This paper outlines the basic traits of a responsive phenomenology by focusing on the issue of originary substitution. On the one hand, a phenomenology of alienness or otherness and an ethics of the other in the sense of Levinas will prove to be closely bound up with this sort of substitution. On the other side, this substitution can be concretised by transitional figures such as the advocate, the therapist, the translator, the witness, or the field researcher; they all intervene from (...) the position of a Third without closing the fissure which opens between ourselves and the Other, between the own and the alien. Precisely by focussing on the issue of substitution, we have the opportunity to outline the basis traits of a responsive phenomenology and to discuss some of its institutional consequences. (shrink)

Against the background of worldwide, intentional or unintentional everyday violations of human dignity and the epochal need to experience oneself as a human being in one’s specific way of being, this article attempts to pursue the question of human dignity and its concealment. On the one hand, it seeks to ask whether human dignity has become obsolete due to social and epochal developments and preconditions and whether it can only appear and be experienced as antiquated in the context of a (...) technological language or an administered world. On the other hand, it asks whether ethical and anthropological thinking have not sufficiently experienced, thought, and conceptualized man. From the context of these perspectives that determine the question of dignity, Heidegger’s article seeks to take up Heidegger’s repeated search for an original ethics based on Heraclitus’ fragment 119, and from this point of view to ask for a perhaps deeper and more adequate understanding of human dignity. At the centre of this is Heidegger’s thesis that human dignity is based on the protection of the unhidden and, ever before, the hiddenness of all beings. Without wanting to ignore the difficulty and complexity of Heidegger’s thinking, the author seeks to find access to this understanding of our dignity based on the experience of personal encounters. (shrink)

El presente trabajo ofrece un intento de reconstrucción del modo en el que Heidegger llega a su peculiar interpretación de la conexión entre φύσις y ἀλήθεια, que constituye un elemento clave de la «hermenéutica de los dos comienzos» presentada en Beiträge zur Philosophie, y que juega de allí en más un papel importantísimo en el marco del «giro» (Kehre) que da lugar al «pensar ontohistórico» (seinsgeschichtliches Denken). A tal fin se considera el modo en que Heidegger interpreta el pensamiento de (...) Heráclito. Además de intentar aportar a una mejor comprensión del desarrollo interno del pensamiento heideggeriano, la discusión apunta también a hacer posible una evaluación crítica de la plausibilidad de construcción interpretativa elaborada por Heidegger. (shrink)

Based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger the article presents the possibility of actualizing Heidegger’s main question about the meaning of Being in the context of the analysis of so-called “a priori perfect.” During the development of fundamental ontology in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger ponders the approach to Being in the history of philosophy and identifies such a feature of Being as a priori, a kind of antecedence of Being in relation to being. Although tradition invariably understands (...) Being in this way, in it, according to Heidegger, the question is no longer raised either about the sense of such antecedence, or about the temporal basis of this sense, and therefore a priori as the essential character of Being is left in total oblivion. We suggest that it is the problematization of apriority in its temporal origin that can contribute to resolving Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical question of time as the transcendental horizon of any concept of Being that precedes being. In this precedence there is a cherished temporal moment, the comprehension of which allows us to develop the “basic question of metaphysics” about the relationship of Being and time in a more concrete way than Heidegger’s four main themes of the question of Being: the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being ); the truth-character of Being; the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being’s variety. Revealing a priori question as the central question of all Heideggers thinking before the “Turn” we attempt to update this question and justify the need for its renewal on the basis of a fundamental ontology. With this task we relate the question of the essence of philosophy in general in its existential-temporal concept since philosophy appears as a temporality-based possible of the questioning return to the “earlier”: to the essential structures of being, knowledge, Being, Dasein. Our analysis is based on the following decisions: Being in relation to being is always pre-understood as “earlier,” and in this understanding a temporal definition operates, hence the main question of fundamental ontology about the relation of Being and time can be developed or at least clarified through the problem of meaning of a priori. The question of the meaning of the “earlier” and of the temporal basis for understanding Being as “earlier,” a priori, is concretized into the question of the conditions for the possibility of any ontology, including the fundamental ontology, which raises the question of the earlier in relation to Being and therefore “lives” in the light of the understanding of the “earlier” as such. This reflexive foundation of the fundamental ontology from itself is a necessary stage on the way of developing its project, if we remember that the main “duty” of the philosopher is to clarify “our inner nature” for the sake of opening the boundaries and conditions of the possibility of philosophy. The conclusion is that the possibilities of fundamental ontology in making sense of Being, time, and philosophy in general are far from exhausted, but await the questions that actualize them and new readings that allow to see the hidden richness of Heidegger’s thought. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger has retrospectively characterized his philosophy as “phenomenology of the invisible”. This paradoxical formula suggests that the aim of his thinking was to examine the origin of the phenomena. Furthermore, Heidegger has also stated that his philosophy is ultimately motivated by a theological interest, namely the question of God’s absence. Following the guiding thread of those remarks, this essay analyzes the essential traits of Heidegger’s thought by interpreting them as an attempt to develop a phenomenology of the invisible. Heidegger’s (...) attitude towards physics and metaphysics, his theory of truth, his reading of Aristotle, his concept of Dasein, his understanding of nothingness are all situated within the problematic context of the relation between the invisible and the revealed. Heidegger’s thought is thereby posited at the point of intersection of phenomenology, ontology, and theology. (shrink)

