Most punishment theories acknowledge neither the full extent of the harms which punishment risks, nor the caring practices which punishment entails. Consequently, I shall argue, punishment in most of its current conceptualizations is inconsistent with treating offenders as equals qua persons. The nature of criminal punishment, and of our interactions with offenders in punishment decision-making and delivery, risks causing harm to offenders. Harm is normalized when central to definitions of punishment, desensitizing us to unintended harms and obscuring caring practices. Offenders (...) may be partially silenced and excluded by mainstream criminal justice practices which limit interaction between offenders and practitioners. When we ignore significant harms, or silence and exclude, we treat others as passive non-subjects. This partially objectifies offenders, and is inconsistent with treatment as equals. Penal theories employing harm-centred and harm-normalizing definitions of punishment can provide few resources to help practitioners either avoid, or recognize and respond to, harms. Care ethics, by contrast, motivates the avoidance of harm, ongoing inclusive engagement, and respectful interaction with others. I argue that defining punishment without presupposing harm facilitates the identification of morally problematic harms, and recognition of caring practices. I offer a principled argument, and political and pragmatic supplementary arguments, for responding to offenders without intentional harm and with care. Principles drawn from care ethics can help to strengthen mainstream criminal practices by structuring decision-making and action. Bottom-up alternative criminal justice practices share some values with these proposed guiding principles, allowing a partial test of the principles. I consider examples of restorative justice practices, therapeutic jurisprudence, community justice and other problem-solving court practices, in addition to considering how well mainstream punishment practices measure up to these principles. My analysis illuminates the strengths and weaknesses of the principles, and how they might contribute to securing treatment as equals for offenders in mainstream practices. (shrink)

Although the economic thought of Marshall and Pigou was united by ethical positions broadly considered utilitarian, differences in their intellectual milieu led to degrees of difference between their respective philosophical visions. This change in milieu includes the influence of the little understood period of transition from the early idealist period in Great Britain, which provided the context to Marshall’s intellectual formation, and the late British Idealist period, which provided the context to Pigou’s intellectual formation. During this latter period, the pervading (...) Hegelianism and influences of naturalism arising from the ideas of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer were challenged by Hermann Lotze, a key transitional thinker influencing the Neo-Kantian movement, who recognised significant limits of naturalism, on the one hand, and the metaphysical tenor of absolute idealism, on the other, and attempted to provide a balance between the two. The goal of this paper is to make the provisional case for the argument that Pigou’s views on ethics were not only directly influenced by utilitarian thinkers like Mill and Sidgwick, but they were also indirectly influenced by Hermann Lotze, via the influence of the Neo- Kantian movement on late British idealism. To that end, Pigou’s essays in The Trouble with Theism (1908), including his sympathetic consideration of the ethics of Friedrich Nietzsche, reflect the influence of Lotze indirectly through the impact at Cambridge of: James Ward’s critique of associationist psychology, and consideration of the limits of naturalism including the critique of evolutionary ethics; Bertrand Russell’s rejection of neo-Hegelianism and, together with Alfred North Whitehead, the development of Logicism; and G.E. Moore’s critique of utilitarian ethics on the basis of the naturalistic fallacy and the development of his own intuitionist system of ethics. (shrink)

This study seeks to critically explore the link between sovereignty, violence and war in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. From a brief rereading of Leviathan’s main arguments that explicitly revolves around the Aristotelian distinction between actuality/ potentiality, it will conclude that Hobbesian pre-contractual violence is primarily based on what Hobbes terms “anticipatory reason” and the problem of future contingency. Relying on Foucauldian insights, it will be emphasized that the assumption of certain potentialities suffices in leading to (...) Hobbes’s well-known conclusion that the state of nature is a “condition of Warre.” In a second step, this study considers some of Agamben’s arguments to account for how pre-contractual violence as envisioned by Hobbes cannot be rendered impotent through the integration of a sovereign. In specific, Agamben’s claims shed light on an irreducible, inextricable entwining between the state of nature and the state of law as “Siamese twins” (Virno). On a meta-level, Agamben thus implicitly shows how the “Hobbesian problem” cannot be merely reduced to a “problem of order” (Parsons). With regard to the current functioning of the stratagems of financial markets and the mechanisms of future-colonization underpinning global politics, this study finally argues that Hobbes ought to be reevaluated in particular regarding the problem of the future in his account. Partly responding to Agamben’s critical investigations, I suggest that a careful exploration of what will be coined “the prospects of an actualization of the potentiality not-to-be” might serve as a first theoretical step towards a productive form of criticism. (shrink)

