The relative contributions of gender, test anxiety and test items scrambling on performance in Mathematics has been widely assessed, although there is an inconclusive argument regarding the magnitude of such effects. This study was designed to contribute to this debate, while also being the first study to evaluate the interactive effects of the three dimensions of test anxiety (worry, emotion and total) on performance in Mathematics. A systematic random sample of 1,358 SS3 students participated in a quasi-experiment. Data were obtained (...) using the Test Anxiety Scale (TAI) (Spielberger, 1980) and a Mathematics Achievement Test (MAT) developed by Etuk (2019). Findings indicated that there was no significant gender difference on performance; tests anxiety and items scrambling had significant effects on performance in Mathematics respectively; low students' performance in Mathematics was associated with high test anxiety and test items arrangement from complex to simple; there was a significant interaction of test anxiety worry, emotion and total on performance in Mathematics. It was concluded that gender does not play a significant role in the performance of students in mathematics. Test anxiety in terms of worry, emotion and total affect the performance of students in Mathematics. Based on the conclusions, relevant implications are discussed. (shrink)

Using contemporary data from the U.S. and other nations, we address 3 questions: Do gender differences in mathematics performance exist in the general population? Do gender differences exist among the mathematically talented? Do females exist who possess profound mathematical talent? In regard to the first question, contemporary data indicate that girls in the U.S. have reached parity with boys in mathematics performance, a pattern that is found in some other nations as well. Focusing on the second question, studies find more (...) males than females scoring above the 95th or 99th percentile, but this gender gap has significantly narrowed over time in the U.S. and is not found among some ethnic groups and in some nations. Furthermore, data from several studies indicate that greater male variability with respect to mathematics is not ubiquitous. Rather, its presence correlates with several measures of gender inequality. Thus, it is largely an artifact of changeable sociocultural factors, not immutable, innate biological differences between the sexes. Responding to the third question, we document the existence of females who possess profound mathematical talent. Finally, we review mounting evidence that both the magnitude of mean math gender differences and the frequency of identification of gifted and profoundly gifted females significantly correlate with sociocultural factors, including measures of gender equality across nations. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...) present some of the more famous work in cognitive science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain systematic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity of philosophy could be constrained. Then I present evidence that, according to performance on the CRT (Frederick 2005), those who have benefited from training and selection in philosophy are indeed less prone to one kind of systematic error: irrationally arbitrating between intuitive and reflective responses. Nonetheless, philosophers are not entirely immune to this systematic error, and their proclivity for this error is statistically related to their responses to a variety of philosophical questions. So, while the evidence herein puts constraints on the worries about the integrity of philosophy, it by no means eliminates these worries. The conclusion, then, is that the present evidence offers prima facie reasons to ascribe a mitigated privilege to philosophers' ability to rationally arbitrate between intuitive and reflective responses. (shrink)

From the perspective of evolutionary theory, we believe it makes more sense to view the sex differences in spatial cognition as being an evolutionary by-product of selection for optimal rates of fetal development. Geary does not convince us that his proposed selective factors operated with “sufficient precision, economy, and efficiency.” Moreover, the archaeological evidence does not support his proposed evolutionary scenario.

International large-scale assessments have gained much attention since the beginning of the twenty-first century, influencing education legislation in many countries. This includes Spain, where they have been used by successive governments to justify education policy change. Unfortunately, there was a problem with the PISA 2018 reading scores for this country, meaning the OECD refused to initially release the results. Therefore, in this paper we attempt to estimate the likely PISA 2018 reading scores for Spain, and for each region within. The (...) figure finally published by the OECD for Spain – in terms of reading scores – was 476.5 points, which is between the lower and upper bound of the interval we find (475 to 483 test points in 2018). Additionally, we report some robustness checks for the OCED countries participating in PISA 2018, which show that the difference between the actual scores and the ones we found with the imputation methods are quite close. (shrink)

This article focuses on key features of the use of sex and gender in titles of articles about women, science, and engineering over an important forty-six-year period. The focus is theoretically and empirically consequential. Theoretically, the paper addresses science as a critical case that connects femininity/masculinity to social stratification; and the use of sex and gender as an enduring, analytical issue that reveals perspectives on hierarchies of femininity/masculinity. Empirically, this article identifies the emergence, development, and stabilization of published articles about (...) women, science, and engineering that use sex and gender in their titles. The distinctive method involves search, retrieval, and review of 23,430 articles, using intercoder reliabilities for inclusion/exclusion. This results in a uniquely specified and comprehensive set of articles on our subject and the identification of titles with sex and gender. Findings point to the growth of gender titles, their increase in every field, differing concentrations of sex and gender titles in journals, a span of telling topic areas, and higher citation rates of gender, compared to sex, titles. Broader implications appear in reasons for the growth of gender titles, meanings of topic areas that occur, insights into social inequalities and science policies, and emerging complexities of nonbinary categories of sex/gender. (shrink)

