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The truth about lying

Cognition 138:161-168 (2015)

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  1. Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
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  • Testimonial Worth.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper introduces and argues for the hypothesis that judgments of testimonial worth (that is, judgments of the quality of character an agent displays when testifying)are central to our practice of normatively appraising speech. It is argued that judgments of testimonial worth are central both to the judgement that an agent has lied, and to the acceptance of testimony. The hypothesis that, in lying, an agent necessarily displays poor testimonial worth, is shown to resolve a new puzzle about lying, and (...)
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  • Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
    Language is a human universal reflecting our deeply social nature. Among its essential functions, language enables us to quickly and efficiently share information. We tell each other that many things are true—that is, we routinely make assertions. Information shared this way plays a critical role in the decisions and plans we make. In Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion, a distinguished philosopher and cognitive scientist investigates the rules or norms that structure our social practice of assertion. Combining evidence from philosophy, (...)
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  • You Don't Say! Lying, Asserting and Insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...)
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  • Lying Despite Telling the Truth.Alex Wiegmann, Jana Samland & Michael R. Waldmann - 2016 - Cognition 150:37-42.
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  • Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.
    This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...)
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  • When is a Lie More of a Lie? Moral Judgment Mediates the Relationship Between Perceived Benefits of Others and Lie-Labeling.Piotr Szarota & Katarzyna Cantarero - 2017 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 48 (2):315-325.
    Lay perceptions of lying are argued to consist of a lie prototype. The latter was found to entail the intention to deceive, belief in falsity and falsity. We proposed and found that the perceptions of the benefits of others are also an important factor that influences the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading someone to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie. Drawing from the intuitionist model of moral judgments we assumed that moral judgment of the (...)
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  • Lying and Knowing.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
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  • The Folk Concept of Lying.Alex Wiegmann & Jörg Meibauer - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (8).
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  • Are False Implicatures Lies? An Empirical Investigation.Benjamin Weissman & Marina Terkourafi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):221-246.
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  • No Need for an Intention to Deceive? Challenging the Traditional Definition of Lying.Ronja Rutschmann & Alex Wiegmann - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):438-457.
    According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies. Then we asked participants to (...)
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