Results for 'Mark Goncharenko'

958 found
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  1. Research Notes of Mark Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    Research notes of Mark Pettinelli about cognitive science, cognitive psychology.
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  2. The Collected Works of Mark Rozen Pettinelli [2006-2015].Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    This collection of articles is almost all of the psychological writings of Mark Pettinelli.
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  3. The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.
    Reasons, it is often said, are king in contemporary normative theory. Some philosophers say not only that the vocabulary of reasons is useful, but that reasons play a fundamental explanatory role in normative theory—that many, most, or even all, other normative facts are grounded in facts about reasons. Even if reasons fundamentalism, the strongest version of this view, has only been wholeheartedly endorsed by a few philosophers, it has a kind of prominence in contemporary normative theory that suits it to (...)
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  4. Mental Notes of Mark Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
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  5. Authorial Freedom.Mark Schroeder - 2024 - In Berislav Marušić & Mark Schroeder (eds.), Analytic Existentialism. Oxford University Press.
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  6. How Does the Good Appear To Us?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):119-130.
    This is a rough draft of a critical notice of Sergio Tenenbaum’s book, Appearances of the Good, for Social Theory and Practice.
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  7. When Beliefs Wrong.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):115-127.
    Most philosophers find it puzzling how beliefs could wrong, and this leads them to conclude that they do not. So there is much philosophical work to be done in sorting out whether I am right to say that they do, as well as how this could be so. But in this paper I will take for granted that beliefs can wrong, and ask instead when beliefs wrong. My answer will be that beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. This answer has (...)
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  8.  78
    Preregistration Does Not Improve the Transparent Evaluation of Severity in Popper’s Philosophy of Science or When Deviations are Allowed.Mark Rubin - manuscript
    One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration can facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo’s error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper’s theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are (...)
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  9.  47
    Believing Well.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 196-212.
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  10. Sins of Thought.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):273-293.
    According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.
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  11. Reasons and Agent-neutrality.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):279-306.
    This paper considers the connection between the three-place relation, R is a reason for X to do A and the two-place relation, R is a reason to do A. I consider three views on which the former is to be analyzed in terms of the latter. I argue that these views are widely held, and explain the role that they play in motivating interesting substantive ethical theories. But I reject them in favor of a more obvious analysis, which goes the (...)
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  12.  96
    Perceptual Reasons and Defeat.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 269-284.
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  13. The Selected Writings of Mark Pettinelli.Mark Pettinelli - manuscript
    The best writing of Mark Pettinelli, about cognitive psychology, cognitive science, etc.
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  14. Is semantics formal?Mark Schroeder - manuscript
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question of the extent to which semantics can be thought of as a purely formal exercise, which we can engage in in a way that is neutral with respect to how our formal system is to be interpreted. I will be arguing, to the contrary, that the features of the formal systems which we use to do semantics are closely linked, in several different ways, to the interpretation that we give to (...)
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  15. Inconsistent multiple testing corrections: The fallacy of using family-based error rates to make inferences about individual hypotheses.Mark Rubin - 2024 - Methods in Psychology 10.
    During multiple testing, researchers often adjust their alpha level to control the familywise error rate for a statistical inference about a joint union alternative hypothesis (e.g., “H1,1 or H1,2”). However, in some cases, they do not make this inference. Instead, they make separate inferences about each of the individual hypotheses that comprise the joint hypothesis (e.g., H1,1 and H1,2). For example, a researcher might use a Bonferroni correction to adjust their alpha level from the conventional level of 0.050 to 0.025 (...)
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  16. Is There a Duty-Generating Special Relationship of Creator to Creature?Mark Satta - 2020 - Sophia 59 (4):637-649.
    Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a special relationship that generates new moral obligations for the creator. Murphy’s position is grounded, in part, on his claim that there are no good arguments to the contrary and that the creator-creature relationship is not a relationship between equals. I argue that there are good reasons to think that a creator and creature being equals is not required for such an obligation. I offer (...)
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  17. The Narrow Ontic Counterfactual Account of Distinctively Mathematical Explanation.Mark Povich - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):511-543.
