There are three main categories of rationale for withholding information or telling lies: if overwhelming harm can only be averted through deceit; complete triviality such that it is irrelevant whether the truth is told; a duty to protect the interests of others. Public health authorities are frequently having to form judgements about the public interest, whether to release information or issue warnings. In June 1992, routine surveillance detected patulin levels (a known carcinogen) in samples of apple juice exceeding safety threshold. (...) Remedial actions were promptly taken and it was planned to subsequently publish the information in the routine way. However, the media portrayed the handling of the problem as a conspiracy and there was a short term reduction in juice sales. In October 1995, the UK Committee on Safety of Medicines issued a warning about certain brands of the contraceptive pill, based on the interim results of three unpublished studies. The increased risk of thromboembolism was small, but the resulting scare led to an increase in unwanted pregnancies. The handling of the B.S.E. crisis in the U.K. also led to accusations of incompetence or conspiracy. Public health authorities have to handle uncertainty and frequently have to form judgements for public safety on the basis of evidence of poor quantity and quality. Their task is not helped by the sometimes conflicting agenda of scientists and media. The public also have differing perceptions and interpretations of risk. The series of scares and crises are having a detrimental effect on public confidence in public health authorities. (shrink)

This paper presents an analysis of bluffing in labor negotiations from legal, economic, and ethical perspectives. It is argued that many forms of bluffing in labor negotiations are legal and economically advantageous, but that they typically constitute lying. Nevertheless it is argued that it is generally morally acceptable to bluff given a typical labor-management relationship where one's negotiating partner is familiar with and most likely employing bluffing tactics him/herself. We also consider whether it is an indictment of our present negotiating (...) practices and our economic system as a whole that, given the harsh realities of the marketplace, bluffing is usually morally acceptable. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by Robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...) in subjectivist accounts of justification reveals that the apparent puzzles Robinson raises for subjectivism are merely apparent. I will suggest that we ought to be reasonable subjectivists about justification, where “reasonableness” is understood in a particular manner. This has consequences for various other issues, including how we make sense of mistaken justification, and I will have something to say about those issues as they arise along the way. (shrink)

I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a (...) language of ‘self-constitution.’ I challenge that, and claim that the language of legislation and judgment was, for Kant, more than a metaphor: The recognition of the moral law, he says, motivates us as if it were “the bidding of another person.” Legislation is typically remote in this way. It typically requires a distance between lawgiver and law-receiver—a distance that allows, for instance, for self-inspection and judgment. For Kant, these are the terms in which to explain the forms of the moral judgment and the sources of moral normativity. It is questionable, however, whether we can be remote from our own actions in the way required—whether we can observe our own actions. We cannot, for example, raise our hand and wonder how far it will go up. I develop this claim into an Anscombean challenge to Kant, and I call upon Kantians to take it seriously. (shrink)

R.M. Hare’s two-level utilitarianism provides a useful framework for understanding the evolution of codes of professional ethics. From a Harean perspective, the codes reflect both the fact that members of various professions face special kinds of ethically charged situations in the normal course of their work, and the need for people in special roles to acquire various habits of thought and action. This highlights the role of virtue in professional ethics and provides guidance to professional societies when considering modifications to (...) their codes. From a Harean perspective, a professional society should ask both “Are there kinds of situations that members of this profession will normally encounter which members of other professions and/or the general public will not?” and “What habits of thought and action would it be good for individuals encountering such situations to have?”. (shrink)

Can I will that my maxim becomes a universal law? . . .It would be easy to show how common human reason, with this compass, knows well how to distinguish . . . what is consistent or inconsistent with duty. (Kant, Foundations, 403–4)How exactly is this compass to work? Cases bring out connected difficulties to do, (1), with whether ''social contexts'' are to be in or out of descriptions of actions maxims would have agents do – for example, ''disarming alone'' (...) and ''voting when enough others would even if one did not'', or ''disarming'' and ''voting'' simply; and, (2), with a seldom noticed ambiguity of ''everyone''s acting in accordance with a maxim'' and ''a maxim''s becoming universal law''. The paper argues dilemmatically for the inadequacy of Kant''s test for maxims consistent with duty whatever policy for social contexts and manner of maxims becoming universal laws it is said to invoke. (shrink)