International interventions have traditionally been justified on the basis of human rights violations, insofar as these strike us as intolerably unjust. In this paper I will argue that there are compelling reasons for the international community to consider political legitimacy as an additional value to be protected. I offer three independent arguments in favour of my claim. The first two arguments dwell on the relationship between democracy and human rights. The third aims to show that political legitimacy has logical and (...) normative priority over justice. From this priority it follows that international interventions should be made with the aim of ensuring political legitimacy. (shrink)

Democracy seems to be no longer self-evident. Colin Crouch and others describe a growing sense of alienation in politics: democratic institutions and procedures may be working properly, yet they themselves promote non-democratic values such technocracy, oligarchy, elitism. For the citizens, only an illusion of democracy persists. The article argues that the weakening of democracy in practice mirrors the vanishing of democracy in political theory and philosophy. We may face a crisis of democratic politics as a result of a crisis of (...) democratic theory. Predominant theories of democracy fail, for the most part, to adequately reflect the changing social conditions in democratic societies and to offer a conception of democratic politics that would address current legitimacy deficits. The article discusses prominent theoretical approaches and points out that all have difficulties conceptualizing possible resources for democratization adequate to contemporary issues and conditions. A new version of political theory is outlined and defended, such that builds upon a redefined notion of democratic sovereignty and communicative power, complex enough to reflect the sociological reality of today’s politics and to reach beyond the institutionalized and formalized setting of democracy. (shrink)

some 20 years. Yet the ethical issues surrounding the disclosure of positive HIV status have not been examined comprehensively. This report examines the ethics behind the disclosure of HIV-positive status primarily or individuals to their sex partners, and for health care practitioners to a patient’s sex partner when the patient is unwilling to disclose. Relevant rights and ethical principles are analysed, including the rights to: self-preservation; privacy and confidentiality; and the bioethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. (...) Historic and contemporary individual rights that people living with HIV have regarding disclosure are emphasised, especially in adverse circumstances, where ethics can support non-disclosure based on the right to self-preservation. Rights declarations and current disclosure guidelines for health care practitioners from several international and South African medical organisations also are reviewed. Of key importance to disclosure decisions are the specific situations of individuals in climates rife with stigma toward, and discrimination against, PLHIV, existing more or less worldwide. The potential negative impacts of disclosure are the basis for disclosure decisions of PLHIV. Research study results show that the negative impacts of disclosure can be severe for individuals, ranging from divorce or abandonment to community ostracism and even to murder. Relevant current theories of social justice related to HIV disclosure also are discussed. A conclusion is reached that, by decreasing stigma and discrimination against PLHIV and protecting individual rights related to HIV disclosure, prevention behaviours will be practised more widely, including ‘positive prevention’ by PLHIV and higher rates of disclosure. The eventual result will be the long-term public health goal of decreased spread of HIV. (shrink)

Meu objetivo neste artigo é defender que podem ser atribuídos sentidos distintos para os termos “vontade” e “volição” na filosofia de Hume. Ao contrário das interpretações tradicionais, sustento que Hume não identifica vontade e volição. Inicialmente, apresento argumentos de Hobbes e Locke contra a concepção escolástica sobre a produção de ações voluntárias e defendo que Hume associa-se a esses dois filósofos. A seguir, apresento os argumentos da interpretação tradicional que identifica vontade e volição na filosofia humeana e também algumas objeções (...) feitas a tais argumentos. Por fim, em oposição à interpretação tradicional, defendo que Hume acredita que a vontade pode ser compreendida como a faculdade pela qual produzimos ações voluntárias e que volições são paixões motivacionais em exercício. As paixões motivacionais que produzem ações são volições, que é a percepção pela qual produzimos ações voluntárias. (shrink)

