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Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem.Adam J. L. Harris, Anne S. Hsu & Jens K. Madsen - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):311 - 343.details
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Probability and conditionals: Belief revision and rational decision.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.details
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The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?Ulrike Hahn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Rational argument, rational inference.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford - 2012 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.details
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On the Modal Logic of Jeffrey Conditionalization.Zalán Gyenis - 2018 - Logica Universalis 12 (3-4):351-374.details
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General properties of bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations.Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):719-755.details
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Denying antecedents and affirming consequents: The state of the art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.details
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A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1715-1740.details
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Varieties of propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.details
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Timothy Childers. Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-19-966182-4 (hbk); 978-0-19-966183-1 (pbk). Pp. xviii + 194. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):413-417.details
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Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.Donald Gillies - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:103-120.details
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Responses and Clarifications Regarding Science and Worldviews.Hugh G. Gauch - 2009 - Science & Education 18 (6-7):905-927.details
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The Confounding Question of Confounding Causes in Randomized Trials.Jonathan Fuller - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):901-926.details
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Confirmation and Meaning Holism Revisited.Timothy Fuller - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1379-1397.details
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Probability in GRW theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.details
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How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.details
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Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist’s Approach to Confirmation. [REVIEW]Malcolm R. Forster - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.details
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Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity.Branden Fitelson - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):652-660.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.details
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Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of).Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:25-36.details
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Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.details
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A bayesian account of independent evidence with applications.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S123-.details
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Does Science Presuppose Naturalism ?Yonatan I. Fishman & Maarten Boudry - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (5):921-949.details
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Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews?Yonatan I. Fishman - 2009 - Science & Education 18 (6-7):813-837.details
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Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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When no Reason for is a Reason against.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):426-431.details
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Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.details
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Bayesian argumentation and the value of logical validity.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (5):806-821.details
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Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.details
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Bayesian humility.Adam Elga - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):305-323.details
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Randomness Is Unpredictability.Antony Eagle - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.details
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Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.details
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Agents and norms in the new economics of science.Stephen M. Downes - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):224-238.details
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The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.details
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Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.details
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Confirmation and Reduction: a Bayesian Account.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):321-338.details
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Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results.Zoltan Dienes - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science.Brendan Shea - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.details
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What’s Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (2):283-306.details
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Climate Change and Cultural Cognition.Daniel Greco - forthcoming - In Philosophy and Climate Change.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.details
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