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Truth

Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (1990)

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  1. A Defense Of Explanation-First Truthmaking: Some Thoughts On Jamin Asay’s A Theory Of Truthmaking.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6.
    Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking (...)
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  • The theory of truth in the theory of meaning.Gurpreet S. Rattan - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (2):214–243.
    The connection between theories of truth and meaning is explored. Theories of truth and meaning are connected in a way such that differences in the conception of what it is for a sentence to be true are engendered by differences in the conception of how meanings depend on each other, and on a base of underlying facts. It is argued that this view is common ground between Davidson and Dummett, and that their dispute over realism is really a dispute in (...)
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  • On Horwich's way out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
    The minimalist view of truth endorsed by Paul Horwich denies that truth has any underlying nature. According to minimalism, the truth predicate ‘exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need’; ‘the function of the truth predicate is to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations’. Horwich proposes that all there really is to truth follows from the equivalence schema: The proposition that p is true iff p, or, using Horwich’s notation, ·pÒ is true ´ p. The (unproblematic) instances (...)
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  • Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa became Extinct.Huw Price - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):241 - 254.
    holds for all central declarative sentences. According to deflationists, the key to an understanding of truth lies in an appreciation of the grammatical advantages of a predicate satisfying DS. As Paul Horwich puts it, “our truth predicate is merely a logical device enabling simple formulations of certain sorts of generalization.” (1996, p. 878; see also Horwich 1990).
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  • Truth and contradiction.Graham Priest - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):305-319.
    I argue that there is nothing about truth as such that prevents contradictions from being true. I argue this by considering the main standard accounts of truth, and showing that they are quite compatible with the existence of true contradictions. Indeed, in many cases, they are actually friendly to the idea.
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  • Global expressivism and alethic pluralism.Huw Price - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-55.
    This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.
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  • Epistemic Deflationism.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.
    The aim of this paper is to look at what a parallel deflationist program might be in the theory of knowledge and examine its prospect. In what follows I will simplify matters slightly by focussing on empirical knowledge rather than knowledge in general, though most of what I have to say ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to knowledge in general. Moreover,note that it is not my aim to offer a full defense of a particular deflationist theory of knowledge, which (...)
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  • Prueba legítima y verdad en el proceso penal I: la independencia metafísica de la verdad.Gabriel Pérez Barberá - 2020 - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 52:5-29.
    En el presente trabajo intento demostrar que, dadas ciertas condiciones, puede haber una relación de necesidad epistémica entre prueba y verdad. Esa es la tesis principal, desarrollada en la segunda parte de la investigación y publicada también en este volumen. Pero tiene apoyo en algunas tesis secundarias, que son expuestas y fundamentadas aquí, en esta primera parte. Las más relevantes son: no es correcto interpretar la fórmula de Tarski como una definición sofisticada de la noción correspondentista de verdad; la verdad, (...)
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  • Methodological Deflationism and Semantic Theories.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1415-1422.
    Methodological deflationism is a policy about how we should conduct ourselves when it comes to theories of truth: in particular, a deflationary theory of truth should be taken as one’s starting point, and the notion of truth should be inflated only as necessary. This policy is motivated, in part, by the need to balance the theoretical virtue of parsimony with that of explanatory sufficiency. In this article, the case is made that the methodological deflationist is in no position to properly (...)
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  • Unity through truth.Bryan Pickel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
    Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory (...)
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  • Reference and Truth.Lavinia Picollo - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):439-474.
    I apply the notions of alethic reference introduced in previous work in the construction of several classical semantic truth theories. Furthermore, I provide proof-theoretic versions of those notions and use them to formulate axiomatic disquotational truth systems over classical logic. Some of these systems are shown to be sound, proof-theoretically strong, and compare well to the most renowned systems in the literature.
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  • Undermining truthmaker theory.Timothy Perrine - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):185-200.
    Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.
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  • Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):73-91.
    According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is appropriate to evaluate things—e.g., beliefs—for epistemic value because there is such a thing as epistemic value. Allan Hazlett's A Luxury of the Understanding is a sustained critique of Realism. Hazlett challenges proponent of Realism to answer explanatory questions while not justifiably violating certain constraints, including two proposed naturalistic constraints. Hazlett argues they cannot. Here I defend Realism. I argue that it is easy for (...)