    An account of distinctively mathematical explanation (DME) should satisfy three desiderata: it should account for the modal import of some DMEs; it should distinguish uses of mathematics in explanation that are distinctively mathematical from those that are not (Baron [2016]); and it should also account for the directionality of DMEs (Craver and Povich [2017]). Baron’s (forthcoming) deductive-mathematical account, because it is modelled on the deductive-nomological account, is unlikely to satisfy these desiderata. I provide a counterfactual account of DME, the Narrow (...)
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  18. What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.
    forthcoming in reisner and steglich-peterson, eds., Reasons for Belief If I believe, for no good reason, that P and I infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence that I have. It seems to me that this is a good reason to include an epistemic acceptability constraint on evidence (...)
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  19. Treating like a child.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):73-89.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 73-89, June 2022.
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  20. The Philosophical Work of Mark Sharlow: an Introduction and Guide.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    Provides an overview of Mark Sharlow's philosophical work with summaries of his positions. Includes references and links to his writings.
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  21. Mechanistic Explanation in Psychology.Mark Povich - forthcoming - In Hank Stam & Huib Looren De Jong (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Theoretical Psychology. (Eds.) Hank Stam and Huib Looren de Jong. Sage.
    Philosophers of psychology debate, among other things, which psychological models, if any, are (or provide) mechanistic explanations. This should seem a little strange given that there is rough consensus on the following two claims: 1) a mechanism is an organized collection of entities and activities that produces, underlies, or maintains a phenomenon, and 2) a mechanistic explanation describes, represents, or provides information about the mechanism producing, underlying, or maintaining the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. the explanandum phenomenon) (Bechtel and Abrahamsen (...)
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  22.  65
    Convergence in Plan.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 307-318.
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  23. There is no aesthetic experience of the genuine.Mark Windsor - 2023 - Analysis 83 (2):305-312.
    Many hold that aesthetic appreciation is sensitive to the authenticity or genuineness of an object. In a recent body of work, Carolyn Korsmeyer has defended the claim that genuineness itself is an aesthetic property. Korsmeyer’s aim is to explain our aesthetic appreciation of objects that afford a sense of being ‘in touch with the past’. In this paper, I argue that genuineness cannot explain our appreciation of these objects. There is no aesthetic experience of the genuine.
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  24. (1 other version)Mapping Human Values: Enhancing Social Marketing through Obituary Data-Mining.Mark Alfano, Andrew Higgins & Jacob Levernier - forthcoming - In Lynn Kahle & Eda Atay (eds.), Social and Cultural Values in a Global and Digital Age.
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  25.  53
    (2 other versions)Implications for virtue epistemology from psychological science: Intelligence as an interactionist virtue.Mark Alfano & Gus Skorburg - 2018 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 433-445.
    This chapter aims to expand the body of empirical literature considered relevant to virtue theory beyond the burned-over districts that are the situationist challenges to virtue ethics and epistemology. We thus raise a rather simple-sounding question: why doesn’t virtue epistemology have an account of intelligence? In the first section, we sketch the history and present state of the person-situation debate to argue for the importance of an interactionist framework in bringing psychological research in general, and intelligence research in particular, to (...)
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  26. Aristotle on the Unity of Touch.Mark A. Johnstone - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (1):23-43.
    Aristotle is history’s most famous and influential proponent of the view that there are exactly five senses. But was he entitled to hold this view, given his other commitments? In particular, was he entitled to treat touch as a single sense, given the diversity of its correlated objects? In this paper I argue that Aristotle wished to individuate touch on the basis of its correlated objects, just as he had the other four senses. I also argue, contrary to what is (...)
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  27. A Schooling in Contempt: Emotions and the pathos of distance.Mark Alfano - 2018 - In Paul Katsafanas (ed.), Routledge Philosophical Minds: The Nietzschean Mind. Routledge.
    Nietzsche scholars have developed an interest in his use of “thick” moral psychological concepts such as virtues and emotions. This development coincides with a renewed interest among both philosophers and social scientists in virtues, the emotions, and moral psychology more generally. Contemporary work in empirical moral psychology posits contempt and disgust as both basic emotions and moral foundations of normative codes. While virtues can be individuated in various ways, one attractive principle of individuation is to index them to characteristic emotions (...)
