The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values understood as subsets of some established set of truth values. After elucidating the importance of the very notion of a truth value in logic and philosophy, we examine some possible ways of generalizing this notion. The useful four-valued logic of first-degree entailment by Nuel Belnap and the notion of a bilattice constitute the basis for further generalizations. By doing so we elaborate the idea of a multilattice, and most notably, (...) a trilattice of truth values – a specific algebraic structure with information ordering and two distinct logical orderings, one for truth and another for falsity. Each logical order not only induces its own logical vocabulary, but determines also its own entailment relation. We consider both semantic and syntactic ways of formalizing these relations and construct various logical calculi. (shrink)

Classical fixpoint semantics for logic programs is based on the TP immediate consequence operator. The Kripke/Kleene, three-valued, semantics uses ΦP, which extends TP to Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. Both these approaches generalize to cover logic programming systems based on a wide class of logics, provided only that the underlying structure be that of a bilattice. This was presented in earlier papers. Recently well-founded semantics has become influential for classical logic programs. We show how the well-founded approach also extends naturally to (...) the same family of bilatticebased programming languages that the earlier fixpoint approaches extended to. Doing so provides a natural semantics for logic programming systems that have already been proposed, as well as for a large number that are of only theoretical interest. And finally, doing so simplifies the proofs of basic results about the well-founded semantics, by stripping away inessential details. (shrink)

Bilattices, introduced by M. Ginsberg, constitute an elegant family of multiple-valued logics. Those meeting certain natural conditions have provided the basis for the semantics of a family of logic programming languages. Now we consider further restrictions on bilattices, to narrow things down to logic programming languages that can, at least in principle, be implemented. Appropriate bilattice background information is presented, so the paper is relatively self-contained.

Kleene’s well-known strong three-valued logic is shown to be one of a family of logics with similar mathematical properties. These logics are produced by an intuitively natural construction. The resulting logics have direct relationships with bilattices. In addition they possess mathematical features that lend themselves well to semantical constructions based on fixpoint procedures, as in logic programming.

In their useful logic for a computer network Shramko and Wansing generalize initial values of Belnap’s 4-valued logic to the set 16 to be the power-set of Belnap’s 4. This generalization results in a very specific algebraic structure — the trilattice SIXTEEN 3 with three orderings: information, truth and falsity. In this paper, a slightly different way of generalization is presented. As a base for further generalization a set 3 is chosen, where initial values are a — incoming data is (...) asserted, d — incoming data is denied, and u — incoming data is neither asserted nor denied, that corresponds to the answer “don’t know”. In so doing, the power-set of 3, that is the set 8 is considered. It turns out that there are not three but four orderings naturally defined on the set 8 that form the tetralattice EIGHT 4 . Besides three ordering relations mentioned above it is an extra uncertainty ordering. Quite predictably, the logics generated by a –order (truth order) and d –order (falsity order) coincide with first-degree entailment. Finally logic with two kinds of operations ( a –connectives and d –connectives) and consequence relation defined via a –ordering is considered. An adequate axiomatization for this logic is proposed. (shrink)

In their useful logic for a computer network Shramko and Wansing generalize initial values of Belnap’s 4-valued logic to the set 16 to be the power-set of Belnap’s 4. This generalization results in a very specific algebraic structure — the trilattice SIXTEEN3 with three orderings: information, truth and falsity. In this paper, a slightly different way of generalization is presented. As a base for further generalization a set 3 is chosen, where initial values are a — incoming data is asserted, (...) d — incoming data is denied, and u — incoming data is neither asserted nor denied, that corresponds to the answer “don’t know”. In so doing, the power-set of 3, that is the set 8 is considered. It turns out that there are not three but four orderings naturally defined on the set 8 that form the tetralattice EIGHT4. Besides three ordering relations mentioned above it is an extra uncertainty ordering. Quite predictably, the logics generated by a–order and d–order coincide with first-degree entailment. Finally logic with two kinds of operations and consequence relation defined via a–ordering is considered. An adequate axiomatization for this logic is proposed. (shrink)

