The concept of moral innocence is frequently referenced in popular culture, ordinary language, literature, religious doctrine, and psychology. The morally innocent are often thought to be morally pure, incapable of wrongdoing, ignorant of morality, resistant to sin, or even saintly. In spite of, or perhaps because of this frequency of use the characterization of moral innocence continues to have varying connotations. As a result, the concept is often used without sufficient heed given to some of its most salient attributes, especially (...) those germane to moral agency and the moral community. In this article I intend to identify these attributes and propose that moral innocence is best defined as an inability to enter the moral community as a result of a trust in moral illusions. The content of the illusions pertains to several factors including one’s role in the moral community, one’s ability to wrong or harm others, the intricacies of one’s moral interaction with others, and the corresponding manifold complexities tangled up with the concepts of good and evil. Maintaining these illusions impedes or even prohibits an appropriate exchange of praise and blame with others. As membership in the moral community requires precisely this ability to engage in such an exchange, moral illusions necessarily give rise to an inability to participate in the moral community. (shrink)

This paper reports findings from a study about school staff’s perceptions of the preferences for social interaction that young people have with similar and different others. This tension was explored empirically using scenarios of moral dilemmas to conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews with school staff from special and mainstream secondary schools. The issue was explored with reference to a tension between social inclusion, the principle of embracing difference, and homophily, the concept that similarity breeds connection. The data suggest that homophily and (...) inclusion can come into a tension with an ethical dimension. In education, the homophily/inclusion tension is one between students’ preferences for being among similar others and the moral imperative of including everybody; or between individuality and commonality. Inclusion is often translated into a demand for full participation as the only way to respond ethically to difference. However, the recognition of students’ rights to negotiate their preferences, even when they come into tension with what is considered to be politically correct, is also an ethical position. The paper concludes that the homophily/inclusion tension is constructive as it challenges the moral necessity of inclusion for all, and opens a debate about participatory decision-making and democratic school management. (shrink)

Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is argued that the (...) Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un-self-controlled’, ‘self-controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful. (shrink)

The literature on ethical decision-making is rooted in a cognitive perspective that emphasizes the role of moral judgment. Recent research in interpersonal dynamics, however, has suggested that ethics revolves around an individual’s perceptions and views of others. We draw from both literatures to propose and empirically examine a contingent model. We theorize that whether the individual relies on cognitions about the ethical issue or perceptions of others depends on the level of social consensus surrounding the issue. We test our hypotheses (...) in three studies. Results suggest that not only does social consensus determine whether an individual relies on ethical cognitions about the issue or perceptions of others, but also that an individual’s view of self is an important moderator in these relationships. We conclude by considering implications of this research for theory and practice. (shrink)

This essay develops a new conceptual framework of science and engineering ethics education based on virtue ethics and positive psychology. Virtue ethicists and positive psychologists have argued that current rule-based moral philosophy, psychology, and education cannot effectively promote students’ moral motivation for actual moral behavior and may even lead to negative outcomes, such as moral schizophrenia. They have suggested that their own theoretical framework of virtue ethics and positive psychology can contribute to the effective promotion of motivation for self-improvement by (...) connecting the notion of morality and eudaimonic happiness. Thus this essay attempts to apply virtue ethics and positive psychology to science and engineering ethics education and to develop a new conceptual framework for more effective education. In addition to the conceptual-level work, this essay suggests two possible educational methods: moral modeling and involvement in actual moral activity in science and engineering ethics classes, based on the conceptual framework. (shrink)

An exploratory model is presented as a heuristic to indicate how individual perceptions of corporate reputation (before joining) and corporate ethical values (after joining) generate specific individual organizational senses of fit. The paper suggests that an ethical dimension of person-organization fit may go some way in explaining superior acquisition and retention of staff by those who are attracted to specific organizations by levels of corporate social performance consonant with their ethical expectations, or who remain with them by virtue of better (...) personal ethical fits with extant organizational ethical values. Specifically, the model suggests that individual misfits that arise from ethical expectations that either exceed or fall short of perceived organizational ethical performances lead to problematic acquisition and retention behavioural outcomes. (shrink)

La modernidad establece las condiciones para un nuevo tipo de sujeto: aquel que se determina a sí mismo y que debe buscar su propia identidad en su historia y en la vida compartida con otros sujetos autónomos. Para ello es central la concepción de autonomía.