Using data from the authors' 1998-99 survey of 1,040 eighth graders in Wuhan, China, this study explores the differences between single-girl and single-boy families with regard to parental expectation and investment in children's education, children's own educational aspirations, and mathematics performance. The authors found that contrary to the known intrafamily discrimination against girls common among families of pre-one-child generations and still common among contemporary rural families with more than one child, there are no gender differences related to education between single-girl (...) and single-boy families in modern urban China. The authors found equally high educational aspirations and similar mathematical performance for male and female only children. They suggest that this gender equality in education is an unintended consequence of the one-child-per-family policy and that under China's current social and economic conditions, girls are better off living in one-child families in the big cities of modern China. (shrink)

The results of some high-stakes aptitude tests in Austria have revealed sex differences. We suggest that such discrepancies are mediated not principally by differences in aptitudes, skills, and knowledge but gender differences in test takers’ perceptions of the test situation. Furthermore, previous research has indicated that candidates’ evaluations of the fairness of the testing tool are of great importance from an institutional point of view because such perceptions are known to influence an organization’s attractiveness. In this study, we aimed to (...) investigate how women and men perceive and evaluate certain aspects of a high-stakes test situation by using the results and evaluations of an actual medical school aptitude test (753 applicants; 59% women). Test takers voluntarily evaluated the test situation and rated specific aspects of it (e.g., the fairness of the selection tool) and provided information regarding their test anxiety immediately after they completed the 4-hour test. Data analyses indicated small, albeit significant sex differences in participants’ perceptions of the test. Men described the test situation as slightly giving more opportunity to socialize and possessing more opportunity to deceive than women did. Furthermore, the perception of the test situation did not directly predict the test results, but it served as a moderator for the indirect effect of test anxiety on test results. By contrast, there were significant direct effects but no indirect effects of situation perception on evaluations of the fairness of the selection tool: The more the test situation was perceived as a high-pressure situation, the lower the fairness ratings of the testing tool. Results were discussed with reference to gender roles and test fairness. (shrink)

The differences model, which argues that males and females are vastly different psychologically, dominates the popular media. Here, the author advances a very different view, the gender similarities hypothesis, which holds that males and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological variables. Results from a review of 46 meta-analyses support the gender similarities hypothesis. Gender differences can vary substantially in magnitude at different ages and depend on the context in which measurement occurs. Overinflated claims of gender differences carry (...) substantial costs in areas such as the workplace and relationships. (shrink)

I have provided evidence that Geary's model does not explain male dominance in spatial abilities by sexual selection. The current literature concerning the relations of nonverbal IQ to testosterone, hand preference, and right- and left-hand skill, as well as the organizing effects of testosterone on cerebral lateralization during the perinatal period, does not support Geary's arguments.

The central problem in Geary's theory is how differences are conceptualized. Recent research has shown that between-sex differences on certain tasks are a consequence of averaging within sex differences. A mixture distribution models between-sex differences on several tasks well and does not appear congenial to a sexual-selection perspective.

Spatial and mathematical abilities may be “sex-limited” traits. A sex-limited trait has the same determinants of variation within the sexes, but the genetic or environmental effects would be differentially expressed in males and females. New advances in structural equation modeling allow means and variation to be estimated simultaneously. When these statistical methods are combined with a genetically informative research design, it should be possible to demonstrate that the genes influencing spatial and mathematical abilities are sex-limited in their expression. This approach (...) would give an empirical confirmation of Geary's evolutionary speculations. (shrink)

Based on Geary's theory, intelligence may determine which males utilize innate spatial knowledge to inform their mathematical solutions. This may explain why math gender differences occur mainly with higher abilities. In support, we found that mental rotation ability served as a mediator of gender differences on the math Scholastic Assessment Test for two high-ability samples. Our research suggests, however, that environment and biology interact to influence mental rotation abilities.

Girls have much lower mathematics self-efficacy than boys, a likely contributor to the underrepresentation of women in STEM. To help explain this gender confidence gap, we examined predictors of mathematics self-efficacy in a sample of 1,007 9th graders aged 13–18 years (54.2% girls). Participants completed a standardized math test, after which they rated three indices of mastery: an affective component (state self-esteem), a meta-cognitive component (self-enhancement), and their prior math grade. Despite having similar grades, girls reported lower mathematics self-efficacy and (...) state self-esteem, and were less likely than boys to self-enhance in terms of performance. Multilevel multiple-group regression analyses showed that the affective mastery component explained girls’ self-efficacy while cognitive self-enhancement explained boys’. Yet, a chi-square test showed that both constructs were equally relevant in the prediction of girls’ and boys’ self-efficacy. Measures of interpersonal sources of self-efficacy were not predictive of self-efficacy after taking the other dimensions into account. Results suggest that boys are advantaged in their development of mathematics self-efficacy beliefs, partly due to more positive feelings and more cognitive self-enhancement following test situations. (shrink)

Achievement test differences between boys and girls and between young men and young women, mostly favoring males, extend far beyond mathematics. Such pervasive differences, illustrated here, may require an explanatory theory broader than Geary's.