Is it possible to think about “the Greeks” without exposing oneself to what they call their gods? Feeling called upon to respond to this question, precisely within the constellation of Europe’s most gloomy hour, Martin Heidegger employs the instruments that come to him through his own “turn,” but also from further back: the “Fourfold” and the “Holy” may thus be studied in their crucial confrontation with Parmenides. A corollary resides in the link with the famous problem of “Hellenization” in Christianity.

_Purpose._ The purity of consciousness in European culture has practically been turned into an abstraction. Because of this, there are so many discrepancies in understanding its nature. For Heidegger, the question of the purity of human consciousness remains open. Our purpose is to study the purity of European consciousness in the work of M. Heidegger. _Theoretical basis._ We draw on the deep foundations of existential, phenomenological, hermeneutic, religious-philosophical and postmodern Western and Eastern thought. _Originality._ While the early Heidegger was thinking (...) under the sign of Dasein, he did not hear the nature of the "pure consciousness" of human. Nevertheless, temporality for him was such a fundamental property that it determined the depth of understanding not only of being, but also of human consciousness itself (like Dasein). In this context, we begin to understand that the depth of consciousness in the concept of early Heidegger can be associated with its temporality. In fact, towards the end of "Being and Time", Heidegger, thinking more and more about the understanding of time from the horizon of being, begins to form similar ideas about understanding itself, that is, about human consciousness, in the sense that consciousness itself arises from the horizon of time (and being). What, then, is pure human consciousness the pure time? Does not this mean that the original meaning of consciousness is in its directed temporalizing. This temporalizing of consciousness of human (as a thinking being), which arises from the future, is perceived in three modes and reveals the fundamental nature of the consciousness itself (thinking is a stream of consciousness and, in such a context, directed understanding). Paraphrasing Heidegger, we say that the ontological meaning of pure human consciousness is revealed as temporality. Already after writing _Being and Time_, Heidegger thinks about the origins of the European consciousness, its comprehending from the depths (originality) of the being of European culture. _Conclusions._ The early Heidegger seeks the purity of being and, at the same time, strives more and more to understand the essence of the purity of human thinking. All of Heidegger’s work is a consistent transition from human understanding of the purity of being (Dasein) to the purity of thinking of a human himself. In this sense, there is a transformation of M. Heidegger’s consciousness from fundamental ontology (Dasein) in the early period to existential anthropology (human consciousness) in the late period. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIf we take Heidegger's ontology to be a philosophy of history, then, for Husserl, the problem of history is only one among the three major directions of his thoughts. After Husserl met Dilthey in 1905, he more and more attended to the problem of history and reflected upon the longitudinal intentionality of time-genesis-history. His basic idea is to grasp the condition of possibility of history by means of an eidetic intuition upon the longitudinal intentionality. However, because Husserl never explicates his (...) thoughts on history in his published works, he is often regarded as a “non-historical” philosopher. In fact, like Dilthey, Husserl purports to combine historical enlightenment with critique of knowledge. It is hence Dilthey-Yorck, Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer who established together the most important tradition of history of philosophy in the twentieth century, namely, phenomenological-ontological philosophy of history. (shrink)

Within the loose group of studies that are sometimes labelled Heideggerian cinema – studies in which scholars consider film in conjunction with Heidegger's philosophy – little attention has been paid to Heidegger's actual view of cinema. This omission is not only odd but it is also problematic. In the off-hand comments Heidegger directs towards film throughout his collected works he criticises the medium for its covering over of Being, a fact that makes engaging with film through Heidegger's thinking a questionable (...) project. The present article aims to address this omission and to provide a conception of Heideggerian cinema that does not ignore, but answers, Heidegger's criticism. It argues that it is not the technological nature of cinema that is the source of Heidegger's hostility towards the medium but his conception of the film-photographic image as a transparent copy of the world. It is on this basis that cinema is denied the ca... (shrink)

