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Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):177-193.details
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Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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A weak symmetry condition for probabilistic measures of confirmation.Jakob Koscholke - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1927-1944.details
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A fiction of long standing.Christian Dayé - 2016 - History of the Human Sciences 29 (4-5):35-58.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.details
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Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
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Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.details
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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(1 other version)How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006). Springer. pp. 247--275.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Confirmation, paradoxes, and possible worlds.Shelley Stillwell - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):19-52.details
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Criteria for naturalness in conceptual spaces.Corina Strößner - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-36.details
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What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.details
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Jan Łukasiewicz’s program of the logicization of philosophy: its genesis, content and realizations.Anna Brożek - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-24.details
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Non-bayesian foundations for statistical estimation, prediction, and the ravens example.Malcolm R. Forster - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (3):357 - 376.details
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Der Rabe und der Bayesianist.Mark Siebel - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313-329.details
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Two envelopes.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (1):69-96.details
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On the significance of conditional probabilities.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):311 - 344.details
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Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum on Analogical Reasoning: New Sources.Marta Sznajder - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1349-1365.details
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The Raven Paradox Revisited in Terms of Random Variables.Bruno Carbonaro & Federica Vitale - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):763-795.details
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