I am very appreciative of those who wrote comments on my article. They raised some interesting and some quite challenging questions. Their responses seem quite in synchrony with my focus and intent—to reveal some problems that we need to address in advancing emotion science. The authors of the commentaries reflected some of the same sort of differences among themselves as I found among the emotion scientists whom I surveyed in search of a definition of emotion. Like the emotion scientists who (...) responded to my survey, most of the authors of the commentaries were generally in agreement on the significance of research in the emotion domain but not in agreement on the meaning of the term emotion. I briefly discuss the noteworthy question (raised in one of the commentaries) as to whether and when discrete emotion concepts might someday share the same fate as the general term emotion and disappear from emotion science. (shrink)

The earliest known products of human imagination appear to express a primordial concern and struggle with thoughts of dying and of death and mortality. I argue that the structures and processes of imagination evolved in that struggle, in response to debilitating anxieties and fearful states that would accompany an incipient awareness of mortality. Imagination evolved to find that which would make the nascent apprehension of death more bearable, to engage in a search for alternative perceptions of death: a search that (...) was beyond the capability of the external senses. I argue that imagination evolved as flight and fight adaptations in response to debilitating fears that paralleled an emerging foreknowledge of death. Imagination, and symbolic language to express its perceptions, would eventually lead to religious behavior and the development of cultural supports. Although highly speculative, my argument draws on recent brain studies, and on anthropology, psychology, and linguistics. (shrink)

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...) so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored. (shrink)

We propose that measures of information integration can be more straightforwardly interpreted as measures of agency rather than of consciousness. This may be useful to the goals of consciousness research, given how agency and consciousness are “duals” in many (although not all) respects.

In this dissertation, I address the question of how to construct scientific theories of emotions that are both conceptually sound and empirically fruitful. To do this, I offer an analysis of the main challenges scientific theories of emotions face, and I propose a meta-theoretical framework to construct scientific concepts of emotions as explications of folk emotion concepts. Part I discusses the main challenges theories of emotions in psychology and neuroscience encounter. The first states that a proper scientific theory of emotions (...) must explain all and only the phenomena under the vernacular term ‘emotion’ with a common set of conceptual resources and under an overarching generic concept of emotion. The second demands that each emotion category corresponds to well-coordinated sets of neural, physiological, and behavioral patterns of responses. I argue that none of the best contemporary theories of emotions in psychology and neuroscience overcomes these challenges. As a result, a new theory of emotions is required. In Part II, I develop the meta-theoretical framework to construct a theory of emotions that overcomes the challenges above. First, I propose a pluralistic account of scientific kinds based on different patterns of projection that various disciplines may take to justify inductive inferences. These are essentialist, historical, and social patterns. Each of these patterns provides a framework to construct different types of scientific concepts. I argue that among the frameworks for scientific kinds available, the one that is best suited to explicate emotion concepts is a functional framework. Consequently, I conclude by recommending scientists pursue functionalist theories of emotions over essentialist, historical, or social theories. (shrink)

The 2015 UK Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire reinforces the importance of informed consent to medical treatment. This paper suggests that Montgomery recognises the challenge faced by vulnerable individuals in choosing between treatment options and making decisions with appreciation of information about material risks. The judgment endorses a form of weak paternalism to safeguard such persons, which is not disrespectful of the aggregate principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But ethical practice requires professionals to tread carefully between (...) weak and hard paternalism in the context of therapeutic interactions with vulnerable patients, while ensuring their awareness of material risks. (shrink)

The enactive approach provides a perspective on human bodies in their organic, sensorimotor, social, and linguistic dimensions, but many fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. A crucial desideratum for a theory of human bodies is that it be able to account for concrete human becoming. In this article I show that enactive theory possesses resources to achieve this goal. Being an existential structure, human becoming is best approached by a series of progressive formal indications. I discuss three standpoints on human becoming (...) as open, indeterminate, and therefore historical using the voices of Pico della Mirandola, Gordon W. Allport, and Paulo Freire. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation we move from an existential to an ontological register in looking at modes of embodied becoming. His scheme of interpretation of the relation between modes of individuation allows us to understand human becoming in terms of a tendency to neotenization. I compare this ontology with an enactive theoretical account of the dimensions of embodiment, finding several compatibilities and complementarities. Various forms of bodily unfinishedness in enaction fit the Simondonian ontology and the existential analysis, where transindividuality corresponds to participatory sense-making and Freire’s joint becoming of individuals and communities correlates with the open tensions in linguistic bodies between incorporation and incarnation of linguistic acts. I test some of this ideas by considering the plausibility of artificial bodies and personal becoming from an enactive perspective, using the case of replicants in the film Blade Runner. The conclusion is that any kind of personhood, replicants included, requires living through an actual history of concrete becoming. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

