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The Quality of Freedom

Oxford University Press (2008)

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  1. Republican Dignity: The Importance of Taking Offence.Jan-Willem Van Der Rujt - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (5):465-492.
    This paper analyses the republican notion of non-domination from the viewpoint of individual dignity. It determines the aspect of individual dignity that republicans are concerned with and scrutinises how it is safeguarded by non-domination. I argue that the notion of non-domination as it is formulated by Pettit contains a number of ambiguities that need to be addressed. I discuss these ambiguities and argue for specific solutions that place great importance on a person's moral beliefs and his status as a moral (...)
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  • Ignorance, Incompetence and the Concept of Liberty.Michael Garnett - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (4):428–446.
    What is liberty, and can it be measured? In this paper I argue that the only way to have a liberty metric is to adopt an account of liberty with specific and controversial features. In particular, I argue that we can make sense of the idea of a quantity of liberty only if we are willing to count certain purely agential constraints, such as ignorance and physical incompetence, as obstacles to liberty in general. This spells trouble for traditional ‘negative’ accounts, (...)
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  • Slaves, Prisoners, and Republican Freedom.Fabian Wendt - 2011 - Res Publica 17 (2):175-192.
    Philip Pettit’s republican conception of freedom is presented as an alternative both to negative and positive conceptions of freedom. The basic idea is to conceptualize freedom as non-domination, not as non-interference or self-mastery. When compared to negative freedom, Pettit’s republican conception comprises two controversial claims: the claim that we are unfree if we are dominated without actual interference, and the claim that we are free if we face interference without domination. Because the slave is a widely accepted paradigm of the (...)
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  • Overall Freedom Measurement and Evaluation: A Defence of the Partly Evaluative Approach to Freedom Measurement.Ronen Shnayderman - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):715-729.
    Freedom is one of the most important moral and political ideals. Questions concerning degrees of overall freedom are therefore of the utmost moral and political concern. To answer these questions we need to know how to measure degrees of overall freedom. This paper offers a novel defence of the partly evaluative approach to freedom measurement against a recent critique of it. According to the partly evaluative approach, the question of how free one is depends partly on the specific value of (...)
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  • Should We Extend Voluntary Euthanasia to Non-Medical Cases? Solidarity and the Social Context of Elderly Suffering.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (2):129-162.
    Several Dutch politicians have recently argued that medical voluntary euthanasia laws should be extended to include healthy elderly citizens who suffer from non-medical ‘existential suffering’. In response, some seek to show that cases of medical euthanasia are morally permissible in ways that completed life euthanasia cases are not. I provide a different, societal perspective. I argue against assessing the permissibility of individual euthanasia cases in separation of their societal context and history. An appropriate justification of euthanasia needs to be embedded (...)
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  • Why Animals Have an Interest in Freedom.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2015 - Historical Social Research 40 (4):92-109.
    Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with animals. Drawing on recent (...)
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  • A Brief History of Liberty--And Its Lessons.Philip Pettit - 2016 - Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 17:5-21.
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  • ‘Ownness Created a New Freedom’: Max Stirner’s Alternative Concept of Liberty.Saul Newman - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-21.
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  • Group Freedom: A Social Mechanism Account.Frank Hindriks - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (6):410-439.
    Many existing defenses of group rights seem to rely on the notion of group freedom. To date, however, no adequate analysis of this notion has been offered. Group freedom is best understood in terms of processes of social categorization that are embedded in social mechanisms. Such processes often give rise to group-specific constraints and enablements. On the proposed social mechanism account, group rights are demands for group freedom. Even so, group rights often serve to eradicate individual unfreedom. Furthermore, generic measures (...)
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  • An Anatomy of Moral Responsibility.M. Braham & M. van Hees - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):601-634.
    This paper examines the structure of moral responsibility for outcomes. A central feature of the analysis is a condition that we term the ‘avoidance potential’, which gives precision to the idea that moral responsibility implies a reasonable demand that an agent should have acted otherwise. We show how our theory can allocate moral responsibility to individuals in complex collective action problems, an issue that sometimes goes by the name of ‘the problem of many hands’. We also show how it allocates (...)
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  • Persons or Property – Freedom and the Legal Status of Animals.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (1):20-45.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 Is freedom a plausible political value for animals? If so, does this imply that animals are owed legal personhood rights or can animals be free but remain human property? Drawing on different conceptions of freedom, I will argue that while positive freedom, libertarian self-ownership, and republican freedom are not plausible political values for animals, liberal ‘option-freedom’ is. However, because such option-freedom is in principle compatible with different legal statuses, animal freedom does not conceptually imply a (...)
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  • An Unresolved Problem: Freedom Across Lifetimes.Andreas Schmidt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1413-1438.
    Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A number of theorists hold that freedom should either be the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part, theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have failed to (...)
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  • Value Neutrality and the Ranking of Opportunity Sets.Michael Garnett - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):99-119.
    I defend the idea that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity or liberty sets. I consider two challenges to this idea. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, because what is valuable about a set of liberties from a liberal point of view is not its size but rather its variety. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because liberties (...)
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  • Freedom: Psychological, Ethical, and Political.Philip Pettit - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (4):375-389.
    Freedom is sometimes cast as the psychological ideal that distinguishes human beings from other animals; sometimes as the ethical ideal that distinguishes some human beings from others; and sometimes as the political ideal that distinguishes some human societies from others. This paper is an attempt to put the three ideals in a common frame, revealing their mutual connections and differences.
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  • Problems of Dirty Hands As a Species of Moral Conflicts.Matthew H. Kramer - 2018 - The Monist 101 (2):187-198.