This thesis presents a social ontology. It takes its problem, the emergence of social structure and order, and the relationship of the macro and the micro within this structure, from social theory, but attempts a resolution from the perspectives of contemporary French philosophy and complexity theory. Due to its acceptance of certain presuppositions concerning the multiplicity and connectedness of all life and nature it adopts a comparative methodology that attempts a translation of complexity science to the social world. It draws (...) both this methodology and its inspiration from the work of Michel Serres. After explaining this methodology, it presents a critique of the work of those prominent philosophers of multiplicity who have written on the social: Alain Badiou, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Manual DeLanda. Having argued for the need of a ‘non-unit’ of social organisation, it then unsuccessfully surveys the work of Michel Foucault and Gabriel Tarde in search of such a ‘non-unit’. It produces one by extracting elements from different theorists and then proceeds to offer a novel explanation of how these expectations first emerge from the ‘social noise’ and then go through a complex process of self-organisation to produce social structure. Apart from complexity theory, this explanation draws on the temporal ontologies of both Serres and Deleuze. In doing so, it argues that the social replication necessary for this self-organisation cannot be achieved through direct imitation. Instead, it draws on an idea from Stuart Kauffman and argues that this is achieved through autocatalysis. Finally, it argues that social structures and what is perceived to be social order are the effect of the codification, to varying degrees, of these emergent expectations. It concludes that this structure is at its most creative when on ‘the edge of chaos’, when at a point of social chaosmos. (shrink)

We work with a large spatialized array of individuals in an environment of drifting food sources and predators. The behavior of each individual is generated by its simple neural net; individuals are capable of making one of two sounds and are capable of responding to sounds from their immediate neighbors by opening their mouths or hiding. An individual whose mouth is open in the presence of food is “fed” and gains points; an individual who fails to hide when a predator (...) is present is “hurt” by losing points. Opening mouths, hiding, and making sounds each exact an energy cost. There is no direct evolutionary gain for acts of cooperation or “successful communication” per se. In such an environment we start with a spatialized array of neural nets with randomized weights. Using standard learning algorithms, our individuals “train up” on the behavior of successful neighbors at regular intervals. Given that simple setup, will a community of neural nets evolve a simple language for signaling the presence of food and predators? With important qualifications, the answer is “yes.” In a simple spatial environment, pursuing individualistic gains and using partial training on successful neighbors, randomized neural nets can learn to communicate. (shrink)

In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ‘I’, in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ . I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ‘Cartesian materialist’ sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed (...) Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I ‘as object’ and the use of I ‘as subject’. I don’t argue directly for the ‘two uses’ view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad argument for the ‘only one use of I’ view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on ‘corporism’—the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind. (shrink)

One of the main influences on Judith Butler‘s thinking has been the work of Michel Foucault. Although this relationship is often commented on, it is rarely discussed in any detail. My thesis makes a contribution in this area. It presents an analysis of Foucault‘s work with the aim of countering Butler‘s representation of his thinking. In the first part of the thesis, I show how Butler initially interprets Foucault‘s project through Nietzschean genealogy, psychoanalysis and Derridean discourse, and how she later (...) develops this interpretation in line with the progress of her own project. In the main part of the thesis, I present an analysis of Foucault‘s thinking in the period from The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) to The History of Sexuality volume 1 (1976). This analysis focuses on the aspect of his work which has most influenced Butler‘s thinking: namely the notion of a relationship between knowledge, discourse and power. The other issues in his work which Butler addresses—genealogy, the subject, the body, abnormality, and sexuality—are discussed within this framework. I show how, in the early 1970s, Foucault develops the notion of power-knowledge, and sets out a relationship between power-knowledge and discourse which is overlooked by Butler. I argue that Butler interprets Foucaultian power through the notions of repression and social norms, and ignores the concepts of technology and strategy which form a key part of Foucault‘s thinking. I show how, from The Archaeology of Knowledge on, Foucault develops a socio-historical ontology and a genealogy of the subject, both of which are at variance with Butler‘s interpretation of his thinking. (shrink)