There are two natural ways of thinking about negation: (i) as a form of complementation and (ii) as an operation of reversal, or inversion (to deny that p is to say that things are “the other way around”). A variety of techniques exist to model conception (i), from Euler and Venn diagrams to Boolean algebras. Conception (ii), by contrast, has not been given comparable attention. In this note we outline a twofold geometric proposal, where the inversion metaphor is understoood as (...) involving a rotation o a reflection, respectively. These two options are equivalent in classical two-valued logic but they differ significantly in many-valued logics. Here we show that they correspond to two basic sorts of negation operators—Post’s and Kleene’s—and we provide a simple group-theoretic argument demonstrating their generative power. (shrink)

In this paper we present a solution of the axiomatization problem for the Fmla-Fmla versions of the Pietz and Rivieccio exactly true logic and the non-falsity logic dual to it. To prove the completeness of the corresponding binary consequence systems we introduce a specific proof-theoretic formalism, which allows us to deal simultaneously with two consequence relations within one logical system. These relations are hierarchically organized, so that one of them is treated as the basic for the resulting logic, and the (...) other is introduced as an extension of this basic relation. The proposed bi-consequences systems allow for a standard Henkin-style canonical model used in the completeness proof. The deductive equivalence of these bi-consequence systems to the corresponding binary consequence systems is proved. We also outline a family of the bi-consequence systems generated on the basis of the first-degree entailment logic up to the classic consequence. (shrink)

In Belnap's useful 4-valued logic, the set 2 = {T, F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4 = ������(2) = {Ø, {T}, {F}, {T, F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16 = ᵍ (4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an (...) information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN₃ coincide with the logic of FOUR₂, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arieli's and Avron's notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research. (shrink)

The paper discusses functional properties of some four-valued logics which are the expansions of four-valued Belnap’s logic DM4. At first, we consider the logics with two designated values, and then logics defined by matrices having the same underlying algebra, but with a different choice of designated values, i.e. with one designated value. In the preceding literature both approaches were developed independently. Moreover, we present the lattices of the functional expansions of DM4.

ABSTRACT In the paper we present a survey of some approaches to the semantics of many-valued propositional systems. These approaches are inspired on one hand by classical problems in the investigations of logical aspects of epistemic activity: knowledge and truth, contradictions, beliefs, reliability of data, etc. On the other hand they reflect contemporary concerns of researchers in Artificial Intelligence (and Cognitive Science in general) with inferences drawn from imperfect information, even from total ignorance. We treat the mathematical apparatus that has (...) emerged recently: algebraic structures related to the new logical systems in the same way Boolean algebras correspond to classical logic. (shrink)

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even well-known; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach.

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even well-known; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach.

This paper contains a joint study of two sentential logics that combine a many-valued character, namely tetravalence, with a modal character; one of them is normal and the other one quasinormal. The method is to study their algebraic counterparts and their abstract models with the tools of Abstract Algebraic Logic, and particularly with those of Brown and Suszko's theory of abstract logics as recently developed by Font and Jansana in their "A General Algebraic Semantics for Sentential Logics". The logics studied (...) here arise from the algebraic and lattice-theoretical properties we review of Tetravalent Modal Algebras, a class of algebras studied mainly by Loureiro, and also by Figallo, Landini and Ziliani, at the suggestion of the late Antonio Monteiro. (shrink)

This paper continues my work of [9], which showed there was a broad family of many valued logics that have a strict/tolerant counterpart. Here we consider a generalization of weak Kleene three valued logic, instead of the strong version that was background for that earlier work. We explain the intuition behind that generalization, then determine a subclass of strict/tolerant structures in which a generalization of weak Kleene logic produces the same results that the strong Kleene generalization did. This paper provides (...) much background, but is not self-contained. Some results from [9] are called on, and are not reproved here. [9] Melvin C. Fitting. “A Family of Strict/Tolerant Logics”. In: Journal of Philosophical Logic. Online. Print publication forthcoming. (shrink)

