PurposeAlthough there is much public talk about privacy, it seems that there is no definite answer; rather, ambiguous concepts of what privacy is and what indeed privacy in peril is. The overall aim of this paper is to clarify how privacy is defined in the academic literature, what the different concepts of privacy have in common, what distinguish them from one another, and what advantages and disadvantages such definitions have in order to clarify if there is a gap in the (...) existing literature.Design/methodology/approachThis contribution constructs theoretically founded typologies in order to systemize the existing literature of privacy studies and to analyse examples of privacy (threats). Therefore, it mainly is a theoretical approach combined with illustrative examples.FindingsThis paper contains a systematic discussion of the state of the art of privacy studies by establishing a typology of existing privacy definitions and discussing commonalties and differences. In this paper, it is argued that the existing literature is insufficient for studying privacy. Therefore, a critical contribution to privacy studies is needed.Originality/valueA critical contribution to privacy studies avoids pitfalls of the existing literature and strives for the development of theoretical and empirical research methods in order to focus on privacy in the context of domination, asymmetrical power relations, resource control, social struggles, and exploitation. (shrink)

Die Einleitung unseres Kapitels bietet eine grundsäzliche Charakterisierung der Soziologie und zeichnet einige wichtige historische Entwicklungslinien der Philosophie der Soziologie (PdS) nach. Im Hauptteil werden zentrale ontologische sowie ausgewählte explanatorische Themen der PdS vorgestellt. Im Schlussteil sollen einige aktuelle Diskussionen umrissen werden.

The Politics of Military Force uses discourse theory to examine the dynamics of discursive change that made participation in military operations possible against the background of German antimilitarist culture. Once considered a strict taboo, so-called out-of-area operations have now become widely considered by German policymakers to be without alternative. The book argues that an understanding of how certain policies are made possible (in this case, military operations abroad and force transformation), one needs to focus on processes of discursive change that (...) result in different policy options appearing rational, appropriate, feasible, or even self-evident. Drawing on Essex School discourse theory, the book develops a theoretical framework to understand how discursive change works, and elaborates on how discursive change makes once unthinkable policy options not only acceptable but even without alternative. Based on a detailed discourse analysis of more than 25 years of German parliamentary debates, The Politics of Military Force provides an explanation for: (1) the emergence of a new hegemonic discourse in German security policy after the end of the Cold War (discursive change), (2) the rearticulation of German antimilitarism in the process (ideational change/norm erosion) and (3) the resulting making-possible of military operations and force transformation (policy change). In doing so, the book also demonstrates the added value of a poststructuralist approach compared to the naive realism and linear conceptions of norm change so prominent in the study of German foreign policy and International Relations more generally. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I argue that Juergen Habermas misinterprets Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Habermas claims that Adorno and Horkheimer universalize instrumental reason, and that they hence undermine their own discursive-rational contribution. He thinks critical social theory can only be reflexively grounded if it recognizes as its pragmatic truth-condition a counterfactually conceived communicative procedure that would be free of distortion. In my view, Habermas dedifferentiates the dialectic of enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer do not reduce thought to instrumental (...) reason, and they characterize enlightenment as a historically differentiated process. They maintain that enlightenment comprises both instrumental and critical thought, critical thought being understood by them as determinate negation. I interpret Dialectic of Enlightenment as a theory of the formation of the subject. Furthermore, I contend that Adorno's Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory eschew Habermas's mistaken reading of Dialectic of Enlightenment. They develop the latter's dialectical account of subjectivization. Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory advance against the backdrop of Dialectic of Enlightenment's theory of the progressive instrumentalization of the self the idea of an unregimented subjective knowledge and experience of nature. (shrink)

It seems obvious that Nietzsche has influenced the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947). The extent to which Adorno and Horkheimer base their argument on Nietzsche, however, remains controversial. By analyzing an early draft of the first excursion of the Dialectic of Enlightenment from 1943, this article demonstrates that Nietzsche was more important for the development of its main concepts than has been assumed, in particular his analysis of myth and enlightenment. In the earlier version of the Ulysses-chapter Nietzsche, together with Rudolf (...) Borchardt, is a pivotal point of reference. Indeed, it is the Nietzschean reflection on Homer and on the pre-Homerian epic—and Borchardt’s interpretation of these themes—that Adorno views as the first original form of the dialectics of enlightenment. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis introduction sets a framework for the special issue on Education and Hope which contains a selection of papers presented at the 16th Conference of the International Network of Philosophers of Education. It sketches the issue of how education and hope are closely intertwined notions. This introduction also gives an overview of the articles included in this issue and how they are thematically arranged. In a short conclusion the issue of hope is related to the issue of speed and slowness.

