- Can a many-valued language functionally represent its own semantics?Jeffrey Ketland - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):292–297.details
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Platonistic formalism.L. Horsten - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):173-194.details
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(1 other version)Realism.Susan Haack - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):275 - 299.details
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(1 other version)Quantification and realism.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):541–572.details
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Metalogic and modality.Hartry Field - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):1 - 22.details
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The sorites paradox and higher-order vagueness.J. A. Burgess - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):417-474.details
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The strengthened liar, the expressive strength of natural languages, and regimentation.Jody Azzouni - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):329–350.details
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Logic in quotes.David Otway Wray - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1):77 - 110.details
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Vagueness and blurry sets.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (2):165-235.details
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Super liars.Philippe Schlenker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):374-414.details
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On meaningfulness and truth.BrianEdison McDonald - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):433-482.details
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The paradox of the believer.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):25-30.details
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Fibonacci, Yablo, and the cassationist approach to paradox.Laurence Goldstein - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):867-890.details
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Bilattices and the theory of truth.Melvin Fitting - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (3):225 - 256.details
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Saving the truth schema from paradox.Hartry Field - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.details
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I'm OK if you're OK: On the notion of trusting communication. [REVIEW]Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (4):329 - 354.details
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Tarski on truth and logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.details
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The truth is never simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.details
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Why the liar does not matter.Lon Berk - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):323-341.details
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Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):491 - 512.details
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Self-reflexive thoughts.Gilbert Harman - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):334-345.details
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(1 other version)Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein: The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond.Martin Gustafsson, Oskari Kuusela & Jakub Mácha (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Routledge.details
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Procedural Semantics and its Relevance to Paradox.Elbert Booij - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-24.details
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Necessity predicate versus truth predicate from the perspective of paradox.Ming Hsiung - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-23.details
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Disagreement for Dialetheists.Graham Bex-Priestley & Yonatan Shemmer - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):192-205.details
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Monstrous Content and the Bounds of Discourse.Thomas Macaulay Ferguson - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):111-143.details
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(1 other version)On Heck’s New Liar.Julien Murzi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):258-269.details
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Aplicación y adopción de reglas lógicas.Camila Gallovich - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):105-125.details
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KF, PKF and Reinhardt’s Program.Luca Castaldo & Johannes Stern - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):33-58.details
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Strict/Tolerant Logics Built Using Generalized Weak Kleene Logics.Melvin Fitting - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Logic 18 (2).details
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Mathematical Perspectives on Liar Paradoxes.José-Luis Usó-Doménech, Josué-Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, Lorena Segura-Abad, Kristian Alonso-Stenberg & Hugh Gash - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (3):251-269.details
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Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality.Dan Nesher - 2021 - Semiotica 2021 (238):153-179.details
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Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth.Qiqing Lin & Hu Liu - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):615-671.details
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Scrutinizing Anti-exceptionalism. Mansooreh - manuscriptdetails
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Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth, written by Simmons, K.George Englebretsen - 2020 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2):499-506.details
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(2 other versions)The Liar Paradox in the predictive mind.Christian Michel - 2019 - Pragmatics and Cognition 26 (2-3):239-266.details
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Identifying logical evidence.Ben Martin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9069-9095.details
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Normality operators and classical recapture in many-valued logic.Roberto Ciuni & Massimiliano Carrara - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):657-683.details
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The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):152-171.details
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Scharp on replacing truth.Andrew Bacon - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):370-386.details
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(1 other version)Truth, Partial Logic and Infinitary Proof Systems.Martin Fischer & Norbert Gratzl - 2017 - Studia Logica 106 (3):1-26.details
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A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding.Thomas Schindler - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2029-2038.details
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Articulation and Liars.Sergi Oms - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):383-399.details
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Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?Johannes Stern - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):81-90.details
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The Implicit Commitment of Arithmetical Theories and Its Semantic Core.Carlo Nicolai & Mario Piazza - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):913-937.details
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Principles for Object-Linguistic Consequence: from Logical to Irreflexive.Carlo Nicolai & Lorenzo Rossi - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):549-577.details
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Notes on the Computational Aspects of Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Stanislav O. Speranski - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (2):407-429.details
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Theories of Frege structure equivalent to Feferman's system T 0.Daichi Hayashi - 2025 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 176 (1):103510.details
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(1 other version)Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things.Andreas C. Bottani - 2016 - Synthese:1-22.details
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Theories of Truth without Standard Models and Yablo’s Sequences.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (3):375-391.details
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