claims.

It has long been accepted that one of Levinas’ major concerns is to establish an ethics of responsibility for the ‘other.’ Yet it has been deemed for decades, even by Levinasians, that his approach to that concern is ‘unsystematic’ and ‘not consistent.’ That situation arose because Levinas’ four terms for ‘other’ are difficult to translate, so his terms were first addressed by adopting English conventions. Such conventions have furthered Levinas scholarship, but our aim is to consider Levinas’ consistency: Hence we (...) undertake the first English-language assessment of the rigour of Levinas’ approach in 1961 to the ‘other’ by means of all four terms. To do so, we follow a ‘formal structure’ that Levinas develops from the tradition of phenomenological logic—mostly Husserl’s. We hope the result will palliate worries about Levinas’ rigor, and allow new ways to engage with his work. (shrink)

I wholeheartedly sympathize conceptually with Coeckelbergh’s paper. The dialectical relationship between vulnerability and technology constitutes the core of Hegel’s Master and Slave. Yet, the empirical dimension is underdeveloped and Coeckelbergh’s ideas could profit from exposure to case studies. Building on a movie/novel devoted to vulnerability coping and living with ICT, I challenge the claim that modern heroism entails overcoming vulnerability with the help of enhancement and computers.

Examines Hegel’s unique understanding and assessment of capitalism as an economic, social, and cultural phenomenon.

In hyper-modern society, food has become a source of endemic discontent. Many food products are seen as ‘tainted’; literally, figuratively or both. A psychoanalytic approach, I will argue, may help us to come to terms with our alimentary predicaments. What I envision is a ‘depth ethics’ focusing on some of the latent tensions, conflicts and ambiguities at work in the current food debate. First, I will outline some promising leads provided by two prominent psychoanalytic authors, namely Sigmund Freud and Jacques (...) Lacan. Subsequently, I will elucidate why our chronic dependency on high-tech food production apparently fails to meet consumer needs, focusing on some scenarios of escape, such as anorexia, cultured meat and ersatz food. And I will use ‘genres of the imagination’ to flesh out how food consumption has become a podium for enacting cultural symptoms, moral outcries, provocative identities and practices of the Self. Notably, I will discuss a story by Franz Kafka, a painting by Pablo Picasso and a food novel by Margaret Atwood. (shrink)