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  • Book reviews. [REVIEW]Jaroslav Peregrin - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):131-135.
    In his “Making it Explicit”,1 Robert Brandom set up a new philosophical paradigm, concentrating especially on the link between language and the world, but extendable (in the way familiar from the dawn of the linguistic turn) to the rest of philosophy. He views modern philosophy in terms of the tension between “representationalist” and “inferentialist” approaches to language (which, according to him, also underlies the much more commonly cited struggle between empiricism and rationalism); and elaborating on the ideas of his teacher (...)
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  • Recent work on alethic pluralism.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):588-607.
    While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey (...)
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  • An analysis of bias and distrust in social hinge epistemology.Anna Pederneschi - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):258-277.
    Philosophical literature has focused on the concept of trust, but often considers distrust merely as an afterthought. Distrust however, because of its pervasive role in our everyday lives, can be quite damaging. Thus, understanding the rationality of distrust is crucial for understanding our testimonial practices. In this paper I analyze whether it is rational or irrational to distrust an informant on the basis of identity bias. My aim is to show that distrust is irrational when based on negative identity bias. (...)
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  • What is a correspondence theory of truth?D. Patterson - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):421 - 444.
    It is often thought that instances of the T-schema such as snow is white is true if and only if snow is white state correspondences between sentences andthe world, and that therefore such sentences play a crucial role in correspondence theories oftruth. I argue that this assumption trivializes the correspondence theory: even a disquotationaltheory of truth would be a correspondence theory on this conception. This discussionallows one to get clearer about what a correspondence theory does claim, and toward the end (...)
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  • Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):313-328.
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  • Incompleteness, constructivism and truth.Fabrice Pataut - 1998 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 6:63.
    Although G¨odel proved the first incompleteness theorem by intuitionistically respectable means, G¨odel’s formula, true although undecidable,seems to offer a counter-example to the general constructivist or anti-realistclaim that truth may not transcend recognizability in principle. It is arguedhere that our understanding of the formula consists in a knowledge of itstruth-conditions, that it is true in a minimal sense and, finally, that it is recognized as such given the consistencyand ω-consistency of P. The philosophical lesson to be drawn from G¨odel’sproof is that (...)
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  • Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271-294.
    Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth- predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth- (...)
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  • Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism.Dimitris P. Papayannakos - 2008 - Science & Education 17 (6):573-611.
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  • Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points.Sergi Oms - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):139-153.
    In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...)
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  • Conditionals and Curry.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2629-2647.
    Curry's paradox for "if.. then.." concerns the paradoxical features of sentences of the form "If this very sentence is true, then 2+2=5". Standard inference principles lead us to the conclusion that such conditionals have true consequents: so, for example, 2+2=5 after all. There has been a lot of technical work done on formal options for blocking Curry paradoxes while only compromising a little on the various central principles of logic and meaning that are under threat. -/- Once we have a (...)
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  • Analytical marxism: A form of critical theory. [REVIEW]Kai Nielsen - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):1 - 21.
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  • Fix, Express, Quantify: Disquotation After Its Logic.Carlo Nicolai - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):727-757.
    Truth-theoretic deflationism holds that truth is simple, and yet that it can fulfil many useful logico-linguistic roles. Deflationism focuses on axioms for truth: there is no reduction of the notion of truth to more fundamental ones such as sets or higher-order quantifiers. In this paper I argue that the fundamental properties of reasonable, primitive truth predicates are at odds with the core tenets of classical truth-theoretic deflationism that I call fix, express, and quantify. Truth may be regarded as a broadly (...)
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  • Deflationary truth and the ontology of expressions.Carlo Nicolai - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4031-4055.
    The existence of a close connection between results on axiomatic truth and the analysis of truth-theoretic deflationism is nowadays widely recognized. The first attempt to make such link precise can be traced back to the so-called conservativeness argument due to Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland: by employing standard Gödelian phenomena, they concluded that deflationism is untenable as any adequate theory of truth leads to consequences that were not achievable by the base theory alone. In the paper I highlight, (...)
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  • The Truth Predicate vs the Truth Connective. On Taking Connectives Seriously.Kevin Mulligan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):565-584.
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  • The ontological status of minimal entities.Luca Moretti - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):97 - 114.
    Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization is inspired by both Schiffer's notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich's notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal to the inferential role (...)
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  • Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):883-903.
    A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this (...)
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  • Situations, Alternatives, and the Semantics of 'Cases'.Friederike Moltmann - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy (1):1-41.
    This paper presents a systematic semantic study of constructions with the noun 'case'. It argues that 'cases' are situations acting as truthmakers within a sentential or epistemic case space. It develops a truthmaker-based alternative semantics of 'case'-constructions, based on Fine's recent truthmaker semantics.
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  • “Muckraking in History”: The Role of the History of Science in Kuhn's Philosophy.Bojana Mladenović - 2007 - Perspectives on Science 15 (3):261-294.
    : This paper analyzes the development of Kuhn's metaphilosophical position concerning the proper relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. I reconstruct Kuhn's model of scientific change presented in Structure as having the logical status of a Weberian explanatory theory; the philosophy of science and the history of science were of equal importance in its development and defense. However, Kuhn's metaphilosophical position changed in the 1990s, when he gave primacy to philosophy over the history of science in response (...)
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  • Pragmatism, Joint-Carving, and Ontology.K. Mitchell - 2014 - The Monist 97 (4):571-591.
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  • Pragmatism on solidarity, bullshit, and other deformities of truth.Cheryl Misak - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):111-121.
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  • On Wright's argument against deflationism.Alexander Miller - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.
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  • La vérité a-t-elle une nature?Félix Milette - 2021 - Philosophiques 48 (2):315-336.
    Félix Milette Les débats concernant la question de la vérité s’articulent principalement autour du clivage entre inflationnistes et déflationnistes, les premiers cherchant à comprendre la nature sous-jacente de la propriété d’être vrai, les seconds niant que cette propriété possède une nature philosophiquement intéressante. Au cours des dernières décennies, un certain nombre de déflationnistes « modérés » ont formulé cette dernière thèse en affirmant que la vérité n’est pas une propriété substantielle. Comment devrions-nous comprendre le sens de cette affirmation? Dans cet (...)
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  • Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery (...)
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  • Thought, thoughts, and deflationism.Vann McGee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3153-3168.
    Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of the notion of truth conditions, (...)
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  • Inscrutability and its discontents.Vann McGee - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):397–425.
    That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I (...)
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  • Deflationism and the normativity of truth.Matthew McGrath - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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  • The intoxicating effects of conciliatory omniscience.David McElhoes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2151-2167.
    The coherence of omniscience is sometimes challenged using self-referential sentences like, “No omniscient entity knows that which this very sentence expresses,” which suggest that there are truths which no omniscient entity knows. In this paper, I consider two strategies for addressing these challenges: The Common Strategy, which dismisses such self-referential sentences as meaningless, and The Conciliatory Strategy, which discounts them as quirky outliers with no impact on one’s status as being omniscient. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. The Common Strategy (...)
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  • Truth and Assertability.Michael McDermott - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):465-470.
    Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.
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  • A Deflationary Metaphysics of Morality.Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):285-298.
    The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account (...)
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  • Grading, sorting, and the sorites.Tim Maudlin - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):141-168.
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  • This is not an instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
    Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the (...)
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  • Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.
    This paper raises concern with the use of theories of reference in philosophical discourse and then to consider the possibility of empirically validating this concern by reference to a novel sort of “quantitative” empirical approach suggested recently by Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). The concern is whether the particular theories of reference or reference relations employed in particular philosophical discussions are actually chosen with a view to entailing or accommodating a desired philosophical outcome. I argue that such dependent selections of assumptions about (...)
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  • Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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  • Expressivism and plural truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  • Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.William G. Lycan - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  • Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism.David Löwenstein - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):23-44.
    Whether or not deflationism is compatible with truth-conditional theories of meaning has often been discussed in very broad terms. This paper only focuses on Davidsonian semantics and Brandom's anaphoric deflationism and defends the claim that these are perfectly compatible. Critics of this view have voiced several objections, the most prominent of which claims that it involves an unacceptable form of circularity. The paper discusses how this general objection applies to the case of anaphoric deflationism and Davidsonian semantics and evaluates different (...)
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  • Linguistic understanding and knowledge.Guy Longworth - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):50–79.
    Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.
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