I argue for a soft compatibilist theory of free will, i.e., such that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, directly opposite hard incompatibilism, which holds free will incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. My intuitions in this book are primarily based on an analysis of meditation, but my arguments are highly syncretic, deriving from many fields, including behaviorism, psychology, conditioning and deconditioning theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, simulation theory, etc. I offer a causal/functional analysis of (...) meta-mental control, or 'metacausality', cashed out in counterfactual terms, to solve what I call the easy problem of free will. (shrink)

Do we communicate with pictures? If so, the text asks, what about their complex, dynamic appearances? Are they part of the communication process? By analysing a cover image of the journal Jugend from 1896 and by consulting the research on the logic of pictures (“Eigenlogik”) in Bildwissenschaft, Iconology and Cultural Anthropology these questions shall be persued. The analysis suggests, that instead of consenting the results of epistemological aesthetic research a new understanding of pictures shall be implemented: They can be considered (...) as parts of cultural semiotic processes. That means, it is not the view of something (epistemology) but the view of someone (culture) that is shown by the pictures. - I - -/- Kommunizieren wir über Bilder? Falls das zutrifft, stellt sich die Frage, ob daran auch deren komplexe dynamische Erscheinungsweise Anteil hat? Über die Analyse eines Titelblatts der Zeitschrift Jugend von 1896 und die Betrachtung der Forschungen zur Eigenlogik von Bildern in Bildwissenschaft, Ikonologie und Kultureller Anthropologie soll diesen Fragen nachgegangen werden. Die Auswertung veranlasst, sich von der klassischen, erkenntnisorientierten, ästhetischen Theorie zu distanzieren und sie als kulturtheoretische, semiotische Theorie neu zu fassen. Die Neuausrichtung wird im Verständnis des Gehalts der Bilder im medialen Transfer greifbar: Statt in einer Ansicht von etwas (Erkenntniswert), so eröffnet sich, liegt er in einer Ansicht über etwas (Meinung/Kulturwert). (shrink)

In the paper at hand I introduce Goethe’s ontology and methodology for the study of life as an alternative to current theories. ‘Life,’ in its individual, social and/or pan-natural form, has been a recurring topic in the social sciences for the last two centuries and may currently experience a renaissance, if we are to believe Scott Lash. Goethe’s approach is of particular interest because he formulated it as one of the first critical responses to the nascent discipline of biology. It (...) can be characterised broadly as phenomenology with a strong dose of life philosophy. For this reason, and to draw its contours more clearly, I compare his approach to the respective thoughts in Husserl’s and Simmel’s work. The comparison focuses on the two central concepts phenomenon and life but also discusses broader epistemological and methodological issues, such as the relationship between observer and observed, the relationship between culture and nature, the nature of causality as well as preferred methods of study. (shrink)

Is it true that there is an analogy between modes of creation and such of perception? Respective to the cultural anthropological research of Ernst Cassirer, Susanne K. Langer and John M. Krois and by the analysis of a tape of the Swiss video-artist Pipilotti Rist this initial thesis of Formal Aesthetics shall be supported. - I - -/- Lässt sich die Behauptung stützen, dass zwischen Gestaltungsweisen und Wahrnehmungsweisen eine Analogie besteht? Aufbauend auf den kulturanthropologischen Forschungen von Ernst Cassirer, Susanne K. (...) Langer und John M. Krois sowie der Analyse eines Tapes der Schweizer Videokünstlerin Pipilotti Rist gilt es diese ursprünglich von der formalen Ästhetik aufgeworfene These zu untermauern. (shrink)

