Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...) it. Uniquely, the brain records its own history, synthesizing a Movie-in-the-Brain, called the Noumenal Cosmos. Attempting thereby to represent the actual Universe, this makes for a sovereign brain that governs itself. The brain is domicile of an Ego, with its selfhood at stake at all times. Yet, it can know itself only by its actions, in which it appears as an actor in its own movie. Phenomena enter garbled, as confused apparitions, and must be put in good form using top–down feedback control by Ego, so that each movie frame makes rational sense within the overall context of the Noumenal Cosmos. A stack of frames is processed typically in 40 Hz rhythm with 300 ms process time each, for about 12 in the stack at any time. Successive neural centers are processing the stack in the brain assembly line, based on data from increasingly global receptive fields. Ego stitches together the movie frames, but only the top frame is in consciousness for 25 ms. The top frame contains the whole scene where the Ego makes an appearance as the actor that imposes Kantian synthetic unity on the scene, merely an assembly of grammatical texts, in a system-internal coded process language, fitting the scene into the Noumenal Cosmos. But Ego observes Ego only to the extent permitted by the objectivity rule, only what it does and thinks, not its true face. From the Noumenal Cosmos, the Ego receives grammatical messages in the internal sense code. They are integrated into a whole in the reaction of the Ego to the momentary scene. The voluntary nature of Ego’s decisions is explained, based on its ability to code in advance its own actions sequentially in time, as it sees fit with a view to an orderly Noumenal Cosmos, records of code being arranged spatially in neural structures. (shrink)

At the centre of discussion lies the reception of Plato’s philosophy, particularly his theory of Ideas, in Kant’s moral philosophy, his ethics and his doctrine of right. Kant saw himself as a follower of Platonism insofar as its anti-empiri­cist principles of human conduct are concerned, although his own version of practical rationalism differs considerably from Plato’s. This is also true of Kant’s conception of freedom and of human rights. The greatest impact on Kant’s moral philosophy is due to the doctrine (...) of the two worlds, the mundus sensibilis and the mundus intelligibilis, which did not originate in Plato himself, but in the Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria. Kant reinterpreted this doctrine by taking the intelligible world as a moral world consisting of free rational agents who ought to transform the empirical world of human society and history according to the norms and standards of moral laws. This was meant to be a programme for a moral reform of the human world, both with regard to individual moral­ity and to the cosmopolitical task of the establishment of an international order of legal institutions. Kant’s practical Platonism insists on the creation of a moral world order through human actions that take their lead from pure practical reason. (shrink)

The main point of disagreement about Kant's approach of the problem of truth is whether it can be understood within the apparatus of contemporary philosophy as a coherence or a correspondence theory. By favoring a systematic consideration of Kant's argumentation in light of the available literature on the problem, this paper argues toward the latter alternative. It is sustained that the definition of truth as "the agreement of cognition with its object" is cogent throughout Kant's thought and that it is (...) finally approached not from an established theory, but as a problem to which a solution cannot be given within the boundaries of the critical-transcendental philosophy. Initially, the literature which locates Kant either as coherentist or correspondentist is taken into account. The latter is systematized into four groups: the ontological reading; the isomorphic reading; the "consequentialist" reading; the regulative reading. Secondly, the argumentation in the pre-critical period is approached. It is argued that a coherence theory lacks its confirmation already within it and that in the decade of 1750 Kant disposes of the isomorphic correspondence reading. Finally, the critical argumentation is considered. It is sustained that the critical approach takes truth as a fundamental problem which cannot be held by a "consequencialist" or regulative correspondence theory. (shrink)

: It has been said that Kant's critical philosophy made it impossible to pursue either the Cartesian rationalist or the Lockean empiricist program of providing a foundation for the sciences (e.g., Guyer 1992). This claim does not hold true for much of nineteenth century French philosophy, especially the eclectic spiritualist tradition that begins with Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) and continues through Paul Janet (1823-99). This tradition assimilated Kant's transcendental apperception of the unity of experience to (...) Descartes's cogito. They then took this to be the method of a philosophical psychology that reveals the active self as substance or cause and thus provides the epistemological grounding for these categories. However, to dismiss these philosophers as simply confused or mistaken would be to overlook the historical role that their interpretations of Kant played in the subsequent development of philosophy and the social sciences in France. Specifically, Émile Durkheim's (1858-1917) sociological theory of the categories was deeply influenced by the eclectic spiritualist tradition and yet at the same time developed in reaction to it, as he thought that its psychological account of the categories failed to bring out their shared or universal character and the extent to which our conceptions of the categories are cultural products. (shrink)

O principal ponto de desacordo sobre a abordagem kantiana do problema da verdade é se ela pode ser compreendida nos moldes da filosofia contemporânea como coerentista ou como correspondentista. Primando por uma consideração sistemática da argumentação de Kant em confronto com a literatura existente sobre o problema, este trabalho defende a segunda alternativa. Sustentase a tese de que a definição da verdade como a “concordância do conhecimento com o seu objeto” é cogente em todo o percurso do pensamento kantiano e (...) que, nessa acepção, a verdade culmina por ser abordada não a partir de uma teoria estabelecida, mas como um problema cuja solução não pode ser dada nos limites da filosofia crítico-transcendental. Pondera-se, primeiramente, a literatura que situa Kant quer como coerentista quer como correspondentista e sistematiza-se a segunda alternativa em quatro grupos: a leitura ontológica, a leitura isomórfica, a leitura “consequencialista” e a leitura regulativa. Num segundo momento, em atenção ao período pré-crítico, argumenta-se que a alternativa coerentista deixa de se confirmar já nessa mesma época e que, na década de 1750, Kant descarta uma suposta teoria correspondentista isomórfica. Num último momento, considera-se a argumentação crítica e defende-se que a mesma concebe a verdade como um problema fundamental que não cabe ao tratamento de uma teoria correspondentista concebida de modo “consequencialista” ou regulativo. (shrink)

Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...) structure, because they differ in the placement of the logical constants “every” and “some”. By contrast, the sentences Every girl loves some boy. and Every boy loves some girl. are thought to have the same logical form, because “girl” and “boy” are not logical constants. Thus, in order to settle questions about logical form, and ultimately about which arguments are logically valid and which sentences logically true, we must distinguish the “logical constants” of a language from its nonlogical expressions. (shrink)

: Neste artigo argumento contra a interpretação muito difundida segundo a qual o ano de 1769 representou um marco na formação da filosofia transcendental e a Dissertação de 1770 corresponde ao primeiro texto crítico. O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a origem das antinomias nas Reflexões da década de 1770. Não se trata de esboçá-las, pois sobre elas Kant é reticente nesse período. Elas são objeto da atenção dele somente às vésperas da redação da Crítica da razão pura. Eu me (...) ocupo apenas com alguns dos elementos que possibilitarão sua formulação e solução na Crítica da razão pura. (shrink)

The viewpoint of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE) and of Genetic Epistemology (GE) on classical epistemological questions is strikingly different: EE starts with Evolutionary Biology, the subject of which is population's dynamics. GE, however, starts with Developmental Psychology and thus focusses the development of individuals. By EE knowledge is seen as portraying or copying process, and truth is interpreted as a product of adaptation, whereas for GE knowledge is due to a construction process in which the production of true insights is only (...) one possibility among others: Like falsity, error and deception, true knowledge goes back to a free relationship to reality. The difference between scientific and common knowledge is hard to be checked by EE, since both result ultimately from human hereditary structures. The study of how scientific knowledge emerges from everyday cognition is rather the task of GE. (shrink)

‘‘The strange Story of the Concept which inaugurated Modern Theoretical Physics’’ is the title of a lecture which I delivered on the invitation of Professor Franco Selleri at the University of Bari about 20 years ago. Since Professor Selleri himself has written several interesting papers on this concept and since the centennial of the birth of modern theoretical physics will be celebrated soon, I found it appropriate to dedicate this essay, containing so far unpublished critical and historical comments on this (...) concept, to Professor Selleri on the occasion of his 70th birthday. It should be emphasized that the critical comments in this essay are not intended to question the validity of the theory initiated by this concept, a theory which in the realm of its applicability is daily corroborated by numerous experiments in high-energy laboratories all over the world. Although these critical remarks refer almost exclusively to the first publication of this theory, a publication which has been hailed as ‘‘the most important paper written in the 20th century,’’ they discuss profound problems of general importance for the study of the foundations of physics. (shrink)

Arthur Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there (...) lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light. (shrink)

O presente texto parte do pressuposto de que a radical irredutibilidade da estética às representações lógicas está no limiar do programa de pesquisa de Kant anunciado como uma filosofia transcendental. Valendo-nos de Newton da Costa, tentaremos mostrar, primeiramente, as condições de contorno que balizavam essa discussão, e o modo como Leibniz e Newton as interpretaram e construíram suas respectivas teorias. Na sequência, tentaremos indicar que na gênese dessa descoberta de Kant tem papel relevante um fato cognitivo singular, as contrapartidas incongruentes, (...) sem o qual a solução não poderia ser encontrada da maneira como se deu. Nosso objetivo, em decorrência disso, será mostrar as determinações que possibilitaram diferentes interpretações metateóricas de um mesmo fato cognitivo: a concepção do espaço. No entanto, nosso interesse principal não será validar uma dessas concepções (a de Kant, ou a de Leibniz, ou a de Newton) em face das outras, como se se tratasse de um juízo disjuntivo, mas apreciar essas teorias a partir de suas sobreposições, valorizando o trajeto metodológico entre os alegados fundamentos de uma proposta cognitiva e os problemas que ela diz resolver. (shrink)

Beth has tried to vindicate the kantian doctrine of mathematical intuition in the frame of contemporary logic. The paper proposes a critical evaluation of this attempt. The theory of mathematical intuition that is exposed in the Critic of Pure Reason is twofold: on one hand, the intuition of the "first principles", as it is analyzed in the Aesthetics, on the other hand, the intuition which is involved in the proofs, as it is analyzed in the Methodology. Contrasting with most defenders (...) of Kant, who try to show that the first kind of intuition remains, in some way, compatible with the non-euclidean geometries, Beth wants to defend the second kind of intuition, by suggesting that it is nothing else than the "instanciation" method, well-known in the predicate calculus. I show that this strategy of defending Kant is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Finding truth is an art that was learned and unlearned. Truth can only be found by looking for independent confirmation of our beliefs, by reality. This methodology is difficult to apply in personal- and social settings, because power and politics turn 'seeking independent confirmation' into 'avoiding dependent rejection'. A completely different social order is implied and the one keeps running the other into the ground like a tectonic plate. Philosophical Modernism showed us how dualism works, before Post-Modernism challenged it, regressing (...) to monism. (shrink)