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  28. Phonetic possibility and modal logic.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I propose a formalization, using modal logic, of the notion of possibility that phoneticians use when they judge speech sounds to be possible or impossible. I argue that the most natural candidate for a modal logic of phonetic possibility is the modal system T.
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  29. I am an abstraction, therefore I am.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I examine a new variant of the well-known idea that the self is an abstract object. I propose a simple model of the self as a property of temporal slices of a body's history. I argue that this model, when combined with even a modest realism with regard to properties, implies that the self has many of the chief features traditionally attributed to selves. I conclude that this model allows one to reconcile the full reality of the (...)
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  30. Moral imagination: implications of cognitive science for ethics.Mark Johnson - 1993 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Using path-breaking discoveries of cognitive science, Mark Johnson argues that humans are fundamentally imaginative moral animals, challenging the view that morality is simply a system of universal laws dictated by reason. According to the Western moral tradition, we make ethical decisions by applying universal laws to concrete situations. But Johnson shows how research in cognitive science undermines this view and reveals that imagination has an essential role in ethical deliberation. Expanding his innovative studies of human reason in Metaphors We (...)
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  31. Hard cases for combining expressivism and deflationist truth: Conditionals and epistemic modals.Mark Schroeder - unknown - In Steven Gross (ed.), [Published in mind 110, April 2001].
    In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more pressing and (...)
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  32. Which Fitch?Mark Jago - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):436-439.
    Jago uses a Fitch-style argument in an attempt to demonstrate that every truth has a truthmaker. But Trueman shows that there is a parallel argument, this time to the conclusion that no truth has a truthmaker. Since we cannot accept both, we must ditch at least one Fitch. But which? Keywords: Truth, truthmaking, truthmaker maximalism, Fitch paradox, Robert Trueman.
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  33. Fanaticism in the manosphere.Mark Alfano & Paul-Mikhail Podosky - 2023 - In Paul Katsafanas (ed.), Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy. London: Rewriting the History of Philosophy.
    This chapter explores a case study in contemporary fanaticism. We adopt Katsafanas’s conceptualization of fanaticism to make possible an in-depth discussion of and evaluation of a diffuse but important social movement — the anglophone manosphere. According to Katsafanas, fanatics are fruitfully understood as members of a group that adopts sacred values which they hold unconditionally to preserve their own psychic unity, and who feel that those values are threatened by those who do not accept them. The manosphere includes several social (...)
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  34.  73
    On the Compatibility of Connectionism and Cognitive Linguistics.Mark Collier - 1998 - Center for Research in Language 11 (4):3-11.
    Is PDP Connectionism compatible with Cognitive Linguistics? It is unfortunate that this question has not received the attention it deserves, since at stake is the very possibility of a unified "West Coast Cognitive Science" approach to language. Part I of this paper argues that a systematic approach to the question of compatibility must involve an enumeration and analysis of the general principles used by each research program in their linguistic explanations. This approach is carried out in Parts II and III, (...)
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  35. Experientialism Unidealized.Mark Schroeder - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2485-2489.
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  36.  74
    Attributive Silencing.Mark Schroeder - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 12:170-192.
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  37. Shifting Perspective on Indexicals.Mark Bowker - 2022 - Pragmatics 32 (4):518-536.
    The debate over the meanings of indexical expressions has relied heavily on the method of counterexamples. This paper challenges that method by showing that purported counterexamples can often be explained away by appeal to perspective shifts. For these counterexamples to establish anything about indexical reference, we must identify the conditions under which theorists can legitimately appeal to perspective shifts. Some tests for semantic content are considered and it is argued that none of them can tell us when appeal to perspective (...)
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  38. Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...)
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  39.  55
    Rationality in Retrospect.Mark Schroeder - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:1-26.
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  40. The Unfinishable Scroll and Beyond: Mark Sharlow's Blogs, July 2008 to March 2011.Mark F. Sharlow - manuscript
    An archive of Mark Sharlow's two blogs, "The Unfinishable Scroll" and "Religion: the Next Version." Covers Sharlow's views on metaphysics, epistemology, mind, science, religion, and politics. Includes topics and ideas not found in his papers.