Relational dimensions of ethical decision making are a potentially interesting focus to enrich our understanding of decision-making processes. This study examines decision preferences and reactions to decisions in a situation of possible harm. Two ethical value orientations, just value orientation and relational value orientation , are introduced. Participants chose relational cooperation, instrumental cooperation, or independence in dealing with an uncertain situation of possible harm. JVO contributes to a decision of relational cooperation. Only RVO was related to expected mutual benefit and (...) relational connection. Overall, this study supports our central thesis that a relational dimension of ethical decisions provides interesting insights into behavioral ethics in organizations and could expand the scope of ethical decision research. (shrink)

In this paper, the moral person is understood through the lens of identity theory in sociological social psychology. Identity theory helps identify the internal dynamics of individuals as moral persons by apprehending their self-views’, behavior, and emotions within and across situations. When the identity process is activated, the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of individuals inter-relate through a self-regulated control system. When this control system is laced with moral meanings, we see how moral persons emerge and are maintained or challenged (...) in situations. I review studies that I carried out over 2 years that sampled over 3,000 individuals using survey and laboratory research. A series of hypothesis consistent with identity theory were tested to examine individuals’ moral identity, moral behavior, and moral emotions. The findings confirm the predictive power of identity theory in explaining the moral person. Future avenues for research are briefly discussed. (shrink)

The concept of moral identity based on virtue ethics has become an issue of considerable import in explaining moral behavior. This attempt to offer adequate explanations of the full range of morally relevant human behavior inevitably provokes boundary issues between ethics and moral psychology. In terms of the relationship between the two disciplines, some argue for ?naturalized (or psychologized) morality,? whereas, on the other hand, others insist on ?moralized psychology.? This article investigates the relationship between virtue ethics and moral identity (...) based on previous research on the relationship between ethics and moral psychology. This article especially attempts to show that meaningful links between the two concepts possible by using theoretical frameworks constructed by the most influential philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. (shrink)

Nowadays ethics plays a vital role in numerous professions. Due to social requirements and technical advances, changes in the accreditation rules in legal, economic, medical and engineering education have emerged in many countries, often requiring the inclusion of an ethics requirement in such professional programmes. In this work, the authors demonstrate that such changes are absolutely necessary in the legal profession in Lithuania. Specifically, the record low level of prestige of the judiciary and lawyers in the Lithuanian society and the (...) fact that lawyers are often accused of legal nihilism, clannish behaviour, and protectionism, demand that legal ethics assumes a far greater role in Lithuanian legal education. It is necessary to stress that the topic of lawyers’ ethical violations and the consequences of such violations is discussed in the society in only in a fragmentary, and not transparent manner; moreover, the significance of ethics in the education and training of lawyers has not been properly evaluated either. Especially having in mind Lithuania’s Soviet heritage (during most of the Communist era there was almost no education on those issues), it becomes obvious that legal ethics must be continuously stressed in the legal profession’s education and development. The importance and relevance of this topic is primarily determined by the current evaluation of lawyers in Lithuania, which shows that lawyers do not fulfil the expectations of the society. This raises a question whether law graduates indeed acquire this system of ethical values as part of the process of obtaining the knowledge and skills that are necessary for a modern lawyer. While analysing the Lithuanian legal documents governing the requirements for legal studies, it has been noticed that a course in legal ethics or lawyer’s professional responsibility is not compulsory either in the qualification requirements for judges, or in the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 20 February 2008 on legal education for those who want to assume the position of a judge according to the order of law. In the description of legal study programmes, courses on professional ethics are designated as an optional non-legal subject, which is quite different from the legal education systems of other countries, where this type of course is compulsory for future lawyers. Even if this course is taught at Lithuanian higher education establishments, it is limited to the analysis of cases and legal regulation. Insufficient attention to this issue obviously creates the erroneous impression that it is of secondary importance for a lawyer. It should be noted that legal ethical standards, the development of lawyers’ value systems and other problematic questions related to legal ethics have not attracted attention of the Lithuanian scholars either. Therefore, this is a question of the utmost importance for legal education and requires additional research. In global educational and other academic literature, much is being discussed about the methods of teaching ethics, and the place of ethical subjects in study programmes and assessment. It is well worth supporting the research on the development of lawyers’ value systems, in that the lack of such values may influence the evaluation of the practicing lawyers’ satisfaction with their job, self-confidence and belief in the importance of their profession. Obtaining social-ethical attitudes and perspectives helps future lawyers gain more trust in their professional identity and the correctness of their professional work. The main conclusions drawn from the research are the following: (1) the university can and needs to contribute to the development of students’ value systems and this is one of the most important content requirements within the legal study programmes; (2) while teaching ethics, the primary focus must be not on the legal acts regulating ethics, which are changing over time, but on the aim of helping that students themselves have an increased sense of selfawareness and sensitivity to ethical issues in law practice, recognise and understand ethical dilemmas arising in the law, recognise the dominant attitudes in the society towards the role of a lawyer and motivate them to reconsider and discuss the value bases of such attitudes and their change; (3) a course on legal ethics – no matter how perfect it would be – is not the only way to develop a personal value system. In this context, the importance of liberal arts education should be accentuated. Given the research conducted, there is a clear link between the development of moral awareness and the person’s education in general. (shrink)