En este articulo analizamos el fenómeno del Ereignis en la obra de Heidegger posterior a la Kehre para confrontar su origen conflictivo. Para esto, presentamos la influencia de su lectura del πόλεµοç de Heráclito y una interpretación de la estructura y sus dimensiones gracias a la tensión de las partes que se mantienen en continua oscilación por la naturaleza abismal de la donación. Asimismo, revisamos el camino que presentan los ensambles del fenómeno a la luz de su obra Beiträge zur (...) Philosophie. De esto modo, comprenderemos un poco más el sentido complejo de este fenómeno y su aporte al problema de la diferencia. In this paper we analyze the phenomenon of Ereignis in Heidegger's work after the Kehre, in order to question his conflicting origin. To do this, we show the influence of his reading of Heraclitus' πόλεµοç as well as an interpretation of the structure and its dimensions, thanks to the tension between the parts kept in continuous oscillation due to the abysmal nature of donation. We also revised the path shown by the gatherings of the phenomenon, in the light of his work Beiträge zur Philosophie. This way, we may get greater insights into the complex sense of this phenomenon and its contribution to the issue of difference. (shrink)

At the very outset of his 1943 lecture-course on Heraclitus, Heidegger speaks of philosophical thinking. Such thinking, says Heidegger, is authentic (eigentliche) and essential (wesentliche), owing...

Martin Heidegger rarely explicitly dealt with the topic of music. The Heraclitus lectures, delivered in 1943 and 1944, offer a notable exception. Heidegger here speaks openly of the “Lied der Erde” (“Earth’s song”). Most intriguing, perhaps, though, is the use of Fügung in relation to ἁρμονία (harmonia), which he links to understanding φὑσις (physis; the “emerging” character of the world) and being. Translated by Assaiante and Ewegen as “jointure,” Fügung bears a connection with the German Fuge, which contains the double (...) meaning of joint and fugue. Drawing on a close reading of the Heraclitus lectures, this paper will explore the dual nature of Fügung with an eye towards laying the groundwork for understanding a latent musicality within Heidegger’s larger corpus, centering around perceiving, fugue, and their implications for listening to the “Earth’s song,” which will be read in literal, environmental terms as the soundscape or, perhaps, musical manifold. (shrink)

Since the seminal 1955 habilitation by Heidegger's pupil, Walter Schulz, it has become an open secret that Schelling's philosophy, more than that of any of the other German Idealists, is an immediate antecedent to Heidegger's thought. For this reason, it is all the more fascinating that to this day research is still lopsidedly concerned with the interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Schelling's Freedom Essay and that a thorough and overarching investigation into the idealistic inheritance of Martin Heidegger's thought remains wanting. (...) The same applies to the debates that Heidegger's students began in the twentieth century. The traditions of modern nature ethics and the criticism of technology, which derive from Schelling, were interpreted and mediated through Heidegger to his students Hans Jonas, Hannah Arendt, and Günther Anders. This essay attempts to delineate some of the basic features of a more bilateral or dialogical relationship between these two philosophers and to more fully appreciate Heidegger's relationship to German Idealism in general and Schelling in particular. (shrink)

In this article, a comparative analysis of Karl Popper’s falsifiability theory and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the context of the historical-philosophical approach to the problem of new knowledge formation and justification is undertaken. An assumption is made that the constellation of fact is connected with the possibility of the emergence of an epistemological field. Researchers have repeatedly addressed this issue; however, one important detail received no due attention: Popper’s counter-arguments regarding Wittgenstein’s view on semantic paradoxes show the fundamental (...) difference of these philosophers’ views on the sign and the signified, which contributes to the analysis of new knowledge formation. Arguments that concern both early and late periods of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are used in this study. The uncertainty of the demarcation criterion allowed analyzing Wittgenstein’s position as to how and why different rules of inference form different epistemological fields. (shrink)

This paper returns to one of Heidegger’s pivotal references to ethics – his remarks in the “Letter on Humanism” – and attempts to follow up on a line of thinking in those remarks that Heidegger himself did not expand upon, namely, the link between ethics and Sophoclean tragedy. Reading Heidegger’s analysis of Heraclitus’s Fragment 119 on ἤθος with reference to Sophoclean tragedy and in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking and his comments elsewhere on ethics and tragedy, the paper seeks to clarify (...) how the thinking of being is, as Heidegger called it, an “original ethics” and what that means for ethical thinking following Heidegger. (shrink)

