- Are Newcomb problems really decisions?James M. Joyce - 2006 - Synthese 156 (3):537-562.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885.details
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On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Prediction with expert advice applied to the problem of prediction with expert advice.Daniel A. Herrmann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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Denying antecedents and affirming consequents: The state of the art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.details
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Clark Glymour’s responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue “Causation, probability, and truth: the philosophy of Clark Glymour”.Clark Glymour - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1251-1285.details
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Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.details
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Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality.Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.details
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Is it always rational to satisfy Savage's axioms?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):285-296.details
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What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Randomness Is Unpredictability.Antony Eagle - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.details
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The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.details
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Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.details
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Religious Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):63--86.details
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Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.details
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A Bayesian Mixed-Methods Analysis of Basic Psychological Needs Satisfaction through Outdoor Learning and Its Influence on Motivational Behavior in Science Class.Ulrich Dettweiler, Gabriele Lauterbach, Christoph Becker & Perikles Simon - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknowndetails
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Causation, Coherence and Concepts : a Collection of Essays.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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Statistical learning theory as a framework for the philosophy of induction.Gilbert Harman & Sanjeev Kulkarni - manuscriptdetails
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Supposition and desire in a non-classical setting.J. Robert G. Williams - unknowndetails
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The Limits of Probabilism.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 55--65.details
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The special status of mathematical probability: a historical sketch.Xavier De Scheemaekere & Ariane Szafarz - 2008 - Epistemologia 32 (1):91.details
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Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2009 - In A. Pazos Sierra, J. R. Rabunal Dopico & J. Dorado de la Calle (eds.), Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence. Hershey.details
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Theoretical omniscience: Old evidence or new theory.André C. R. Martins - unknowndetails
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.details
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Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.details
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