The object of this essay is to explore the central role played by the ‘ethic of care’ in debates within and beyond feminist legal theory. The author claims that the ethic of care has attracted feminist legal scholars in particular, as a means of resolving the theoretical, political and strategic difficulties to which the perceived ‘crisis of subjectivity’ in feminist theory has given rise. She argues that feminist legal scholars are peculiarly placed in relation to this crisis because of their (...) reliance on the social ‘woman’ whose interests are the predominant concern of feminist legal engagement. With the problematisation of subjectivity, the object of feminist legal attention disappears and it is in attempts to deflect the negative political consequences of this that the ethic of care has been invoked, the author argues, unsuccessfully. The essay concludes with suggestions as to how the feminist project in law might proceed in the wake of the crisis of subjectivity and the failure of the ethic of care to resolve it. (shrink)

Sowohl bei dem Paul- als auch dem Hiob-Dilemma ist der Anteil der zweiten Entwicklungsstufe erstaunlich hoch. Es wurde ja bereits auf das Verantwortungsgefühl der Finnen auch in bezug auf die Religion hingewiesen. Vielleicht spiegelt sich dadurch einiges von dem im Volke lebendigen Protestantismus wider. Ende 2000 zählten 85% der Gesamtbevölkerung von Finnland zur evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche . Nach Schätzungen von Heino wird die Kirche immer noch für einen Moralisten gehalten, der die Menschen daran erinnert, was angemessen ist und was nicht. Vermutlich (...) liegt er dabei nicht falsch, wenn man das von den Vertretern der zweiten Stufe vermittelte Gottesbild betrachtet. Die auffällig großen Anzahlen der dritten Stufe bei den Ergebnissen dieser Untersuchung, die auf Interviews von aktiven Kirchenmitgliedern beruht, liegen noch höher als erwartet. Dies kann durch die Vielzahl der Formen von Religiosität auf der dritten Stufe erklärt werden, vom Atheismus bis zum Fundamentalismus, wie auch Oser und Gmünder feststellen . Aufgrund dieser vorliegenden Ergebnisse läßt sich leicht der zweifachen Auslegung der dritten Stufe durch Schweitzer und Bucher zustimmen. Danach stellt die religiös ausgerichtete dritte Stufe eine natürliche Phase der Entwicklungs des Individuums auf dem Weg zur nächsten Stufe dar. Die nicht-religiös ausgerichtete dritte Stufe ist der Endpunkt einer Entwicklung. Bei meiner Untersuchung würde die dritte Stufe eben ausdrücklich die ausreligiös gerichtete Entwicklungsstufe ausmachen, wobei es sich sehr wohl z. B. um das Auseinandergehen von kirchlicher und persönlicher Religiosität handeln könnte. Dies unterstützt meine These von der Privatisierung der Religiosität, insbesondere bei Männern. Der Gesamtanteil der dritten Stufe läßt sich auch von der lutherischen Zwei-Regimentlehre her erklären. Die Einteilung in ein irdisches und geistiges Regiment, in diesseitige und jenseitige Angelegenheiten, wird den auffällig großen Anteil der dritten Stufe zumindest nicht senken. Bei ihren Überlegungen über den Unterschied zwischen der Transzendenz und der Immanenz betonen Oser und Gmünder die Verbindung der religiösen Reife mit der religiösen Weltanschauung. Je höher die religiöse Entwicklung ist, umso dringender benötigt man eine Auslegung der jeweiligen Situation nach den Kriterien des religiös-metaphysischen Weltbildes, die auf die Betrachtung der Welt als einer Ganzheit in unterschiedlichen neuartigen Situationen beruhen. In Finnland läßt sich allem An-schein nach die Integration der religiösen Dimensionen hinsichtlich der lutherischen Regimentlehre nur schwer auffassen. Hinzu kommt die Frage nach der Universalität der Entwicklung der religiösen Struktur und nach deren unveränderlicher, die Kulturgrenzen überschreitender