This paper considers Margaret Cavendish's distinctive anti-mechanist materialism, focusing on her 1664 Philosophical Letters, in which she discusses the views of Hobbes, Descartes, and More, among others. The paper examines Cavendish's views about natural, material souls: the soul of nature, the souls of finite individuals, and the relation between them. After briefly digressing to look at Cavendish's views about divine, supernatural souls, the paper then turns to the reasons for Cavendish's disagreement with mechanist accounts. There are disagreements over the explanation (...) of particular phenomena, but also a broader disagreement over what to take as one's most basic causal model. (shrink)

The ten original studies included in this Research Topic investigate selected assumptions and predictions of parochial altruism theory in detail. We, the editors, are convinced that their highly instructive findings will help researchers interested in parochial altruism, but also in intergroup psychology more generally, to gain a much more fine-grained understanding of the interplay of altruistic and spiteful motives in human decision making in the context of intergroup relations. The broad range of disciplines represented by the authors contributing to this (...) Research Topic and the variety of methods used in their studies are representative for the current interdisciplinary interest in parochial altruism. The most important insight that, in our view, can be derived from the works collected here is that human decision making in intergroup contexts is more complex than suggested by current theory. Thus, we hope that future theorizing on parochial altruism will be stimulated by the evidence gathered in this Research Topic. In this editorial, we briefly highlight central findings reported here, which, to us, appear most informative for prospective enhancements of parochial altruism theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to investigate one of the most interesting and debated issues within the philosophical dis-cussion about politics: the metaphor of the body politic and its relation with the theory of sovereignty in contemporary political theory. After an opening section, which proposes a brief sketch about the origin of the body politic within phi-losophy (especially in Plato’s and Aristotle’s contributions), the article provides a theoretical insight of such a theory, by dealing with three of its definitions: (...) Kantorowicz’s “king’s two bodies”; Hobbes’ Leviathan and Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. The article aims at presenting some arguments to de-fine these three perspectives, by examining – in the last sec-tion – how this paradigm has evolved into the more complex and articulated theory of the rule of law in contemporary democratic societies. (shrink)

Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...) her attempt to restrict subjectivism primarily to “urgent” situations like self-defense contradicts her own point of departure and is either incoherent or futile. Finally, the only actual whole-heartedly objectivist account she criticizes is an easy target; while those objectivist accounts one finds in certain Western European jurisdictions are immune to her criticisms. Those accounts are also clearly superior to hers in terms of action-guidingness. (shrink)

In this essay I focus on the form of government defended by Marsilius of Padua in the first Discourse of Defensor pacis (1324). The interpretation of his overall account depends heavily on our understanding of the “major and valentior part” of the citizenry upon which all legislative and elective powers are bestowed. I argue that there is sufficient textual evidence to believe that the above term refers not to some small elite group but to the totality of citizens or the (...) overwhelming majority of them. I also argue that his imaginary polity meets all the necessary conditions that any political regime should meet in order for it to be characterised as an essentially democratic one. Thus, Marsilius deserves a more prominent position in the history of democratic ideas. (shrink)