We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The (...) mathematical ideas presented here originated in investigations of so-called stable models in the semantics of logic programming. (shrink)

Strict/tolerant logic, ST, evaluates the premises and the consequences of its consequence relation differently, with the premises held to stricter standards while consequences are treated more tolerantly. More specifically, ST is a three-valued logic with left sides of sequents understood as if in Kleene’s Strong Three Valued Logic, and right sides as if in Priest’s Logic of Paradox. Surprisingly, this hybrid validates the same sequents that classical logic does. A version of this result has been extended to meta, metameta, … (...) consequence levels in Barrio et al.. In my earlier paper Fitting I showed that the original ideas behind ST are, in fact, much more general than first appeared, and an infinite family of many valued logics have Strict/Tolerant counterparts. This family includes both Kleene’s and Priest’s logic individually, as well as first degree entailment. For instance, for both the Kleene and the Priest logic, the corresponding strict/tolerant logic is six-valued, but with differing sets of strictly and tolerantly designated truth values. The present paper extends that generalization in two directions. We examine a reverse notion, of Tolerant/Strict logics, which exist for the same structures that were investigated in Fitting. And we show that the generalization extends through the meta, metameta, … consequence levels for the same infinite family of many valued logics. Finally we close with remarks on the status of cut and related rules, which can actually be rather nuanced. Throughout, the aim is not the philosophical applications of the Strict/Tolerant idea, but the determination of how general a phenomenon it is. (shrink)

I develop a basic theory of content within the framework of truthmaker semantics and, in the second part, consider some of the applications to subject matter, common content, logical subtraction and ground.

This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" and overdetermined or "inconsistent", thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these systems have nested implications, and I investigate (...) twelve natural extensions containing nested implications, all of which can be viewed as coming from natural variations on Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Many of these logics exist antecedently in the literature, in particular Nelson 's "constructible falsity". (shrink)

This paper develops a theory of propositional identity which distinguishes necessarily equivalent propositions that differ in subject-matter. Rather than forming a Boolean lattice as in extensional and intensional semantic theories, the space of propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice. After motivating a departure from tradition by way of a number of plausible principles for subject-matter, I will provide a Finean state semantics for a novel theory of propositions, presenting arguments against the convexity and nonvacuity constraints which Fine (2016, 2017a,b) introduces. I (...) will then move to compare the resulting logic of propositional identity (PI) with Correia’s (2016) logic of generalised identity (GI), as well as the first degree fragment of Angell’s (1989) logic of analytic containment (AC). The paper concludes by extending PI to include axioms and rules for a subject-matter operator, providing a much broader theory of subject-matter than the principles with which I will begin. (shrink)