There is a “Pragmatist turn” visible in the field of organization science today, resulting from a renewed interest in the work of Pragmatist philosophers like Dewey, Mead, Peirce, James and others, and in its implications for the study of organizations. Following Wicks and Freeman, in the past decade Pragmatism has also entered the field of business ethics, which, however, has not been uniformly applauded in that field. Some scholars fear that Pragmatism may enhance already existing positivist and managerialist tendencies in (...) current business ethics, while others see more emancipatory potential in Pragmatism, arguing that it complements and supports stakeholder theory. In this paper, a comparison of the philosophical underpinnings of Pragmatist and Critical conceptions of business ethics is offered, concentrating on the Pragmatism of John Dewey and the Critical theory of the Frankfurt School, in particular of Axel Honneth. It is argued that these two developed along two converging lines. Along the first line, Dewey was far more skeptical and critical of capitalism than is often thought. Along the second line, the reactions to Pragmatism of Frankfurt School Critical theorists developed over time from generally hostile, to partially inclusive, to more fully integrative. At the crossroads of these converging lines a Pragmatist Critical perspective is developed and exemplified, and its implications for business ethics are outlined. (shrink)

Não se pode aprender filosofia, pode-se apenas aprender a filosofar.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 10, Page 1480-1493, December 2022. By applying the concept of democracy and the state proposed by Richard Rorty, the article aims to make a theoretical contribution to understanding frames of political mobilization and solidarity. While Rorty’s conceptual instruments stem from the field of epistemology and moral philosophy and have, so far, not been widely applied to theorizing statehood in general and labour market policy in particular, his ideas can help to understand leftist politics (...) between inter- and re-nationalization. By drawing on empirical findings on debates and negotiations between European trade union organizations, the text proposes an idea on how to overcome a dualistic framework beyond a footloose cosmopolitanism and national protectionism. (shrink)

Identity politics is commonly criticized as endangering democracy by undermining community, rational communication, and solidarity. Drawing on both radical democratic theory and standpoint theory, this article posits the opposite thesis: identity politics is pivotal for the democratization of democracy. Democratization through identity politics is achieved by disrupting hegemonic discourse and is, therefore, a matter of power, while such forms of power politics are reasonable when following minority standpoints generated through identity politics. The article develops this approach by connecting radical democratic (...) theories with standpoint theories and highlighting their commonalities and potential for mutual enhancement. Standpoint theory allows us to substantiate and reconcile two initially contradictory claims: particular minority standpoints are necessary to criticize the prevailing discursive and institutional orders, and these standpoints stem from intersubjective reason and embody ‘strong objectivity.’ This discussion presents a new perspective on the tension between particularity and universality, as well as the relationship between power and reason in democracy. Democratization is an oscillation between these polarities, and political theory should not aim to resolve this tension but to recognize and articulate it. Such recognition might involve elevating knowledge emerging from oppressed groups and exercising epistemic modesty when assessing specific forms of identity politics. (shrink)

I argue that contemporary accounts of ideology critique—paradigmatically those advanced by Haslanger, Jaeggi, Celikates, and Stanley—are either inadequate or redundant. The Marxian concept of ideology—a collective epistemic distortion or irrationality that helps maintain bad social arrangements—has recently returned to the forefront of debates in contemporary analytic social philosophy. Ideology critique has similarly emerged as a technique for combating such social ills by remedying those collective epistemic distortions. Ideologies are sets of social meanings or shared understandings. I argue in this paper (...) that because agents must coordinate on them to be mutually intelligible, ideologies, on the fashionable contemporary account, are conventions. They are equilibrium solutions to a particular kind of social coordination problem. The worry is that changing pernicious conventions requires more than the epistemic remedy contemporary critical social theorists prescribe. It also requires overcoming strategic impediments like high first-mover costs. Thus contemporary proponents of ideology critique—the “new ideology critics,” as I’ll call them—face a dilemma. Either their account of social change fails to account for important strategic impediments to social change, in which case it is inadequate, or it incorporates a theory of strategic behavior, and thus merely reinvents the wheel, poorly. It adds nothing to prominent convention-based accounts of social change in the social sciences. More generally, this is an example of a pernicious trend in contemporary critical social theory. Contemporary critical social theorists have abandoned their predecessors’ commitment to engaging with social science, thereby undermining their efforts. (shrink)