One of the least explored areas of C.S. Peirce's wide range of work is his contributions to psychology and the philosophy of mind. This dissertation examines the corpus of this work, especially as it relates to the subjects of mind, habit, instinct, sentiment, emotion, perception, consciousness, cognition, and community. The argument is that Peirce's contributions to these areas of investigation were both highly original and heavily influenced by the main intellectual currents of his time. An effort has been made to (...) present Peirce's philosophy without apology, within the conceptual framework and idiom of its time, and without appeal to a comprehensive view that Peirce never articulated. Nevertheless, as several noted interpreters have argued, much of this work can be viewed through the lens of Peirce's innovative theory of signs and the notion of the semiotic triad as its central unifying feature, despite the fact that the general theory was itself under continuous refinement and remained incomplete at the time of his death. Another hermeneutical device employed is William James' better known and more accessible work which, when juxtaposed with Peirce's ideas, serves to bring them into sharper relief. While general and historical in the presentation of material, this study seeks, at the same time, to engage the criticism of contemporary Peirce scholars in an attempt to account for several of the conundrums inherent in Peirce's work. Among the problems with implications for his philosophy of mind and theory of inquiry are the limitations of his theory of continuity, his negative view of the self, his somewhat ambiguous position on the relation of psychology to logic, and the metaethical puzzle arising from application of his theory of probable inference to truly fateful decisions. These problems provide an interesting perspective and lend balance to the truly insightful contributions Peirce made to the discovery of the mind. (shrink)

Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...) as what should be. Desire involves a deontic manner of representing: a norm of the ought-to-be type features in desire’s intentional mode, as opposed to content. The dissertation is structured in three parts. In order to defend this conception, I formulate three main desiderata for a promising theory of the intentionality of desire in the introduction (§0). The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the death of desire principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain some mental states and be explained by other mental states. The first part examines the main conceptions of desire in light of these desiderata. I argue that the classical pictures of desire do not adequately meet our desiderata. The first chapter is devoted to the evaluative conception (§1), while the second examines the motivational approach (§2). Following these criticisms, I then present the deontic view of desire (§3). In the second part, I defend this conception with the help of three arguments. The main idea is that appealing to norms of the ought-to-be type can satisfy our chief desiderata: the world should conform to norms (world-to-mind direction of fit, §4), norms are grounded on values and in turn ground obligations (explanation, §5), and norms are about non-actual states of affairs (death of desire principle, §6). In the last part, I develop the deontic view to draw a cartography of the various types of desire. Some desires are correct, while others are inappropriate. This distinction is explained by the deontic conception, as it matches that between states of affairs that ought to obtain and states that should not obtain (§7). Two study cases are examined: caprice and the impermissibility of desire aggregation. Intuitively, hopes, wishes, or urges are types of desire. The next chapter presents a typology inspired by the deontic view and the type of norms there are (§8). The last chapter discusses the main objections to the deontic approach (§9). In conclusion, I show the relevance of the deontic view for several debates in philosophy of mind and ethics. Desires are crucial because they are the ‘eye’ of what should be. (shrink)

The principal aim of my thesis is to provide a unified theory of imagining, that is, a theory which aspires to capture the common nature of all central forms of imagining and to distinguish them from all paradigm instances of non-imaginative phenomena. The theory which I intend to put forward is a version of what I call the Agency Account of imagining and, accordingly, treats imaginings as mental actions of a certain kind. More precisely, it maintains that imaginings are mental (...) actions that aim at the formation of episodic representations, the content of which is directly determined by what we want them to represent. My defence of this version of the Agency Account happens in two stages. On the one hand, I try to show that it is both extensionally adequate and explanatorily illuminating with respect to those mental states or projects which are clear instances of either imaginative or non- imaginative phenomena. And on the other hand, I seek to demonstrate that the most plausible alternative to the Agency Account - namely the Cognitive Account according to which it is distinctive of imaginings that they are non-cognitive phenomena and thus to be contrasted with perceptions, judgements, and so on - is bound to fail as a unified theory of imagining. The dissertation contains five main parts. In the first, I specify in more detail what a unified account of imagining has to achieve and, in particular, which phenomena it is supposed to capture. The second part presents the Cognitive Account, thereby focussing on Brian O'Shaughnessy's sophisticated version of it while the third part is reserved for the evaluation and rejection of the Cognitive Account. In the fourth part, I develop my version of the Agency Account of imagining. And the fifth and last part is concerned with the accommodation of potential counterexamples to it. (shrink)

