- Constitutive Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts.Michelle Liu - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-25.details
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Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.details
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The Role of Certainty.Timm Triplett - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):171-190.details
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The Knowledge Argument and Two Interpretations of 'Knowing What it's Like'.Daniel Stoljar - 2017 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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The world as I found it. A subjectivist metaphysics of the mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2015 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelonadetails
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(1 other version)Semantic gaps and protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In J. Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Quanta and Mind: Essays on the Connection Between Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness. Springer Verlag.details
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A Defence of the Resemblance Meaning of ‘What it’s like’.Richard Gaskin - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):673-698.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.details
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Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angelesdetails
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‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.details
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Subjectivism and the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):311-342.details
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Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal knowledge without experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 269.details
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'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.details
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What it is like.Haoying Liu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Impossible worlds and partial belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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An externalist's guide to inner experience.Benj Hellie - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97–145.details
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Forms and objects of thought.Michael W. Pelczar - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.details
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Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies.Torin Alter - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.details
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The knowledge argument and objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.details
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Physicalism could be true even if Mary learns something new.Barbara Montero - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189.details
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(1 other version)Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment.William Seager - 1999 - London: Routledge.details
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6 Subjective Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2008 - In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 125.details
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Anti-individualism and Phenomenal Content.Darragh Byrne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1733-1755.details
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An Argument for Existentialism.Yannis Stephanou - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):507-520.details
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Deviant phenomenal knowledge.Torin Alter - manuscriptdetails
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