It is not evident in what sense philosophy relates to its own time and present. From the history of philosophical thought, several models have been suggested, ranging from a strong reliance on tradition to the wholesale rejection of the present and demand for a ‘philosophy of the future,’ from the suspicion that philosophy is nothing but one ideology among others to the demand that philosophy should engage in the struggles and conflicts of its time in order to prepare for a (...) better future. The essay presents an assessment and problematization of these approaches and argues for a point of view that starts from philosophy’s precarious, ambivalent and contingent relation to its time and contemporaneity. Neither wholly independent of nor entirely subjected to its own time, philosophy can inhabit a shifting position from which critique and resistance are possible even if not ultimately guaranteed. (shrink)

The current discussion on the role of the universities often starts off with a perspective on the university as a scientific and/or pedagogical institution and consequently runs into a conflict between both logics in which each element is somehow devalued from the other perspective. Therefore, it may be productive to analyse the university from a standpoint in between, a perspective of knowledge as such. In order to conceptualise such a third perspective of knowledge, the history of the European university is (...) reconstructed and interpreted as a process of reflection on the ‘spiral of knowledge’. Before this background the idea of the university is renewed in terms of knowledge and summarised in the idea of a ‘deliberate university’. (shrink)

Bertolt Brecht and Theodor W. Adorno stand for opposing modes and stances within an artistic modernism oriented toward radical social transformation. In his 1962 essay ‘Commitment’, Adorno advanced a biting critique of Brecht’s work and artistic position. Adorno’s arguments have often been dismissed but, surprisingly, are seldom closely engaged with. This paper assesses these two approaches that have been so central to twentieth-century debates in aesthetics: Brecht’s dialectical realism and Adorno’s sublime or dissonant modernism. It provides what still has been (...) missing: a close reading and immanent critique of Adorno’s case against Brecht. And it clarifies one methodological blind spot of Adorno’s formalist conceptualisation of autonomy: he fails to provide the detailed analysis of context that his own dialectical method immanently calls for. The paper shows how and why Brecht’s dialectical realism holds up under Adorno’s attack, and draws conclusions for contemporary artistic practice. (shrink)

This paper sets out the notion of a current “biopolitical turn of digital capitalism” resulting from the increasing deployment of AI and data analytics technologies in the public sector. With applications of AI-based automated decisions currently shifting from the domain of business to customer (B2C) relations to government to citizen (G2C) relations, a new form of governance arises that operates through “algorithmic social selection”. Moreover, the paper describes how the ethics of AI is at an impasse concerning these larger societal (...) and socioeconomic trends and calls for an ethics of AI that includes, and acts in close alliance with, social and political philosophy. As an example, the problem of Predictive Analytics is debated to make the point that data-driven AI (Machine Learning) is currently one of the main ethical challenges in the ethics of AI. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga a “Tese” do primado do objeto na obra de Theodor W. Adorno, central ao seu materialismo não dogmático e relativamente pouco estudada. O primado do objeto será apresentado em seus elementos constitutivos, como crítica ao modo essencialmente idealista da dialética que perpassa o conjunto da obra de Adorno, em especial nos textos e discussões que precederam a publicação da Dialektik der Aufklãrung, para se explicitar no período de elaboração da Negative Dialektik. A “Tese” desenvolve momentos apresentados por (...) Lukács, Benjamin e Horkheimer, particularmente quanto ao nexo entre razão e experiência e se fundamenta especialmente no trajeto Kant – Hegel, como crítica ao idealismo, incorporando de modo estruturante as perspectivas de Marx e de Nietzsche. Ao romper a pretensa “simetria” entre sujeito e objeto, a “Tese” do primado do objeto revela como é insustentável a alegação habermasiana do Discurso filosófico da modernidade segundo a qual Adorno e Horkheimer incidiriam num ceticismo total frente à razão e à sua totalização ideológica. Ao contrário: estes autores, ao articularem de um modo original substância material histórica e argumentação teórica, contribuíram de modo fundamental para examinar o problema da reificação mediante sua relação à objetividade – como o não-idêntico – no âmbito da razão. (shrink)