This forum contribution addresses two major themes in de Goede’s original essay on ‘Financial security’: (1) the relationship between stable markets and the proverbial ‘security dilemma’; and (2) the development of new decision-technologies to address risk in the post-World War II period. Its argument is that the confluence of these two themes through rational choice theory represents a fundamental re-evaluation of the security dilemma and its relationship to the rule of law governing market relations, ushering in an era of perpetual (...) physical and financial insecurity. (shrink)

Democratic theorists are usually dismissive about the idea that citizens act “through” their representatives and often hold persons to exercise true political agency only at intervals in elections. Yet, if we want to understand representative government as a proper form of democracy and not just a periodical selection of elites, continuous popular agency must be a feature of representation. This article explores the Kantian attempt to justify that people can act “through” representatives. I call this the “exercise view” of representation (...) and defend its superiority to the “opportunity view,” which I attribute to Locke. It is superior because it has a robust conception of rationality and collective action, allowing us to understand how representation can mediate public reason. (shrink)

Hutcheson fonde sa théorie morale sur un « sens moral ». Ce sens nous permet de faire des distinctions morales. Cette théorie donnera lieu à un débat sur la réalité des valeurs morales. Selon certains commentateurs, nos distinctions morales portent sur des faits moraux réels que l’on peut connaître empiriquement grâce à notre sens moral. Inversement, certains soutiendront que le sens moral ne produit pas de connaissance morale. Les jugements moraux issus de ce sens sont des réponses émotionnelles plus ou (...) moins fiables que l’on ressent face à des motivations qui nous semblent être vertueuses. Nous montrerons que, selon Hutcheson, nos jugements moraux sont bien des réponses émotionnelles, mais qu’ils ont néanmoins un critère d’objectivité. Notre sens moral, grâce à la Providence divine, a pour fonction de préserver le bien-être de l’humanité. Cette fonction du sens moral sert de critère pour évaluer le bon fonctionnement de ce sens moral. (shrink)

For Foucault, Hobbes is important for the transition from sovereignty to governmentality, but he does not always go into great detail how. In “Society Must Be Defended”, Hobbes’s reactions against the political historicism of his time lead him to an ahistorical foundation to the state. In Security, Territory, Population, his contract is emblematic of the art of government still caught in the logic of sovereignty. Management techniques, one of which being inheritance laws like primogeniture, inducing changes in a population’s milieu (...) so that its interest is properly directed allow the art of government to escape this logic. Hobbes supports primogeniture, but its historical position in the common law makes this support unexpected. This article examines the historical context of primogeniture and the reasoning for Hobbes’s support of it in light of Foucault’s claims about him in order to give more precision to those claims. The result is that primogeniture as a law of nature produces the family as an interested unit of the population. Yet this interest is itself historicized, so Hobbes’s attempt to de-historicize politics did not fully succeed. (shrink)