Geary's is the traditional view of the sexes. Yet each part of his argument – the move from sex differences in spatial ability and social preferences to a sex difference in mathematical ability, the claim that the former are biologically primary, and the sociobiological explanation of these differences – requires considerable further work. The notion of a biologically secondary ability is itself problematic.

Spatial visualization as a key variable in sex-related differences in mathematical problem solving and spatial aspects of geometry is traced to the 1960s. More recent relevant data are presented. The variability debate is traced to the latter part of the nineteenth century and an explanation for it is suggested. An idea is presented for further research to clarify sex-related brain laterality differences in solving spatial problems.

Geary's model is a worthy effort, but ambiguous on important issues. It ignores differential resource allocation, although this follows directly from sexual selection via differential parental investment. Dimorphism in primary traits is arbitrarily attributed to sexual selection via intramale competition, rather than direct evolutionary pressures. Dubious predictions are made about the consequences of raising mathematics achievement.

Although Geary's partitioning of mathematical abilities into those that are biologically primary and secondary is an advance over most sociobiological theories of cognitive sex differences, it remains untestable and ignores the spatial nature of women's traditional work. An alternative model based on underlying cognitive processes offers other advantages.

Geary suggests that implicit mathematical principles exist across human cultures and transcend sex differences. Is such knowledge present in animals as well, and is it sufficient to account for performance in all species, including our own? I attempt to trace the implications of Gearys target article for comparative psychology, questioning the exclusion of “subitizing” in describing human mathematical performance, and asking whether human researchers function as cultural agents with animals, elevating their implicit knowledge to secondary domains of numerical performance.

Cognitive reflection is recognized as an important skill, which is necessary for making advantageous decisions. Even though gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection test appear to be robust across multiple studies, little research has examined the source of the gender gap in performance. In Study 1, we tested the invariance of the scale across genders. In Study 2, we investigated the role of math anxiety, mathematical reasoning, and gender in CRT performance. The results attested the measurement equivalence of the Cognitive (...) Reflection Test – Long, when administered to male and female students. Additionally, the results of the mediation analysis showed an indirect effect of gender on CRT-L performance through mathematical reasoning and math anxiety. The direct effect of gender was no longer statistically significant after accounting for the other variables. The current findings suggest that cognitive reflection is affected by numerical skills and related feelings. (shrink)

To the extent that Geary's theory concerning biologically primary and secondary behaviors depends on factor analytic methods and findings, it is woefully weak. Factors have been mistakenly called primary mental abilities, but the adjective “primary” represents reification of a mathematical dimension defined by correlations. Fleshing out a factor beyond its mathematical properties requires much additional quantitative experimental and correlational research that goes far beyond mere factoring.

Geary's emphasis on hunting ignores the possible importance of other human activities, such as scavenging and gathering, in the evolution of spatial abilities. In addition, there is little evidence that links spatial abilities and math skills. Furthermore, such links have little practical importance given the small size of most differences and girls' superior performance in mathematics classrooms.

We challenge the notion that differences in spatial ability are the best or only explanation for observed sex differences in mathematical word problems. We suggest two ideas from the study of autism: sex differences in theory of mind and in central coherence.

Males are often found to outperform females in tests of mathematics achievement and it has been proposed that this may in part be explained by differences in cognitive style. This study investigated the relation between Wholistic-Analytic and Verbal-Imagery cognitive style, gender and mathematics achievement in a sample of 190 Australian primary school students aged between 8?11?years (M?=?9.77, SD?=?1.05). It was hypothesised that males would outperform females in mathematics achievement tests, and that gender would interact with cognitive style on mathematics performance. (...) A significant gender/cognitive style interaction was found. Boys with an Analytic/Imagery style achieved significantly higher results than the girls with an Analytic/Imagery style, supporting the contention that certain cognitive styles affect boys and girls mathematics performance differently. Implications of results and strategies for improving mathematics achievement among girls are discussed. (shrink)