To introduce an archival protocol of a ‘Debate about methods in the social sciences, especially the conception of social science method represented by the Institute’, held on 17 January 1941 at the Institute of Social Research in New York, the article focuses on certain conflicts in substance and terms of discourse among members of the Institute, with special emphasis on Franz Neumann’s distinctive approaches, notwithstanding his professed loyalty to Max Horkheimer’s theory. These are seen to arise not only from Neumann’s (...) assignment as bargaining agent for the Institute and his distinctive relations with American colleagues, but also from their different orientations to the conflicted legacies of Weimar. (shrink)

Normative political philosophy always refers to a standard against which a society's institutions are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined according to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructing the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particular views (...) on the addressee and can also be motivationally effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is examined as a form of such reconstructive internal critique . It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognition made explicit in Honneth's philosophical anthropology help explain progressive social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenges in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognition to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional, prudential, conceptual, and moral considerations that could serve to answer these challenges are sketched. (shrink)

Este artículo tematiza la relevancia del Hamlet, de Shakespeare, para el pensamiento de T. W. Adorno, aun cuando este no haya escrito in extenso sobre aquel. El drama aparece sobre todo en su discurso oral como modelo para describir la relación de discontinuidad entre teoría y práctica. Aquí se desea mostrar cómo el teórico crítico del pensamiento moral abstracto piensa el paso del conocimiento a la praxis a partir del vínculo entre Hamlet y el llamado “factor añadido” (Das Hinzutretende). Desde (...) esta lectura, el Hamlet de Adorno representa un lugar clave de transiciones malogradas. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 2, Page 164-173, February 2022. The article entails a critical discussion of the book Capitalism, Alienation and Critique by Asger Sørensen. Like Sørensen’s book, it stresses the importance of the first generation of critical theory – especially Horkheimer and Adorno – although Sørensen is at the same time critized for neglecting the insights of Horkheimer and Adornos work from the mid-1940s and onwards. In arguing for the actuality of especially the late Horkheimer, the (...) article emphasizes the following topics: The problems of education and ‘Bildung’, The historical transformation of the critique of Capitalism after the Second World War and The drawbacks of classical humanism when it comes to grasping the current political and ecological crisis. (shrink)

This article was written on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, where the Frankfurt School was founded and continues to evolve. From philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives, the article focuses on the trichotomic characteristics of critical theory, specifically: critique, explanation, and normativity. It looks first at the founding of the Institute for Social Research; second, at the emergence of critical theory at the Institute; and third, at how these ideas evolved. It (...) identifies trichotomy underpinning Horkheimer’s approach to critical theory. In the conclusion, the revisions made to critical theory in the later stages of development are considered. (shrink)

O presente artigo, analisando a hermenêutica de Gadamer e a teoria crítica de Horkheimer e Marcuse, procura mostrar que, se se concebe a sociedade moderna do ponto de vista do político, é possível elaborar uma teoria da modernidade em que ambas, em vez de se oporem, sejam complementares.This paper analyses Gadamer's hermeneutics and the critical theory of Horkheimer and Marcuse. It tries to show that, if modern society is conceived as political, then it is possible to elaborate a theory of (...) modernity where hermeneutics and critical theory, instead of opposing, complement each other. (shrink)

Börje Holmberg; A Paradigm for Research in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 19–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

In diesem Aufsatz wird die bislang kaum beachtete frühe Moralphilosophie von Max Horkheimer aus den 1930er Jahren in ein produktives Spannungsverhältnis zu den Grundannahmen des ethischen Naturalismus gesetzt. Horkheimer versteht die Moral als ein normatives Instrument, mit dem die menschliche Gattung ihr gesellschaftliches Leben zu organisieren versucht. Die natürliche Normativität der menschlichen Lebensform ist für Horkheimer selbst historisch bestimmt, als die menschliche Lebensform sich notwendig nur historisch realisieren kann. In der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist diese Normativität nach Horkheimer widersprüchlich verfasst: Einerseits (...) sollen die Menschen moralischen Normen und nicht allein ihren eigenen Interessen folgen, andererseits erfordert die bürgerliche Gesellschaft gerade das rücksichtslose Verfolgen eigener Interessen, da sonst die Selbsterhaltung der Menschen gefährdet würde. Die Auswirkungen dieser Widersprüchlichkeit werden hier anhand von drei Aspekten untersucht: die Opazität und Naturhaftigkeit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, das Leiden der menschlichen Natur, Geschichte als Anpassungsprozess der menschlichen Natur. Abschließend wird Horkheimers Ansatz hinsichtlich seiner theoretischen Reichweite in den moralphilosophischen Diskussionen der gegenwärtigen Kritischen Theorie verortet. (shrink)