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  41. A serpent in the garden?Mark Bowker - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper presents Elmar Unnsteinsson’s novel theory of Edenic Intentionalism, on which a speaker cannot refer to an object when the speaker is relevantly confused about its identity. A challenge to the theory is presented and several possible responses considered. The challenge is this: According to Edenic Intentionalism, reference often fails even when speakers seem to refer successfully. Elmar therefore supplements Edenic Intentionalism with an explanation of how communication can succeed without reference. If such an explanation is available, it isn’t (...)
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  42. Seven Theses Concerning Hume’s Skepticism with Regard to Reason.Mark Ressler - manuscript
    There is a controversy concerning whether to give Section 1.4.1 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature a skeptical or naturalistic reading. I divide the overall interpretation of this section into seven smaller interpretative theses, none of which alone determine either a skeptical or naturalistic reading, but which together better support what has been called the naturalistic interpretation.
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  43.  64
    Visualizing Values.Mark Alfano, Andrew Higgins, Jacob Levernier & Veronica Alfano - forthcoming - In David Rheams, Tai Neilson & Lewis Levenberg (eds.), Handbook of Methods in the Digital Humanities. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Digital humanities research has developed haphazardly, with substantive contributions in some disciplines and only superficial uses in others. It has made almost no inroads in philosophy; for example, of the nearly two million articles, chapters, and books housed at philpapers.org, only sixteen pop up when one searches for ‘digital humanities’. In order to make progress in this field, we demonstrate that a hypothesis-driven method, applied by experts in data-collection, -aggregation, -analysis, and -visualization, yields philosophical fruits. “Call no one happy until (...)
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  44. Blessed Are Those Who Have Not Seen and Yet Have Known By Faith: Knowledge, Faith, and Sight in the New Testament.Mark J. Boone - 2020 - Evangelical Quarterly 2 (91):133-146.
    THIS IS A PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION OF THE PAPER. The New Testament speaks of our having faith rather than sight. This distinction is not made to distinguish faith from knowledge. Rather, it is to distinguish one kind of knowledge from another. We may know by trust in reliable authority; this knowledge is necessarily secondhand, but it is knowledge all the same. This, I argue, is the New Testament idea of faith. Another way of knowing is firsthand. Sight in the New Testament, (...)
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  45. Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):257-309.
    This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to (...)
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  46. Knowledge Based on Seeing.Mark Schroeder - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):101-107.
    In Epistemological Disjunctivism, Duncan Prichard defends his brand of epistemological disjunctivism from three worries. In this paper I argue that his responses to two of these worries are in tension with one another.
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  47. God et al—World-Making as Collaborative Improvisation: New Metaphors for Open Theists.Mark Steen - 2022 - In K. J. Clark and J. Koperski (ed.), Abrahamic Reflections on Randomness and Providence. pp. 311-338.
    The Abrahamic traditions regard God as the world’s author. But what kind of author? A novelist? A playwright? Perhaps a composer of classical music? I will argue that it is best to regard God as like an improvisational play director or the leader of a jazz ensemble. Each determines the broad melodic contours or coarse-grained plot beforehand, while allowing their musicians or actors, and chance, to fill in the more fine-grained details. This analogy allows us to regard God as the (...)
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  48. How Technology Changes Our Idea of the Good.Mark Sentesy - 2011 - In Laverdure Paul & Mbonimpa Melchior (eds.), Eth-ICTs: Ethics and the New Information and Communication Technologies. University of Sudbury. pp. 109-123.
    The ethical neutrality of technology has been widely questioned, for example, in the case of the creation and continued existence of weapons. At stake is whether technology changes the ethical character of our experience: compare the experience of seeing a beating to videotaping it. Interpreting and elaborating on the work of George Grant and Marshall McLuhan, this paper consists of three arguments: 1) the existence of technologies determines the structures of civilization that are imposed on the world, 2) technologies shape (...)
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  49. The Philosophical Beliefs of Humanity: Dogmatism, Relativism, and Skeptical-Dogmatism.Mark Walker - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  50. The Epistemic Consequences of Forced Choice.Mark Schroeder - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (3):365-374.
    In “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” I used a variety of cases, including cases of forced choice, to illustrate my explanation of how and why some pragmatic factors, but not others, can affect whether an agent knows. In his recent contribution, Andy Mueller argues that cases of forced choice actually pose a dilemma for my account. In this paper I reply.
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