Bilattices, introduced by Ginsberg as a uniform framework for inference in artificial intelligence, are algebraic structures that proved useful in many fields. In recent years, Arieli and Avron developed a logical system based on a class of bilattice-based matrices, called logical bilattices, and provided a Gentzen-style calculus for it. This logic is essentially an expansion of the well-known Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic to the standard language of bilattices. Our aim is to study Arieli and Avron’s logic from the perspective of abstract (...) algebraic logic . We introduce a Hilbert-style axiomatization in order to investigate the properties of the algebraic models of this logic, proving that every formula can be reduced to an equivalent normal form and that our axiomatization is complete w.r.t. Arieli and Avron’s semantics. In this way, we are able to classify this logic according to the criteria of AAL. We show, for instance, that it is non-protoalgebraic and non-self-extensional. We also characterize its Tarski congruence and the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced generalized models, which in the general theory of AAL is usually taken to be the algebraic counterpart of a sentential logic. This class turns out to be the variety generated by the smallest non-trivial bilattice, which is strictly contained in the class of algebraic reducts of logical bilattices. On the other hand, we prove that the class of algebraic reducts of reduced models of our logic is strictly included in the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced generalized models. Another interesting result obtained is that, as happens with some implicationless fragments of well-known logics, we can associate with our logic a Gentzen calculus which is algebraizable in the sense of Rebagliato and Verdú . We also prove some purely algebraic results concerning bilattices, for instance that the variety of distributive bilattices is generated by the smallest non-trivial bilattice. This result is based on an improvement of a theorem by Avron stating that every bounded interlaced bilattice is isomorphic to a certain product of two bounded lattices. We generalize it to the case of unbounded interlaced bilattices. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. The problem raised by the liar paradox has long been an intriguing challenge for all those interested in the concept of truth. Many “solutions” have been proposed to solve or avoid the paradox, either prescribing some linguistical restriction, or giving up the classical true-false bivalence or assuming some kind of contextual dependence of truth, among other possibilities. We shall not discuss these different approaches to the subject in this paper, but we shall concentrate on a kind of formal (...) construction which was originated by Kripke's paper “Outline of a theory of truth” [11] and which, in different forms, reappears in later papers by various authors.The main idea can be presented as follows: assume a first order language ℒ containing, among other unspecified symbols, a predicate symbolTintended to represent the truth predicate for ℒ. Assume, also, a fixed modelM= 〈D, I〉 whereDcontains all sentences of ℒ andIinterprets all non-logical symbols of ℒ exceptTin the usual way. In general,Dmight contain many objects other than sentences of ℒ but as that would raise the problem of the meaning of sentences in whichTis applied to one of these objects, we shall assume that this is not the case. (shrink)

Baltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further (...) extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective. (shrink)

In this paper a logic for reasoning disquotationally about truth is presented and shown to have a standard model. This work improves on Hartry Field's recent results establishing consistency and omega-consistency of truth-theories with strong conditional logics. A novel method utilising the Banach fixed point theorem for contracting functions on complete metric spaces is invoked, and the resulting logic is shown to validate a number of principles which existing revision theoretic methods have heretofore failed to provide.

The family of all stable models for a logic program has a surprisingly simple overall structure, once two naturally occurring orderings are made explicit. In a so-called knowledge ordering based on degree of definedness, every logic program P has a smallest stable model, sk P — it is the well-founded model. There is also a dual largest stable model, S k P, which has not been considered before. There is another ordering based on degree of truth. Taking the meet and (...) the join, in the truth ordering, of the two extreme stable models sk P and S.. (shrink)

Kleene’s strong three-valued logic extends naturally to a four-valued logic proposed by Belnap. We introduce a guard connective into Belnap’s logic and consider a few of its properties. Then we show that by using it four-valued analogs of Kleene’s weak three-valued logic, and the asymmetric logic of Lisp are also available. We propose an extension of these ideas to the family of distributive bilattices. Finally we show that for bilinear bilattices the extensions do not produce any new equivalences.

In this paper, the notion of degree of inconsistency is introduced as a tool to evaluate the sensitivity of the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) value of evidence with respect to changes in the prior or reference density. For that, both the definition of the FBST, a possibilistic approach to hypothesis testing based on Bayesian probability procedures, and the use of bilattice structures, as introduced by Ginsberg and Fitting, in paraconsistent logics, are reviewed. The computational and theoretical advantages of using (...) the proposed degree of inconsistency based sensitivity evaluation as an alternative to traditional statistical power analysis is also discussed. (shrink)

An unflagging interest in describing future events has continuously motivated investigations, particularly in the field of logic. Aristotle, universally acknowledged as the father of logic, proposed a set of certain bases from which we could depart with our investigations. However, these are tools in which, despite their great value, one can perceive certain shortcomings. Over the centuries many attempts have been made to discover a means of describing any sentence, expressed in any grammatical form. One of these attempts is bilattice (...) theory, through which it has been attempted to describe future events. This theory makes use of tools such as vagueness and different forms of semantics including subvaluationism and supervaluationism. In lattice theory itself, the double lattice known as the FOUR lattice is directly employed. After analyzing the structure of a given theory one may easily make use of it in practice, providing examples of its usage. (shrink)