Social networking technologies have become a ubiquitous framework for social interaction, serving to organise much of the individual’s social life. Such technological structuring affects not merely the individual’s psyche (as a psychotechnics), it also affects broader aspects of society (as a socio-technics). While social networking technologies may serve to transform society in positive ways, such technologies also have the potential to significantly encroach upon and (re) construct individual and cultural meaning in ways that must be investigated. Erich Fromm, who psychoanalytically (...) describes humans as a product of their society and the economic systems within that society, may provide insight into the influence of social networking technologies in contemporary society. He sees the relationship between the individual and society as being in a constant state of dynamic change. Utilising Fromm’s psycho-societal insight, social networking technologies are shown to conflate and confuse the relation between Thanatos and Eros – the Thanatos of a lifeless and consumerist agenda-filled mechanisation, and the Eros associated with social engagement. Thanatos and Eros are tied together via social networking technologies. This results in, firstly, social networking technologies functioning predominantly to further capitalist agendas through the monetisation of these technologies – particularly in terms of linking commodity fetishism and the foundational social drive of the individual. Secondly, social networking technologies mechanise human action according to predictable behavioural paths through the use of these technologies, especially in terms of how socialisation is possible via these technologies (shaping how platonic and romantic relationships may take place in the contemporary world). Such a mechanisation of interpersonal engagement contrasts with Erich Fromm’s assertion that interpersonal relations (vis-à-vis love) are not “mere emotion”, but rather represent an interpersonal creative capacity and interplay. Fromm’s psycho-societal insights will show how contemporary individuals may take independent and responsible rational action to establish accountable and psychologically beneficial ways of engaging with others through social networking technologies. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

This article discusses successive positions of the Frankfurt School, contrasts them to the unfolding ideas of Castoriadis and argues for a critical theory centred on a concept of autonomy, but aware of the obstacles and complications inherent in social–historical reality and its modern configuration. To clarify this perspective, we need a concept of society that distances itself from the Parsonian paradigm, more so than recent theorists of the Frankfurt School have done. The critique of over-integrated images of society, developed by (...) various sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s but not properly assimilated by the mainstream of the discipline and never taken on board by Frankfurt theorists, is an important source of reference, and it can be taken further in the light of Castoriadis’s reflections on the social–historical. The result is a definition of autonomy as a capacity of explicit and unlimited interrogation, confronted with its own hubristic temptations in the context of a multidimensional social world. (shrink)

Ideal theory has been extensively contested on the grounds that it is ideology: namely, that it performs the distorting social role of reifying and enforcing unjust features of the status quo. Indeed, a growing number of philosophers adopt a nonideal methodology—which dispenses with ideal theory—because of this ideology critique. I argue, however, that such philosophers are confused about the ultimate dialectical upshot of this critique even if it succeeds. I do so by constructing a parallel—equally plausible—ideology critique of nonideal methodology; (...) specifically, I argue that capitalist and managerial social attitudes have commodified people’s conception of justice and induced suspicion of ideal theory, which is not construed as having direct practical value. Consequently, nonideal methodology performs the distorting role of reifying and enforcing the hegemonies of capitalism and managerialism. Ideal theory and nonideal methodology are, therefore, in symmetrically bad positions. (shrink)

Algorithmen und Filterblasen werden oft dafür kritisiert, zu epistemischen Schließungen zu führen, die wiederum identitätspolitische Spaltungen verstärken und damit die Demokratie gefährden. Der Artikel argumentiert für die gegenteilige These: Epistemische Schließungen durch digitale Kommunikation sind förderlich für die Konstruktion von identitätspolitischen Gegenöffentlichkeiten, von denen ausgehend hegemoniale Diskurse kritisiert werden können, um die Demokratie zu demokratisieren. Digitale Kommunikation ist identitätspolitischer Demokratisierung zuträglich, weil sie Gegenöffentlichkeiten sowohl epistemische Schließungen als auch diskursive Offenheit ermöglicht, durch die ein identitätspolitischer Standpunkt gebildet und effektiv in (...) die hegemoniale Öffentlichkeit eingebracht werden kann. (shrink)