Entwicklungslinie. Die Resultate dieser Untersuchung unterstützen mit gewissem Vorbehalt die Auffassung, nach der die Entwicklung der religiösen Struktur in verschiedenen Kulturen gleichartigen Gesetzmäßigkeiten unterliegen würde. Die Hinweise auf die Kulturverbundenheit religiöser Äußerungen werden gleichfalls zu einem gewissen Punkt durch das finnische Material bekräftigt. Die Kulturverbundenheit kann im Hintergrund geschichtlicher Ereignisse betrachtet werden. Die finnische Gesellschaft und damit verbunden auch das Weltbild und die Religiosität der Finnen gerieten gegen Mitte der 60er Jahre in eine Übergangsphase. Die Urbanisierung beschleunigte sich, und die traditionelle Agrarkultur begann sich aufzulösen. Mit der Zunahme der Arbeitstellen in der Industrie entstanden immer dichter bewohnte Siedlungen. Im Zusammenhang mit dieser Entwicklung änderte sich auch das religiöse Weltbild allmählich. Die Veränderungen in bezug auf die Religiosität geschahen zumindest anfangs langsam, denn z. B. noch in der Mitte der 70er Jahre erwähnte Pentikäinen , folgende Termini als allgemein gebräuchlich für die finnische Lebensart: "The Finnish way of life and Finnish world view." Laut Heino bezeichnen die Wörter Unverbundenheit, Privatisierung und Synkretismus die Veränderung in der Religiosität der Finnen in den letzten Jahren. Den Statistiken zufolge zeigt sich auch im religiösen Leben das Streben nach Individualität und Unabhängigkeit. Das Nebeneinander vieler Religionen verblüfft ebenso. Diese von Heino beschriebene Lage der letzten Jahre kann als der Endpunkt des in den 60er Jahren begonnenen Entwicklungsprozesses angesehen werden. Aus der Perspektive der religiösen Entwicklung stimuliert die Umwelt nicht gerade die Entstehung eines reifen religiösen Denkens. Im Jahre 1967 waren die Befragten meiner Untersuchung im Alter von 23-37 Jahren. Daß man sich an das Weltbild der Jugend festklammert, kann sehr wohl eine Erklärung für den Stillstand der religiösen Entwicklung auf der zweiten oder dritten Stufe sein. Holm schrieb, wie unsere Kultur dazu neigt, religiöse Auffassungen als recht kindlich hinzustellen. Manch einer mag glauben, daß es bei religiösen Fragen nicht wie üblich erlaubt ist, seinen Überlegungen freien Lauf zu lassen. Es gilt, entweder den naiven Kindesglauben aufrechtzuerhalten oder seinen Glauben ganz aufzugeben. Holm betont, daß eine starke bewußte Arbeit nötig ist, um früh erlernte Überzeugungen verarbeiten, sich neu zu orientieren und sich weiter zuentwickeln. Steht solch ein Prozeß erst an den Anfängen oder ist er vielleicht noch nicht abgeschlossen? Zu Beginn meiner Untersuchung wurde die Hypothese aufgestellt, daß die eigenen Erfahrungen eventuell in einer Verbindung mit der Entwicklungsstufe des religiösen Urteils stehen. Die Hypothese erwies sich als falsch. Die Ergebnisse meiner Untersuchung sind eigentlich recht logisch. Diesen Resultaten zufolge besteht kein Zusammenhang zwischen einem religiösen Dilemma im eigenen Leben und einer hohen religiösen Entwicklungsstufe. Eigene Erfahrungen über religiöse Dilemmata oder Leiden fördern den Entwicklungsprozeß keineswegs. Diese Ergebnisse können als Stütze grundsätzliche Annahme strukturalistischer Theorien angesehen werden, d.h. die Annahme einer invarianten Sequenz. Die Stufen können nicht überschritten werden, sondern man unterliegt der immanenten Logik der Transformationen der Strukturen. Sie bekräftigen auch die von Kohlberg erwähnte grundsätzliche Vermutung der kognitiven Theorie, wonach die Entwicklung kognitiver Strukturen das Resultat des Interaktionprozesses zwischen der Struktur des Organismus und der Struktur der Umwelt ist und nicht so sehr das Ergebnis von Lernen und Reifung. Welche Rolle die Umwelt und das Lernen bei der religiösen Entwicklung spielen, bleibt noch bei umfangreicheren Projekten in der Zukunft zu untersuchen. (shrink)

