- The Value of a Free and Wandering Mind.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 270-288.details
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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Hurt Feelings.David Shoemaker - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (3):125-148.details
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Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?Anne Meylan & Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1102-1124.details
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What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Responsibilism within Reason.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue-Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge, UK:details
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Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.details
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Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Liturgical Philosophy of Religion: An Untimely Manifesto on Sincerity, Acceptance, and Hope.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - In M. David Eckel, Allen Speight & Troy DuJardin (eds.), The Future of the Philosophy of Religion. Springer. pp. 73-94.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):48-64.details
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Responsabilidad, autoría Y voluntad: La propuesta de Moran.Miranda Del Corral - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (1):207-230.details
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On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions.Karl de Fine Licht & Bengt Brülde - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):1981-2001.details
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Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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Reflection Without Regress.Cory Davia - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):995-1017.details
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Frontier Kantianism: Autonomy and Authority in Ralph Waldo Emerson and Joseph Smith.Ryan W. Davis - 2018 - Journal of Religious Ethics 46 (2):332-359.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness.Claudio Cormick & Valeria Edelszten - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):1-39.details
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Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility.Alix Cohen - 2013 - Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.details
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The Source of Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2023 - Ethics 133 (2):163–188.details
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Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy.Francesco Chiesa & Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (1):155-182.details
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On the role of knowers and corresponding epistemic role oughts.Cheryl Abbate - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.details
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Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Epistemically blameworthy belief.Jessica Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3595-3614.details
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Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Michael Brownstein - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):765-786.details
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Reliability and social knowledgerelevant responsibility.Leandro De Brasi - 2015 - Trans/Form/Ação 38 (1):187-212.details
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Active belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 35 (S1):119-147.details
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Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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What can we not do at will and why.Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1941-1961.details
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Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.Erin Beeghly - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):547-563.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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The Importance of Forgetting.Rima Basu - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):471-490.details
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Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.details
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The Epistemic Condition.Daniel J. Miller - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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