Fortunately, the challenge of alienation is now again taken seriously in intellectual discussions. Already years ago, Axel Honneth made the reflection on alienation a defining issue for social philosophy per se, and as the prime example of social philosophy, he brought forth Critical Theory. Within this horizon, recently two conceptions of alienation have been proposedby Rahel Jeaggi and Hartmut Rosa, and the present article takes issue with both of these proposals, criticizing in particular their anti-essentialism. Hence, questioning the post-metaphysical agenda (...) that Jaeggi has inherited from Honneth, I criticize her juxtaposition of the existentialist and the Marxist critique of alienation, her understanding of the good life as autonomy, and finally her acceptance of post-modern and liberal criticism of metaphysics and ontology. Turning to Rosa, I appreciate his societal approach to the critique of alienation, emphasizing the significance of capitalist modernity, but also he accepts the post-metaphysical agenda, and his aesthetic idea of the good life as resonance remains strongly individualistic. Both of these conceptions of alienation thus have ideological implications that threatens to turn upside down the original intentions and implications of Critical Theory in relation to social and political justice. To conclude, the criticism of capitalism, political economy and real life politics is still relevant for understanding alienation, and therefore it is worth returning to the classics of the discussion. (shrink)

Identity politics is subject to similar critiques in contemporary public debate and political theory. A central topos of this critique is that identity politics is essentializing: it fixes subjects to their social position and resorts to a politics of particularity that leads to divisions in national citizenship and democratic discourse (the communitarian and liberal position) and to divisions within social movements (the critical position). Contrary to this one-sided critique, we propose a different interpretation with the concept of “constructivist identity politics.” (...) We show that political identities are not essentialistically given, but emerge from processes of social and political construction; that they are actively produced, learned, and practiced by political (sub)cultures and movements. In these processes of construction, political articulation and agency are produced, enabling subjects to critique relations of domination and discrimination. Following radical democratic theory, we argue that the particular political perspectives of identity politics thus enabled do not endanger democracy or solidarity in social movements, but contribute to their further democratization by actualizing the universal principles of democracy in particular disputes. While the construction processes of identity politics tend to essentialize and produce exclusions, critical reflection on such tendencies is also inherent to identity politics. This understanding also enables a critique of such identity politics that is not oriented towards the democratic values of equality and freedom and blocks critical self-reflection. After an overview of contemporary identity politics critique, we elaborate this constructivist understanding following debates in feminist and postcolonial theory since the 1980s. Building on this, we systematically develop the notion of constructivist identity politics by differentiating three aspects of it: subjectification, articulation, and representation. We refer to approaches by Foucault, Rancière, Laclau/Mouffe, and Hall and illustrate the respective aspects through examples of migrant self-organizations as well as gay culture and queer critique. (shrink)

One World democracy and the European tradition consider civil and socio-political identity as the main national and state-forming factor. The unity of the nation is only possible in a civil society that is guided by democratic principles. The nation is primarily a political community, United by common political values, norms and culture, preservation of national unity in accordance with these principles is a combination of public policy underlying the civil-democratic values of freedom, justice, solidarity. Different social layers of the Ukrainian (...) society for many centuries in their aspirations and activities focused on those or other foreign countries, effectively identifying their own narrow corporate, social class or regional interests with a policy of external patrons. Attempts to establish national unity solely on the basis of anthropological, linguistic and emotional identity in the case of the Ukrainian people stumble upon a number of objections. Only joint internal economic-political and social and civic development trends, combined with active relationships between people provide for this phenomenon the term spread. Public and political activity needs to focus not on the emancipation of the rights and interests of some certain groups of Ukrainian society, and the nation as a whole, a unity which must be bonded to the state-a political entity that could represent the interests of all groups and would encourage them to cooperate for the common good. This national and state elite is primarily a spiritual factor that voluntarily takes on himself the burden of responsibility for social welfare, so that every member of society, regardless of regional and social origin primarily saw themselves as belonging primarily to the national political community, and not to a particular class. These values have the same fundamental importance and is inextricably linked. According to the concept of civilian democracy, the nation as a political whole is finally formed only under condition of effective functioning of democracy, as it is in all its varieties is a necessary basis for the establishment and development of civil society, forming a wide system of socio-political relationships, cement national unity. (shrink)