- An Ethics of Philosophical Belief: The case for personal commitments.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Can You Keep a Secret? BS Conspiracy Theories and the Argument from Loose Lips.Ryan Ross - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.details
|
|
How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.details
|
|
Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
|
|
Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
|
|
Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
|
|
Philosophical proofs against common sense.Bryan Frances - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):18-26.details
|
|
A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics.Louis Doulas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):493-513.details
|
|
A challenge to the new metaphysics: deRosset, Priority, and explanation.David Fisher, Hao Hong & Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6403-6433.details
|
|
Carnapian Explication and the Canberra Plan’s Conceptual Analysis: a Comparison and Critique.Rogelio Miranda - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):160-179.details
|
|
Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis: a systematic comparison.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1011-1034.details
|
|
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
|
|
Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach.Robert Carry Osborne - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.details
|
|
From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.details
|
|
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.details
|
|
Philosophical Renegades.Bryan Frances - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-166.details
|
|
On Living the Testimonial Sceptic’s Life: Can Testimonial Scepticism Be Dismissed?Arnon Keren - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):333-354.details
|
|
Why the debate about composition is factually empty.Mark Balaguer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3975-4008.details
|
|
Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
|
|
From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):365-377.details
|
|
Soames and Moore on method in ethics and epistemology.Sarah McGrath & Thomas Kelly - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1661-1670.details
|
|
Carnapian Explication and the Canberra Plan’s Conceptual Analysis.Rogelio Miranda Vilchis - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):160-179.details
|
|
A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
|
|
Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces.Folke Tersman & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.details
|
|
The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):142-163.details
|
|
Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.details
|
|
An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.details
|
|
Sequence Data, Phylogenetic Inference, and Implications of Downward Causation.Kirk Fitzhugh - 2016 - Acta Biotheoretica 64 (2):133-160.details
|
|
Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages: A Challenge to McGrath.Sherman Benjamin - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-18.details
|
|