Central issues in philosophy of architecture include foundational matters regarding the nature of: (1) architecture as an artform, design medium, or other product or practice; (2) architectural objects—what sorts of things they are; how they differ from other sorts of objects; and how we define the range of such objects; (3) special architectural properties, like the standard trio of structural integrity (firmitas), beauty, and utility—or space, light, and form; and ways they might be special to architecture; (4) architectural types—how to (...) consider abstract groups of architectural objects and their instances; (5) meaning and other language-like phenomena in architecture and its objects; (6) formation of and warrant for our basic grasp, and considered judgment, of architectural objects; and (7) social and moral features of architectural objects and architectural practice. Yet other questions engage applied philosophical concerns regarding architecture, such as the character of architectural notation; intellectual property rights; and client-architect obligations. A far-reaching philosophy of architecture extends beyond even a broadly aesthetics-based assessment, to include considerations of ethics, social and political philosophy, and philosophical reflections on psychology and the behavioral sciences. The aesthetics of architecture, by itself, spans traditional issues mooted in philosophy of art, as well as aesthetics of the everyday, and environmental aesthetics. Such traditional issues include the nature of the work; the possibility of classes, kinds, or types in the domain; the character and roles of representation, intentionality, and expression; and the warranted foundations for criticism. The ethics of architecture also addresses traditional issues, including delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in architectural milieus. Still other aspects of philosophy of architecture concern social and technological characteristics. (shrink)

Using depth interviews and participant observation, the predominant metaphors that emerge in pet owners' relationships with theiranimals are pets as pleasures, problems, parts of self, members of the family, and toys. These metaphors as well as patterns of interacting with and accounting for pets, suggest vacillation between viewing companion animals as human and civilized and viewing them as animalistic and chaotic. It is argued that these views comprise a mixed metaphor needed to more fully understand our fascination with pets.

An overview of core phenomena and processes leading to Freud’s establishing his psycho-analytic method and early metatheoretical concepts is followed by the author’s revision of his topographical model into a seamless biosemiotic theory of mind and human communication. A careful methodological analysis of the semantic/referential scope; speech/listening processes, and semiotic features, of a dialogue designed to make the unconscious conscious, reveals an epistemological bridge between psychoanalytic methodology and the biosemiotic agenda within a unifying inter-penetrative paradigm.

This paper provides an overview of the origins, vicissitudes, and abandonment of ‘metapsychology’, the psycho-biological scientific core of the Freudian opus, and introduces the authors’ key revisions. Although couched in the language of metaphor and analogy from 19th century physics, the conceptual foundations of Freud’s theories contained the seeds of a bio-semiotic theory of mind and of human nature in the natural world. Its updated, modernized, version opens the door to an inter-penetrative epistemology leading to universal principles of logical form, (...) applicable to all types of vital inter-action. (shrink)

In my continuing efforts to build a bridge between psychoanalytic findings and biosemiotics here, as in previous works, ‘biosemiotic’ refers to the hierarchy of meaning-forms (from biological to semiotic-organizations) underlying an updated psychoanalytic model of mind. Within this framework I present a broad range of bio-semiotic phenomena, processes, dynamics, defenses, and universal and unique internalized interpersonal patterns, that in psychoanalysis all commonly fall under the broad heading of the “Unconscious.” Reconceptualized as interpretive data within the purview of a psychoanalytic discourse-semantic (...) this biosemiotic framework posits an epigenetic continuum of human meaning-organizations originating at basic organic levels, moving upward through biological, psycho-somatic and affective expression, proto-semiotic transmissions, represented forms, and finally to explicit linguistic signs and complex symbol systems. In addition to assuming an uninterrupted epigenetic continuum crystallizing in hierarchic organization, this framework accentuates the multilayered and increasingly condensed quality of higher more elaborate organizations of meaning in human communication, drawing attention to persisting biological undercurrents in implied sense, intent, and motivation, all of which impact on repressive/defensive mechanisms. Drawing from previous works (Aragno 1997, 2005, 2008a, b, Psychoanalytic Inquiry 29(1):30–47, 2009, Biosemiotics 3:57–77, 2010, 2011a, Signs 5:71–74, 2011b, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Centennial Paper, Special Centennial Issue 59(2):239–288, 2011b, Signs 5:29–70, 2011c) in which I labored to update and revise Freud’s first topographical theory of mind, this paper presents the phenomenology of unconscious ‘data’ for the purpose of introducing a diverse range of non-linguistic signifying forms from which psychoanalysts infer mental processes and ‘interpret’ meanings. An important underlying premise regarding psychoanalytic data and its relation to the basic biosemiotic ‘agenda’ is that until grounded in an updated developmental theory of mind inclusive of pre- and proto-semiotic-forms, that is evolutionarily plausible, epistemologically based, and correlates with contemporary neuroscience, the term “sign” is merely an abstract linguistic ‘label’ rather than a mental act with antecedent developmental stages manifesting meanings through different forms and modes of expression. Drawn from the yields of the psychoanalytic method and semantic this revised metatheoretical approach provides insights into the sensory-emotive, bodily origins of unconscious layers of non-linguistic signification thereby expanding our understanding of the formative stages of the ‘semiotic function’ in human evolution. This being the third in a series of papers integrating the yields of psychoanalytic methodology with the underlying premises of ‘Biosemiotics,’ some familiarity with the background knowledge provided in the previous two is strongly recommended. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 43-54, January 2022. This article reviews literature in composition studies since affective science's emergence in the 1980s. It focuses on composition studies’ history of adopting findings and theories from affective science, and distinguishes trends in how the field applies those elements in theoretical versus pedagogical contexts. While composition studies’ adoption of affective science in its theorizing has helped the field progress toward a “complete psychology of writing,” affective science's influence on classroom practices has (...) not been so clear cut or direct. However, affective science is a fast-growing, liberal, and multidisciplinary field. As it progresses, composition studies continues to embrace its concepts and theories. This review notes the expectations and limitations developing through this dynamic interdisciplinary relationship. (shrink)