Dynamics of perceiving oneself on femininity and masculinity dimensions in diverse contexts The article is about issues related to gender perceived as a result of social context and thus fits in the current, processual gender paradigm. Two studies have been conducted verifying hypotheses about perceiving oneself on the femininity and masculinity dimensions in various types of contexts. Expectations were that generic contexts would make perceiving oneself within the psychological gender dimensions more dynamic. Women were expected to perceive themselves as more (...) feminine and less masculine in contexts matching their gender, i.e. "feminine", comparing to "masculine", and men were expected to perceive themselves as more masculine and less feminine in "masculine" contexts comparing to "feminine" contexts. Research results do not confirm the above hypotheses and indicate dynamism in perceiving oneself on femininity and masculinity dimensions. However, the dynamism is perceived only on dimensions inconsistent with biological gender - situation affects women's perceiving of themselves on the masculinity dimension and men's - on femininity dimensions. (shrink)

In Darwinian terminology, “sexual selection” refers to purely reproductive competition and is conceptually distinct from natural selection as it affects reproduction generally. As natural selection may favor the evolution of sexual dimorphism by virtue of the division of labor between males and females, this possibility needs to be taken very seriously.

Geary is highly selective in his use of the literature on gender differences. His assumption of consistent female inferiority in mathematics is not necessarily supported by the facts.

The principles of sexual selection were used as an organizing framework for interpreting cross-national patterns of sex differences in mathematical abilities. Cross-national studies suggest that there are no sex differences in biologically primary mathematical abilities, that is, for those mathematical abilities that are found in all cultures as well as in nonhuman primates, and show moderate heritability estimates. Sex differences in several biologically secondary mathematical domains are found throughout the industrialized world. In particular, males consistently outperform females in the solving (...) of mathematical word problems and geometry. Sexual selection and any associated proximate mechanisms influence these sex differences in mathematical performance indirectly. First, sexual selection resulted in greater elaboration in males than in females of the neurocognitive systems that support navigation in three-dimensional space. Knowledge implicit in these systems reflects an understanding of basic Euclidean geometry, and may thus be one source of the male advantage in geometry. Males also use more readily than females these spatial systems in problem-solving situations, which provides them with an advantage in solving word problems and geometry. In addition, sex differences in social styles and interests, which also appear to be related in part to sexual selection, result in sex differences in engagement iii mathematics-related activities, thus further increasing the male advantage in certain mathematical domains. A model that integrates these biological influences with sociocultural influences on the sex differences in mathematical performance is presented in this article. (shrink)

Criticism of sex differences in mathematical ability and sex roles in sociobiology and the pernicious influence of these ideas on education.

Analyses of bodies of data usually omit some relevant studies. Geary omits some studies looking at functional correlates of basic biological data, studies of developmental implications for functioning, and the recent achievement of acceleration of cognitive development.

The male advantage in certain mathematical domains contributes to the difference in the numbers of males and females that enter math-intensive occupations, which in turn contributes to the sex difference in earnings. Understanding the nature and development of the sex difference in mathematical abilities is accordingly of social as well as scientific concern. A more complete understanding of the biological contributions to these differences can guide research on educational techniques that might someday produce more equal educational outcomes in mathematics and (...) other academic domains. (shrink)

We evaluate three of Geary's claims, finding that there is little evidence for sex differences in object- vs. person-orientation; sex differences in competition, even if biologically caused, lead to sex differences in mathematics only given a certain style of teaching; and sex differences in mental rotation, though real, are not well explained in a sociobiological framework or by the proximate biological variables assumed by Geary.

This commentary focuses on one of the many issues raised in Geary's target article: the importance of gender differences in spatial ability to gender differences in mathematics. I argue that the evidence for the central role of spatial ability in mathematical ability, or in gender differences in it, is tenuous at best.

Sexual selection provides an adequate partial explanation for the difference in means between the distributions, but fails to explain the difference in variance, that is, the overrepresentation of both boys with outstanding mathematical reasoning ability and boys with mental retardation. Other genetic factors are probably at work. While spatial ability is correlated with OMRA, so are other cognitive abilities. OMRA is not reducible to spatial ability; hence selection for navigational skill is unlikely to be the only mechanism by which males (...) have gained an advantage in OMRA. (shrink)

The target article draws on evolutionary theory to formulate a biosocial model of sex differences in quantitative abilities. Unfortunately, the data do not support some of the crucial hypotheses. The male advantage in geometry is not appreciably greater than the male advantagi in algebra, and the greater male variability in mathematics cited by Gear is not cross-culturally invariant.

Geary proposes a sociobiological hypothesis of how sex differences in math and spatial skills might have jointly arisen. His distinction between primary and secondary math skills is noteworthy, and in some ways analogous to the closed versus open systems postulated to exist for language. In this commentary issues concerning how genes might affect complex cognitive skills, the interpretation of heritability estimates, and prior research abilites are discussed.