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In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inferencepatterns (...) 

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...) 

Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language to metaphysics. It (...) 

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...) 

The Linda paradox is a key topic in current debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. We present a novel analysis of this paradox, based on the notion of verisimilitude as studied in the philosophy of science. The comparison with an alternative analysis based on probabilistic confirmation suggests how to overcome some problems of our account by introducing an adequately defined notion of verisimilitudinarian confirmation. 

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixedpremise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and crossspecies arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general definition of argument (...) 

In the paper the following questions are discussed: What is logical consequence? What are logical constants? What is a logical system? What is logical pluralism? What is logic? In the conclusion, the main tendencies of development of modern logic are pointed out. 

I discuss Prawitz’s claim that a nonreliabilist answer to the question “What is a proof?” compels us to reject the standard BolzanoTarski account of validity, andto account for the meaning of a sentence in broadly veriﬁcationist terms. I sketch what I take to be a possible way of resisting Prawitz’s claimone that concedes the antireliabilist assumption from which Prawitz’s argument proceeds. 

Aristotle's General Definition of the Syllogism may be taken as consisting of two parts: the Inferential Conditions and the Final Clause. Although this distinction is well known, traditional interpretations neglect the Final Clause and its influence on syllogistic. Instead, the aforementioned tradition focuses on the Inferential Conditions only. We intend to show that this neglect has severe consequences not just on syllogistic but on the whole exegesis of Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. Due to these consequences, our objective is to analyse (...) 

This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence :the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated,introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two inﬂuential accounts of consequence, the modeltheoretic and the prooftheoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarilypreserve truth. We brieﬂy discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections (...) 



In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic where logical terms no longer (...) 

Infectious logics are systems which have a truthvalue that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies fourvalued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated (i) as a way to treat different pathological sentences (like the Liar and the TruthTeller) differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truthvalue gluts and some others to be truthvalue gaps, and (ii) as a way to (...) 

Since Kaplan : 81–98, 1979) first provided a logic for contextsensitive expressions, it has been thought that the only way to construct a logic for indexicals is to restrict it to arguments which take place in a single context— that is, instantaneous arguments, uttered by a single speaker, in a single place, etc. In this paper, I propose a logic which does away with these restrictions, and thus places arguments where they belong, in real world conversations. The central innovation is (...) 

Logic is a celebrated representation language because of its formal generality. But there are two senses in which a logic may be considered general, one that concerns a technical ability to discriminate between different types of individuals, and another that concerns constitutive norms for reasoning as such. This essay embraces the former, permutationinvariance conception of logic and rejects the latter, Fregean conception of logic. The question of how to apply logic under this pure invariantist view is addressed, and a methodology (...) 

A number of recent works consider treating validity as a primitive notion rather than one defined in some standard manner. There seem to have been three motivations. First, to understand how truth and validity interact in potentially paradoxical settings. Second, to argue that validity is in fact afflicted with paradoxes analogous to the semantic paradoxes. Third, to develop a ‘deflationary’ conception of validity or consequence. This article treats the notion of validity as a primitive notion and shows how to provide (...) 

In standard modeltheoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. (...) 

Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. I then outline an (...) 

There have been several different and even opposed conceptions of the problem of logical constants, i.e. of the requirements that a good theory of logical constants ought to satisfy. This paper is in the first place a survey of these conceptions and a critique of the theories they have given rise to. A second aim of the paper is to sketch some ideas about what a good theory would look like. A third aim is to draw from these ideas and (...) 

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixedpremise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and crossspecies arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors (...) 

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...) 

In this contribution, we will present some results concerning the connectives of biintuitionistic logic in the setting of Arnold Koslow’s implication structures. Furthermore, we will present soundness and completeness results of Koslow’s implication structures with respect to biintuitionistic logic. 

What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...) 



The paper investigates the propriety of applying the form versus matter distinction to arguments and to logic in general. Its main point is that many of the currently pervasive views on form and matter with respect to logic rest on several substantive and even contentious assumptions which are nevertheless uncritically accepted. Indeed, many of the issues raised by the application of this distinction to arguments seem to be related to a questionable combination of different presuppositions and expectations; this holds in (...) 

The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation ⇒x. We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse (...) 

Permutation invariance is often presented as the correct criterion for logicality. The basic idea is that one can demarcate the realm of logic by isolating specific entities—logical notions or constants—and that permutation invariance would provide a philosophically motivated and technically sophisticated criterion for what counts as a logical notion. The thesis of permutation invariance as a criterion for logicality has received considerable attention in the literature in recent decades, and much of the debate is developed against the background of ideas (...) 

Bolzano’s definition of consequence in effect associates with each set X of symbols (in a given interpreted language) a consequence relation X . We present this in a precise and abstract form, in particular studying minimal sets of symbols generating X . Then we present a method for going in the other direction: extracting from an arbitrary consequence relation its associated set C of constants. We show that this returns the expected logical constants from familiar consequence relations, and that, restricting (...) 

The need to distinguish between logical and extralogical varieties of inference, entailment, validity, and consistency has played a prominent role in metaethical debates between expressivists and descriptivists. But, to date, the importance that matters of logical form play in these distinctions has been overlooked. That’s a mistake given the foundational place that logical form plays in our understanding of the difference between the logical and the extralogical. This essay argues that descriptivists are better positioned than their expressivist rivals to provide (...) 

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) 

The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. The classical conception, (...) 

The problem of logical constants consists in finding a principled way to draw the line between those expressions of a language that are logical and those that are not. The criterion of invariance under permutation, attributed to Tarski, is probably the most common answer to this problem, at least within the semantic tradition. However, as the received view on the matter, it has recently come under heavy attack. Does this mean that the criterion should be amended, or maybe even that (...) 