Recently, feminists like Jane Roland-Martin, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, and others have advocated a conversational metaphor for thinking and rationality, and our image of the rational person. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl refers to thinking as a “constant interconnecting of representations of experiences and an extension of how we hear ourselves and others. There are numerous disadvantages to thinking about thinking as a conversation.We think there are difficulties in accepting the current formulation of the conversational metaphor without question. First, there is danger that we will (...) lose important dialectical connections like that between the self and society. Second, the conversational metaphor alone cannot fully express the way conversations are constructed. We will want to take up the notion of narrative as a metaphor for thinking advocated by Susan Bordo, Alasdair MacIntyre, Jerome Bruner, and others, including Mary Belenky and her colleagues.Eventually, we want to champion narrative and the dramatic narrative of culture as a metaphor for thinking that involves such expressions as sights, insights, silences, as well as sounds, moments of mood and poetic moments. The dramatic narrative provides the structural possibilities needed to criticize certain kinds of conversations, in order to talk about the relations of public and private, self and society and most importantly, about the drama of our lives within and without.The dramatic narrative for thinking helps dispel the dangerous dualisms of mind and body that not even conversation or narration alone can banish, and allows us to frame questions about education that do not require us to separate mind from body. The dramatic narrative metaphor for thinking lets us show who we are, act out what we think, and reconstruct rationality to reflect what many women, and some men, do. (shrink)

Many emotion researchers would probably agree that at least some aspects of discrete emotions are evolutionarily conserved (e.g., the sensation/feeling component cannot be learned). Such agreement probably extends to the notion that aspects of emotions emerge in ontogeny as a function of developmental, learning, and cultural processes. Determining when and under what circumstances they emerge seems largely a matter for empirical research, though theories differ in their predictions and in the way they describe the relevant emotional-, cognitive-, and neuro-developmental processes.

I offer some supplementary reflections on the range and scope of some central concepts in Kalevi Kull’s ‘The Biosemiotic Fundamentals of Aesthetics: Beauty is Perfect Semiotic Fitting.’ Focus is directed, motivated by John Dewey, to some further aspects of Peirce’s linking of aesthetics to the nature of quality and of feeling. The complex dimensionality of semiotic fitting is taken up with an eye on Peirce’s theory of interpretants. Some suggestions are made about the use of beauty instead of form or (...) order as analytical concepts. (shrink)

An aesthetic and epistemological departure from ocular centrism has occurred in the wake of current technological evolutions and the posthuman turn. The sonic exploration of the more-than-human takes artists and philosophers beyond anthropomorphism to reveal the hidden patterning of life forms and yet-unfathomed universes. The conflation of nature with culture is one shift that takes place when thinking with sounds and rhythm and studying our environments. On an ontological level, a reordering of subject and object occurs when encountering the reciprocal (...) relationship of sounding. What if culture is actually nature? How does technology connect with botany, and what does it mean to engage the environment with the expanded tactility of the ear? This essay observes current inter-species practices in sound art by revisiting philosopher Susanne Langer’s theory of an embodied and embedded mind. Her “new key” in philosophy emphasizes music as a dynamic sound-pattern to conceptualize a semiology of artistic forms that renders human feeling in regard to non-human antecedents. This serves as a tool to trace the preconceptual substrata of mind, leading us through process-oriented studies of nature and psychophysical affect. Thinking with Langer involves the interconnection of natural systems, behavioural patterns, and human expression, which emerges in art. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