In moral psychology, it has long been argued that empathy is a necessary capacity of both properly developing moral agents and developed moral agency . This view stands in tension with the belief that some individuals diagnosed with autism—which is typically characterized as a deficiency in social reciprocity —are moral agents. In this paper we propose to explore this tension and perhaps trouble how we commonly see those with autism. To make this task manageable, we will consider whether high functioning (...) individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder are capable of empathetic responses. If they are, then they possess a capacity that, on the view above, is required for moral agency. If they are not so capable, and yet sometimes engage in moral behaviour, this casts some doubt on the claim that empathy is required for moral agency. This second possibility will necessitate an exploration of the capacity of some individuals with autism to engage in moral behaviour, giving us further grounds to re-see these individuals as moral agents. (shrink)

A study of 612 CPAs employed in four separate regions of the People’s Republic of China shows that they exhibit ethical orientations that are not significantly different from one another and that they do not, as a group identify with the Subjectivist description provided in the Forsyth et al. (Journal of Business Ethics 8(83):813–833, 2008) meta-analytic international study involving the Ethical Position Questionnaire. Confirmatory factor analysis did however establish the validity of the instrument as a measure of idealistic and relativistic (...) tendencies. It was established that the ethical tone within local accounting firms plays a significant role in forming ethical positions and that these variables together work to influence ethical judgement making with respect to issues involving independence and objectivity. The constructs of relativism and idealism act as reliable predictors of moral choice, but need to be carefully interpreted in the context of field research. The study highlights concerns about the ethicality of a fledgling group of professionals having to cope with the exigencies associated with the world’s fastest developing economy. (shrink)

The linguistic and cognitive sciences have severely underestimated the degree of linguistic diversity in the world. Part of the reason for this is that we have projected assumptions based on English and familiar languages onto the rest. We focus on some distortions this has introduced, especially in the study of semantics.

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is (...) substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind seeks to explain why it is difficult for liberals and conservatives to get along. His aim is not just explanatory but also prescriptive. Once we understand that the differences between disputants spring from distinct moral views held by equally sincere people, then we will no longer have reason for deep political animus. Conservatives and Liberals have distinct moral views and they understand human nature differently. He claims that these differences are best understood by consulting an (...) array of psychological studies, key genetic findings, and the theoretical underpinnings of sociobiology. After summarizing his arguments, we isolate and discuss the three most important and contentious issues in his book. We argue that although the project's motivation is noble and some of his findings are insightful, his key explanations, inferences, and prescriptions are wanting. We end by suggesting a way he could defend a weaker version of his view. (shrink)

Unethical and dishonest behavior has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines. Recent work has begun to focus on a previous overlooked factor predicting dishonest behavior: the beneficiary or victim of dishonest acts. In two laboratory experiments, we manipulate the level of resources allocated to our participants (their "wealth") and investigate whether perceived inequity from wealth that is randomly or subjectively assigned leads individuals to cross ethical boundaries through helping or hurting others. The results show that dishonest behavior (...) is influenced by positive and negative inequity that motivates helping and hurting acts. Furthermore, a third experiment shows that people tend to discount the wrongness of crossing ethical boundaries to hurt or help others when the action restores equity. (shrink)

Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not unified on any of these levels and that moral (...) science should adopt a more fine-grained taxonomic approach that studies carefully defined groups of moral judgments. (shrink)

Family relationships are complex, interdependent, multifactorial, cultural, and sociopolitical. In instances of family caregiving, the dynamics of these relationships influence the well-being of all members. This paper will address one dynamic of family relationships, moral reasoning, as set forth in the theories of Carol Gilligan. Gilligan's theories about two patterns of reasoning, based on the ethics of justice and care, will be examined within “stories” from fiction and interviews with family caregivers. This examination will raise issues about Gilligan's theories as (...) well as about the literary works themselves and will suggest new ways for health professionals to work with family caregivers. (shrink)

What are the mechanisms underlying the reproduction and change of collective beliefs? The paper suggests that a productive and promising approach for dealing with this question can be found in ontogenetic and cross-cultural studies on ‘collective argumentations and belief systems’; this is illustrated with regard to moral beliefs: After a short discussion of the rationality/relativity issue in cultural anthropology some basic elements of a conceptual framework for the empirical study of collective argumentations are outlined. A few empirical case studies are (...) summarized; the results deliver some empirical evidence to the assumption that as the ‘logic of collective argumentations’ develops in children and adolescent there will be different and increasingly more complex constraints on the kinds of basic moral beliefs that can be collectively accepted. Most importantly, as children approach adolescence they may have acquired a ‘logic of argumentation’ which makes possible a collectively valid distinction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ of some disputed particular moral issue. A comparison with a land litigation among Trobriands (Papua New Guinea) shows that the ‘logic of argumentation’ and the corresponding basic moral beliefs of Trobriands very much resemble the ‘logic of argumentation’ and moral rationality standards of (German) adolescents. (shrink)

Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of (...) immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition. (shrink)

A critical examination of Carol Gilligan's study of “psychological theory and women's development,” this essay begins by exploring her concerns about malebiased developmental theorizing. I consider in detail Gilligan's criticisms of Sigmund Freud and her own empirical studies of moral development, as they relate to the work of L. Kohlberg. After defending Freud to some degree, I propose various alternative interpretations of her data-interviews with males and females about hypothetical ethical dilemmas and with females about actual abortion decisions. I contend (...) that Gilligan is too willing to concede the adequacy of Kohlberg's categories for fathoming the moral reasoning of males and that she may, in consequence, exaggerate differences between males and females. Noting the ironic similarities between Gilligan's claims and Schopenhauer's misogyny, I suggest that there may be something undesirably self-limiting about the ‘different’ course of development she sketches. To move toward a morally preferable, feminism-compatible version of an “ethic of care,” I recommend that it be extended — by the imagination — beyond the ‘here and now’ and that it not be restricted to existing webs of personal relationships. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)

This research examines the relationships between education in business ethics, Reynolds’s (J Appl Psychol 93:1027–1041, 2008) “moral attentiveness” construct, or the extent to which individuals chronically perceive and reflect on morality and moral elements in their experiences, and Singhapakdi et al.’s (J Bus Ethics 15:1131–1140, 1996) measure of perceptions of the role of ethics and social responsibility (PRESOR). Education in business ethics was found to be positively associated with the two identified factors of moral attentiveness, “reflective” and “perceptual” moral attentiveness, (...) and with the PRESOR “stakeholder view” factor. Also, reflective moral attentiveness was found to act as a mediator in the relationship between education in business ethics and the PRESOR stakeholder view factor. Evidence of gender and social desirability bias effects was also found. The implications of these relationships and social cognitive theory for improved understanding of the mechanisms by which a variety of variables have their effects on PRESOR in business are discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to re-examine an ethic of care as the main ethical approach to nursing practice in light of past and present developments in nursing ethics, and to briefly speculate whether or not it will survive within nursing in the future. Overall, it is maintained throughout that the terms ?caring?, ?nursing? and an ?ethic of care? are inextricably linked. This is because, it is argued, professionally focused nursing practices are based predominantly on a well-recognised moral commitment (...) to deliver expert care, and that a care-based ethic is the major factor in the construction and maintenance of these practices. Subsequently, the influences and developments of a caring ethic in nursing are firstly re-examined, and the discussion is supported by evidence from more recent nursing research and theoretical developments. Consideration is given to the philosophical underpinnings of both care theory and caring ethics, and the fundamental importance of caring in nursing, as an interpersonal relationship and as an appropriate ethical response, is made transparent. Finally, an outline of the future possibilities that may affect an ethic of care in nursing is offered. (shrink)