The complexities of Heidegger’s early accounts of nature provide a privileged perspective from which to understand the evolution of his thought into the 1930s and beyond. This movement seems largely driven by his response to what Karsten Harries has called “the antinomy of being”. In Heidegger’s early writings, Natur is associated with the “theoretical” and the “intraworldly.” However, less attested is an “unworlded” and thus intrinsically “incomprehensible” sense of nature, as the abyssal ground of worlding. This thread is traced through (...) key Marburg period texts, into Being and Time, and beyond it into the 1928 “metontology” appendix and its surprising transformation in the 1929 inaugural lecture. Finally, some cursory observations are made about how this trajectory unfolds in later Heideggerian thought, taking the 1936 Artwork essay as an example, showing how both sides of the antinomy of being come to be incorporated within a more comprehensive framing of the Seinsfrage. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article we propose to study the way in which the conceptualization of death carried out by Hegel has been read by a series of authors. In this way, in a first section we will restore Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel to, in a second moment, recover Kojève’s decisive reading of the same author, and end with a replacement of the hermeneutics carried out by Bataille of the German idealist philosopher. Thus, in the conclusion to this article, the existence (...) of repeated and extremely similar motifs present in the three recently named thinkers will be exposed, for whom the figure of Hegel has certainly constituted an unavoidable inheritance. (shrink)

The light metaphor is a perpetual favorite for philosophers, both East and West. I seek to revaluate its opposite, darkness. I claim that there are good reasons to favor darkness over light, or at least to not see them as mutually incompatible or in hierarchical fashion. In recent Western philosophy, both Heidegger and Derrida argue that what the light metaphor represents, the promise of clarity and objectivity, is exactly what makes Western metaphysics problematic. In Chinese philosophy, classical Daoism offers a (...) thinking that does not favor the light metaphor over its opposite. Daoists have the good sense to acknowledge darkness as a positive contribution to human life, at the very least on par with light. I argue that both the Western criticism of the light metaphor, and the Daoist approach to light and darkness, can be read as challenging the metaphysics of presence and providing an alternative way of thought. (shrink)

Esta contribución elabora la concepción del ser en su mismidad e ipseidad en Heidegger y Nietzsche, contrastando la concepción nietzscheana de la voluntad de poder y del eterno retorno con la interpretación heideggeriana y enmarcándola dentro de su concepción del ser anterior y posterior a la Kehre. La tesis sostiene que, mientras Heidegger concibe la ipseidad ya no como identidad a sí mismo en el sentido de las egologías tradicionales, sino como modo de existencia auténtico del Dasein que se asume (...) como tal, la concepción de Nietzsche es la inversa: la ipseidad como modo de existencia implica la renuncia a ser uno mismo y la asunción de diferencias y transformación de las fuerzas componentes. Mientras la mismidad en Nietzsche se resume al querer [Wille] como unicidad eternamente retornante, un retorno a la mismidad originaria en el sentido heideggeriano es imposible porque las diferencias son irreductibles a una pertenencia originaria de ser y pensar. Paradójicamente, el “yo” nietzscheano es propiamente él mismo, renunciando a ser él mismo: éste es el poder que lo singulariza. (shrink)

The call to “know thyself” is neither a matter of presence and absence to self, nor the necessary or unnecessary possibility or impossibility of self-knowledge ‒ rather it is a problem. And the oracle gives a sign of this problem by implying that which is neither spoken nor concealed. But if implication is the problem of the sign, it is because it suspends the self and the very possibility of self-knowledge.

From the mid-thirties onwards, Martin Heidegger occasionally speculated about the future possibility of artificially producing human beings. What is at stake in biotechnology, Heidegger claims, is the imminent possibility of the destruction of the human essence. It is unclear, however, how Heidegger can substantiate such a claim given that he consistently denounced attempts to define human Dasein as a living being to which a higher capacity such as reason or language is added. This paper will argue that, in this sense, (...) Heidegger took the radical challenge of biotechnology both too seriously and not seriously enough. Too seriously, because it is unclear why he would fear the annihilation of Dasein’s essence if he is convinced that this essence is not related to man’s biological equipment in the first place. Not seriously enough, because Heidegger at the same time remained convinced that even the most intrusive interventions in the human body will not be able to disrupt Dasein’s ontological essence. (shrink)