Covid-19, yeni koronavirüs salgını, insanoğlunun karşısına birdenbire çıkmış ve insan bu felaket karşısında yaşamını devam ettirebilmek için belli birtakım kurallara bağlı olmak zorunda olduğunu görmüştür. Pandeminin getirdiği yeni kurallara bağlı olarak kullanmaya başladığımız maske de bu şartlardan biridir. Tarih boyunca somut olarak maske kullanımı insana uzak ya da yabancı bir durum değildir. Maskenin sözlük anlamlarına baktığımızda tozdan ya da kimyasallardan korunmak için kullanılan bir araç olduğunu gördüğümüz gibi, bir de soyut anlamda kendini ötekine farklı bir şekilde yansıtma veya aktarma durumu (...) olarak ele alınabileceğini görmekteyiz. Biz bu çalışmamızda maskenin soyut kullanımından hareketle günümüzde kullandığımız bir araç olarak maskenin, ortak yönleri olup olamayacağını değerlendirmeye çalıştık. Öte yandan içinden geçmekte olduğumuz bu salgın hastalıkların tarihte ilk kez bizim başımıza gelen bir şey olmadığını görmezsek ve bu süreci değerlendirmezsek, geçiş döneminden sonra pandeminin birey, toplum, ekonomi, siyaset ve devlet görüşleri üzerinde ne tür değişiklikler yapacağını kontrol etmezsek, salgın günün birinde bitecek olsa bile olumsuz sonuçlarla karşılaşmayacağımızı söyleyemeyiz. Çünkü salgın insanın sadece biyolojik yönünü etkileyen bir felaket değildir, aynı zamanda insanın diğer yönü olan psikoloji tarafını da doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak etkilemektedir. İnsan psişik yönü de olan bir varlık olduğu için bu yönün de ele alınarak incelenmesi gerekir. Pandemi koşullarında birtakım kurallara uymayı alışkanlık haline getiren insan şu ana kadar getirmiş olduğu tüm değerlerinden hızlı bir şekilde kopma eğilimi göstermeye veya bu duruma gönüllü olmaya başlamıştır. Kurallara uymayan insanlar ise sorumluluk almadıkları için bir ahlak varlığı olmaktan uzak hale gelmişlerdir. Çalışmamız söz konusu salgının, insanın günlük hayatında kullandığı somut ve soyut maske tanımlarından hareketle, değerlerine nasıl yabancılaştığını ve öte yandan ahlaki sorumluluklarını ne şekilde göz ardı ettiği üzerine eğilmeye çalışmıştır. (shrink)

The text analyzes the discourse on sovereignty in the Czech politics in the light of current processes of the transformation of sovereignty caused by the globalization and Europeanization. The author discusses the dispute between liberal-conservative critics of the European integration and cosmopolitan critics of the sovereign statehood and points to the limits of both positions. It is argued that the conservatives who warn against the loss of sovereignty in the ongoing process of Europeanization and who call for the protection of (...) the Czech statehood cling to an obsolete and invalid concept of sovereignty that is no longer adequate to changing social and geopolitical conditions. Similarly, it is pointed out that the defenders of cosmopolitan Europe who take sovereignty to be an old and useless category hindering the process of democratization are unable to off er an alternative capable of responding to growing concerns regarding the democratic defi cit and the loss of political autonomy. The text tries to show that both positions misconstrue the challenges of globalization and Europeanization for the state and democracy. (shrink)

Psychopaths are brutal individuals, having no empathetic concern for others. Initially, the existence of psychopaths seems to be a mystery from an evolutionary point of view. On close examination, however, it can be accommodated by evolutionary theory. Brutal individuals excelled meek individuals in the desperate circumstances where they had to fight their competitors over natural resources for survival and reproduction. This evolutionary explanation of psychopaths receives support from Pinker's observation of the history of brutality. We have good reasons for predicting (...) that psychopaths are likely to die out in the future. (shrink)

EL artículo aborda los alcances de la propuesta moral de David Hume, específicamente la idea de que, ante la imposibilidad de realizar propósitos morales sinceros, el camino que queda para el individuo es fingir que dichos sentimientos se han adquirido. Tal actitud es vista por el autor como favorable para las buenas relaciones sociales y para la construcción de acuerdos de convivencia entre individuos egoístas posesivos. Sin embargo, dado el radical determinismo de la mente concebido por Hume, tal esfuerzo mostraría (...) la intención por coadyuvar a soluciones pacíficas al problema de la insociabilidad, pero no tendría efectos reales sobre las pasiones originales de los individuos. (shrink)

In this work I argue an interpretation on Thomas Hobbes’s thought and its relation with international law. Several scholars argue that Hobbes reject the international law. Nevertheless, I will prove that it is possible to find a legal theory on international law in his works, if it takes to account the historical context and the peculiarities of global order in the Modern Age. In this way it is possible to understand why Carl Schmitt said that Hobbes was one of the (...) founders of Ius Publicum Europaeum, sentence that the German jurist did not prove. My aim is to locate Thomas Hobbes into the History of Legal International Ideas. (shrink)