A barrier to the development and refinement of ethics education in and across health professional schools is that there is not an agreed upon instrument or method for assessment in ethics education. The most widely used ethics education assessment instrument is the Defining Issues Test (DIT) I & II. This instrument is not specific to the health professions. But it has been modified for use in, and influenced the development of other instruments in, the health professions. The DIT contains certain (...) philosophical assumptions (“Kohlbergian” or “neo-Kohlbergian”) that have been criticized in recent years. It is also expensive for large institutions to use. The purpose of this article is to offer a rubric—which the authors have named the Health Professional Ethics Rubric—for the assessment of several learning outcomes related to ethics education in health science centers. This rubric is not open to the same philosophical critiques as the DIT and other such instruments. This rubric is also practical to use. This article includes the rubric being advocated, which was developed by faculty and administrators at a large academic health science center as a part of a campus-wide ethics education initiative. The process of developing the rubric is described, as well as certain limitations and plans for revision. (shrink)

Any ethical argument involving the problems of access to assisted reproductive technologies should entail the discussion of the decision protocol and consider the individual deliberating on the appropriateness of these remedies from the point of view of self and community. Yet, arguments based on patients' own moral calculations are rare in the bioethics literature. The moral voice behind most discourses concerning ARTs is that of an outwardly independent spectator, who nonetheless proceeds to justify a personally significant worldview in the utilization (...) of these resources. Investigators grounded in social and legal sciences have offered relevant arguments in this regard, but because their discourses are derived from research protocols specific to their respective disciplines, they fail to provide a general rationale applicable to moral deliberation. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory, as a method of management based on morals and behavior, must be grounded by a theory of ethics. However, traditional ethics of justice and rights cannot completely ground the theory. Following and expanding on the work of Wicks, Gilbert, and Freeman (1994), we believe that feminist ethics, invoking principles of caring, provides the missing element that allows moral theory to ground the stakeholder approach to management. Examples are given to support the suggested general principle for making business decisions (...) under feminist moral theory. (shrink)

The enthusiasm for a positivistic approach to sexuality education has begun to subside. Recognizing that sexuality is more than a biological phenomenon, and that education is more than just information, sexuality educators throughout North America are now acknowledging the importance of values. There are two problems, however, with the philosophical orientation on values within the literature. The first problem is the pervasive view that teachers should remain neutral to facilitate value clarification. The commitment to neutrality is often based on an (...) appreciation and respect for pluralism, on the subjective nature of values, and on the integrity of persons. The commitment to neutrality, however, confuses pluralism with relativism, subjectivity with subjectivism, and integrity with validity. (shrink)

In the mid-1970s, the biomedical model of medicine gave way to the biopsychosocial model of medicine; it was billed as a more comprehensive and compassionate model of medicine. After more than a century of disentangling medicine from religion, the medicine and spirituality movement is attempting to bring religion and spirituality back into medicine. It is doing so under a biopsychosociospiritual model. I unpack one model for allowing religion back into medicine called the RCOPE. RCOPE is an instrument designed to categorize (...) religion and spirituality as psychological coping mechanisms. I explore how such instruments are related to the history of statistical measurement and demonstrate the political impetus that governs such enterprises. The biopsychosociospiritual medicine is billed as a more holistic and comprehensive model. This new model of medicine offers total care. However, I demonstrate how this total care becomes totalizing, indeed totalitarian, admitting religion and spirituality back into the fold of medicine under a new secularized medical control. (shrink)

Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski offer experimental confirmation for Ernest Becker's claim that the fear of death is a powerful unconscious motive producing polarized worldviews and scapegoating. Their suggestion that their findings also prove Sigmund Freud's theory of repression, with worldviews as its irrational products, is questionable, although Becker's own statements about worldviews as “illusions” seem to invite such interpretation. Their basic theory does not depend on this, however, and abandoning it would enable them to take better advantage (...) of their finding that worldviews incorporating the values of rationality and tolerance tend to counteract polarization effects. (shrink)

