- Elucidating open theism.Joshua R. Sijuwade - 2023 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 94 (2):151-175.details
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Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.details
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Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility: A Defense of Kane’s Libertarian Theory.Neil Campbell & Jamal Kadkhodapour - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):415-430.details
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A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples.James Cain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):83-93.details
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Rejecting Pereboom’s empirical objection to agent-causation.Jordan Baker - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3085-3100.details
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Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame.Richard L. Archer & Shirley Matile Ogletree - 2011 - Ethics and Behavior 21 (1):35-48.details
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Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.details
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Self-Forming Acts and Other Miracles.László Bernáth - 2014 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 1 (58):104-116.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss.Brandon Rdzak - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):201-216.details
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Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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Teizm a twardy inkompatybilizm.Dariusz Łukasiewicz - 2017 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (3):191-203.details
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Group Agents and Their Responsibility.Raimo Tuomela & Pekka Mäkelä - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):299-316.details
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The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?Scott Sehon - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):363-380.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Responsibility and Visioneering—Opening Pandora’s Box.Martin Sand - 2016 - NanoEthics 10 (1):75-86.details
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Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?Brendan Murday - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1313-1330.details
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Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
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La fiabilidad teórica del determinismo. Un examen desde la propuesta de Mariano Artigas.Martín Montoya - 2016 - Scientia et Fides 4 (2):245-262.details
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Libertarian Control and Ultimate Responsibility.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):132-148.details
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Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.details
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Kane and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection: A Reply to Moore.John Lemos - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2597-2615.details
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Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.details
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Kane, Pereboom, and Event-Causal Libertarianism.John Lemos - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):607-623.details
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On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will.Robert Kane - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.details
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Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.details
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Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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Moral Responsibility for Self-Deluding Beings.David J. Franz - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1791-1807.details
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Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.details
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The Problem of Induction and the Problem of Free Will.Avijit Lahiri - manuscriptdetails
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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Cogs in a Cosmic Machine: A Defense of Free Will Skepticism and its Ethical Implications.Sacha Greer - unknowndetails
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Daniel Dennett’s and Sam Harris’ Confrontation on the Problem of Free Will.Zahra Khazaei, Nancey Murphy & Tayyebe Gholami - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 22 (2):27-48.details
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Quantum Indeterminacy, Freedom, and Responsibility.Carlos Patarroyo - 2008 - Ideas Y Valores 57 (136):27-57.details
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Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.details
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Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom: A Libertarian Approach.Daniel Shay - unknowndetails
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Agency and Virtues.Zahra Khazaei - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 21 (3):119-140.details
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The Theory and Application of Critical Realist Philosophy and Morphogenetic Methodology: Emergent Structural and Agential Relations at a Hospice.Martin Lipscomb - unknowndetails
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Modality, compatibilism, and Leibniz: a critical defense.Seth Adam Jones - unknowndetails
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