In twentieth-century continental philosophy, German philosophical anthropology can be seen as a sort of conceptual laboratory devoted to human/animal research, and, in particular, to the discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Its main notion—the idea of the special position of humans in nature—is one of the first philosophical attempts to think of the specificity of humans as a natural and qualitative difference from non-human animals. This school of thought correctly rejects both the metaphysical and/or religious characterisations of humans, and the (...) positivistic gradualism, that sees the human being as an animal endowed with a greater degree of certain faculties. At the same time, German philosophical anthropology still takes it for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that in correspondence with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. The semiotic side of this view is the distinction between signs and symbols developed by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer: animal signs would be mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli, whereas only human symbols could convey complex representation of objects and situations. The goal of this contribution is to criticise the alleged uniqueness of the hiatus and its semiotic implications through the opposite approach of the diffuse discontinuities. This approach that focuses on the semiotic traits of different species-specific environments can be traced back to Jakob von Uexküll’s biosemiotical phenomenology, which thinks of discontinuities as a normal phenomenon of animal life. (shrink)

Digital media and its effects on society have been widely discussed and questioned by many authors, for instance one’s additional self such as Facebook or Instagram and its later ways to behave virtually or the effects of uninterrupted entertainment on memory, attention span and creativity. Besides being an occupation during idle time, an internet connection and its gadgets have become an essential tool to accomplish some of the most ordinary tasks, such as track addresses or pay bills, as well as (...) a powerful feature within the scientific-academic environment. The shift from analog to digital has probably been achieved. The philosopher Vilém Flusser argued that the inadvertent use of “technical” media could substantially change the way we process information, the way we think. Although Vilém Flusser had already highlighted the importance of idle time during which critical thought takes place, it is only during spare time that one is able to re-think about what was done, criticize it and adjust accordingly. Flusser’s major outcome is a possible reshaping of historical consciousness. The following text discusses the gains and losses of cognitive dimensions after the digital shift and its impacts on the architectural design process, based on Vilém Flusser’s “hypothesis that human civilisation has seen two fundamental turning points since its beginning. The first may be defined as ‘the invention of linear writing’. The second may be called the invention of technical images”.. The research looks at new media within the architectural design process: tri-dimensional modeling versus two-dimensional representation, use of smartphones and other interactive media by constructing analogies between writing and architectural representation, and how these new procedures are radically changing consciousness and the task of developing knowledge. (shrink)

Recent developments in the natural sciences make a renewed dialogue with the humanities possible. Previously, humanists resisted transferring scientific paradigms into fields like history, fearing materialism and determinism would deprive experience of its meaning and people of their freedom. At the same time, scientists were realizing that deterministic materialism made understanding phenomena like life virtually impossible. Scientists escaped the irony of describing a nature to which they did not belong by also discovering that their knowledge can never be complete and (...) that descriptions of nature at the subatomic level were essentially random. These developments, as Monod said, weakened the “Modern” paradigm sufficiently to make life scientifically possible. To understand how life might actually exist, however, scientists had to move beyond laments about observations losing information and concentrate on how nature creates information. Nature creates information in the process of reducing thermodynamic gradients and stores created information in self-organized systems. Nature thus becomes historical, for it is defined by qualitative changes accumulating over time because of unpredictable contingencies. This paper will explore the possibility that the patterned processes by which nature changes apply in the human realm, where interactions can change people and created information can be stored in self-organized societies. Values, Ethics and Morals are the qualitatively new information stored in social systems. VEMs script the actions structuring societies, demonstrating there is meaning in history and solving the problem of how sequences of events –“chronicles”–become narratives. Moreover, when societies compete, their system-structuring information is tested in the same way natural selection tests DNA. Thus, the succession of social systems suggests there is a meaning of history. The meaning of history need be no more transcendental or intended than Darwinian evolution. But if organs and traits can have biological value without implying design, socially constructed attributes like morality, consciousness, and freedom can be valued without supposing history has an ultimate or eternal purpose. Aspiring to show how the cacophony of historical events becomes a cosmos, a “well-ordered” context in which changes become meaningful, this sketch suggests a new understanding of nature may provide a basis for ethics. (shrink)