    Every problem of dirty hands is a moral conflict in which a highly unpalatable course of conduct is chosen for the sake of fulfilling a stringent moral duty, and in which either the chosen course of conduct is evil or else it would have been evil in the absence of the exigent circumstances to which it is a response. To support this conception of problems of dirty hands, this paper endeavors to elucidate the nature of moral conflicts and the nature (...)
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  • The Freedom of Collective Agents.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
    Corporate freedom is the freedom of a collective agent to perform a joint action. According to a reductive account, a collective or corporate agent is free exactly if the individuals who constitute the corporate agent are free. It is argued that individual freedoms are neither necessary nor sufficient for corporate freedom. The alternative account proposed here focuses on the performance of the joint action by the corporate agent itself. Subsequently, the analysis is applied to Cohen’s (1983) analysis of proletarian freedom. (...)
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  • Gruesome Freedom: The Moral Limits of Non-Constraint.John Lawless - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Many philosophers conceive of freedom as non-interference. Such conceptions unify two core commitments. First, they associate freedom with non-constraint. And second, they take seriously a distinction between the interpersonal and the non-personal. As a result, they focus our attention exclusively on constraints attributable to other people’s choices – that is, on interference. I argue that these commitments manifest two distinct concerns: first, for a wide range of options; and second, for other people’s respect. However, construing freedom as non-interference unifies these (...)
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  • Working on the Inside: Ronald Dworkin's Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]M. H. Kramer - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):118-129.
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  • Agency in Social Context.John Lawless - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):471-498.
    Many political philosophers argue that interference threatens a person’s agency. And they cast political freedom in opposition to interpersonal threats to agency, as non-interference. I argue that this approach relies on an inapt model of agency, crucial aspects of which emerge from our relationships with other people. Such relationships involve complex patterns of vulnerability and subjection, essential to our constitution as particular kinds of agents: as owners of property, as members of families, and as participants in a market for labor. (...)
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  • Withdrawing Versus Withholding Freedoms: Nudging and the Case of Tobacco Control.Andreas T. Schmidt - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics 16 (7):3-14.
    Is it a stronger interference with people's freedom to withdraw options they currently have than to withhold similar options they do not have? Drawing on recent theorizing about sociopolitical freedom, this article identifies considerations that often make this the case for public policy. However, when applied to tobacco control, these considerations are shown to give us at best only very weak freedom-based reason to prioritize the status quo. This supports a popular argument for so-called “endgame” tobacco control measures: If we (...)
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  • Republican Dignity: The Importance of Taking Offence.Jan-Willem van der Rijt - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (5):465-492.
    This paper analyses the republican notion of non-domination from the viewpoint of individual dignity. It determines the aspect of individual dignity that republicans are concerned with and scrutinises how it is safeguarded by non-domination. I argue that the notion of non-domination as it is formulated by Pettit contains a number of ambiguities that need to be addressed. I discuss these ambiguities and argue for specific solutions that place great importance on a person's moral beliefs and his status as a moral (...)
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  • The Purgative Rationale for the Death Penalty: Replies to Steiker and Danaher.Matthew H. Kramer - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (2):379-394.
    This article defends my 2011 book “The Ethics of Capital Punishment” against the thoughtful critiques written by Carol Steiker and John Danaher respectively. It does not attempt to respond to every point of contention in the two critiques, but concentrates instead on a few of the main points from each of them.
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  • Causal Tests in Subjunctive Judgements About Negative Freedom.Ronen Shnayderman - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (2):183-197.
    This essay discusses a heretofore neglected dimension of one of the most important questions in the realm of political theory: which obstacles that stand in the way of our performing a certain action render us unfree to perform that action? This dimension is concerned with the issue of the causal test that a certain central kind of obstacle—i.e., subjunctive interference—has to pass in order to render us unfree. The aim of this essay is, first, to introduce this issue; and, second, (...)
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  • How Changes in One's Preferences Can Affect One's Freedom : A Reply to Dowding and Van Hees: Ian Carter and Matthew H. Kramer.Ian Carter - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):81-96.
    How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the “pure negative” conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by (...)
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  • Counterfactual Success Again: Response to Carter and Kramer: Keith Dowding and Martin Van Hees.Keith Dowding - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):97-103.
    We would like to thank Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer for their challenging reply to our recent article. Dowding and van Hees is one of a series of articles in which we try to address measurement issues with regard to individual freedom. Our aim is to provide a conception of freedom that will eventually yield a way of measuring the relative freedom of groups of people within a society and a relative measure of freedom across societies. In doing so, we (...)
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  • Revising Republican Liberty: What is the Difference Between a Disinterested Gentle Giant and a Deterred Criminal?Nikolas Kirby - 2016 - Res Publica 22 (4):369-386.
    This paper assesses the most well thought out contemporary conception of republican liberty put forward by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. I demonstrate that it is incoherent: at least insofar as it seeks to pick out a form of unfreedom not captured by the negative conception of liberty. This incoherence arises because Pettit and Skinner cannot both hold that republican unfreedom is defined by one agent’s mere capacity to interfere arbitrarily with another agent and, at the same time, claim that (...)
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  • Human Rights, Individualism and Cultural Diversity.Rowan Cruft - 2005 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (3):265-287.
    Abstract Two features of human?rights discourse are often targeted for criticism: its universalism and its individualism. Both features, it is usually claimed, illegitimately overlook the significance of cultural diversity. In this essay I argue that individualism is incompatible with universalism and compatible with cultural diversity. Thus I defend the view that human rights are individualistically justified, and I argue that it follows from this that human rights are in an important sense non?universal. I go on to show how my non?universalist (...)
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