An implicit goal of many interventions intended to enhance integrity is to minimize peoples' exposure to unethical events. The intent of the present effort was to examine if exposure to unethical practices in the course of one's work is related to ethical decision making. Accordingly, 248 doctoral students in the biological, health, and social sciences were asked to complete a field appropriate measure of ethical decision making. In addition, they were asked to complete measures examining the perceived acceptability of unethical (...) events and a measure examining perceptions of ethical climate. When these criterion measures were correlated with a measure examining the frequency with which they had been exposed to unethical events in their day-to-day work, it was found that event exposure was strongly related to ethical decision making but less strongly related to climate perceptions and perceptions of event acceptability. However, these relationships were moderated by level of experience. The implications of these findings for practices intended to improve ethics are discussed. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists have been vigorously examining the psychological capacities that realize our moral agency. Our purpose is to take some of this work and present its implications for moral education. To connect recent work with more long-standing debates in moral education, we frame this discussion with Helen Haste’s 1996 examination of liberal and communitarian positions on moral agency and education. We argue that contemporary research does not confirm the descriptive theory of moral agency offered by either liberal theorists or (...) communitarians, but nonetheless the prescriptive theory of liberal moral education can be vindicated. (shrink)

The abuse of prisoners by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib had far-reaching consequences, leading many people around the world to question the legitimacy of U.S. goals and activities in Iraq. Drawing on extensive unclassified reports from multiple investigations that followed Abu Ghraib, this article considers both psychological and social-situational factors that contributed to ethical failures there. This analysis suggests that leaders need to be more attuned to the developmental stage of subordinates and take appropriate steps to reinforce ethical behaviors. From (...) a psychological standpoint, young adults especially are strongly inclined to behave in accord with social conventions and pressures around them. Particularly in ambiguous circumstances, it is important that standards of behavior be clear and explicit throughout all phases of an operation and that leaders at all levels represent and reinforce those standards. (shrink)

The manifest dissociation between our capacity to make moral judgments and our ability to provide justifications for them, a phenomenon labeled Moral Dumbfounding, has important implications for the theory and practice of moral psychology. I articulate and develop the Linguistic Analogy as a robust alternative to existing sentimentalist models of moral judgment inspired by this phenomenon. The Linguistic Analogy motivates a crucial distinction between moral acceptability and moral permissibility judgments, and thereby calls into question prevailing methods used in the study (...) of moral judgment. Indeed, the judgments that are the focus of most current empirical work in moral psychology are not proper targets of scientific study. (shrink)

Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often (...) failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature. (shrink)

Although it has become increasingly evident that an adequate theory of obligation must rest on evolutionary biology and human ethology, attempts toward this end need to explore the full range of personal, cultural, and political obligations observed in our species. The new naturalism reveals the complexity of social behavior and the defects of reductionist models that oversimplify the foundations of human duties and rights. Ultimately, this approach suggest a return to the Aristotelian concept of natural justice.

The study reported here sought to examine the ethical orientations of business managers and business students in Singapore. Data were obtained using Defining Issue Test. Analysis of Variance revealed that age, education and religious affiliation had influenced cognitive moral development stages of the respondents. Vocation, gender and ethnicity did not seem to have affected moral judgement of the subjects. Contrary to the general view, both business students and business managers demonstrated the same level of sensitivity to ethical dimensions of decision-making. (...) Implications of the findings and limitations of the study are discussed. (shrink)

In her well-known In A Different Voice, Gilligan argues that the male and female approaches to morality are fundamentally opposed to each other. The masculine approach emphasizes impartial justice, and the application of a 'hierarchy' of rules. In contrast, the feminine approach is grounded in care and concern for others, and emphasizes flexibility and attention to context when making moral decisions. This paper offers a critique of Gilligan's views through a consideration of Mencian morality. Mencius inhabits the 'feminine' perspective insofar (...) as his morality is grounded in care and responsibility. However, he develops from this a philosophy of government which recognizes the need for impartial justice to apply among citizens. Mencius's views show that, pace Gilligan, there is no inherent incompatibility between 'feminine' care and concern and 'male' impartial justice. It is possible for the latter to be founded upon the former. (shrink)