: The work of Boris Hessen and Henryk Grossman on the emergence of early modern science is an attempt at a historical sociology of science and a historical epistemology of scientific knowledge. One of their theses is elaborated here, namely that early modern mechanics developed in the study of contemporary technology. In particular I discuss the thesis that the replacement of the Aristotelian concept of motion by the modern general and mathematical concept developed in the study of transmission machines. In (...) addition to a discussion of the thesis and its implications, I also present a case study to substantiate the thesis. I show that Benedetti's famous refutation of Aristotle and his introduction of a new concept of motion depended on empirical knowledge of the newly invented treadle mechanism. I argue that although the historiography of science since the 1930s has explored many of the individual issues first raised by the Marxist historians of science, this perspective remains unique in that it establishes direct and informative connections between the grand narrative of the transition from agrarian-feudal society to industrial production in early capitalism and the development of science and technology down to specific cognitive issues such as shared assumptions concerning the natural order. (shrink)

Though the term ‘science fiction’ was coined somewhat later, the early twentieth century saw an enormous rise in an interest in technological tales set in the near future, mirroring a general awareness of the growing importance of science. Hans Dominik was one of the most prolific – and successful – German authors of this kind of popular literature. According to estimates millions of copies of his books have been sold, making Dominik’s work an interesting case study illustrating the sorts of (...) ideas about science that German-speaking audiences entertained. Being a trained engineer and a public relations officer by profession, Dominik drew heavily on scientific topics that were headline news at the time and yet he also managed to create something new on the basis of these. One of the methods he employed was the use of religious motifs and topoi. Dominik magnified the relevance of scientific enterprises and depicted the consequences of science – or scientific misconduct, rather – as the beginning of a catastrophe, or even an apocalypse. By the same token, Dominik often introduced the figure of the scientist as a protagonist who would save the world. Thus Dominik was able to draw the attention of a large audience to concepts of the use of atomic energy or nuclear weapons – to name only two – and their creative or destructive potential, decades before such devices were technically feasible. (shrink)

At the turn of the seventeenth century, Bruno and Cavalieri independently developed two theories, central to which was the concept of the geometrical indivisible. The introduction of indivisibles had significant implications for geometry – especially in the case of Cavalieri, for whom indivisibles provided a forerunner of the calculus. But how did this event occur? What can we learn from the fact that two theories of indivisibles arose at about the same time? These are the questions addressed in this paper. (...) Relying on the methodology of “historical epistemology”, this paper asserts that the similarities and differences between the theories of Bruno and Cavalieri can be explained in terms of “shared knowledge”. The paper shows that the idea – on which both Bruno and Cavalieri build – that geometrical objects are generated by motion was part of the mathematical culture of the time. Tracing this idea back to its Pythagorean origins thus sheds light on the relationship between motion and continuum in mathematics. (shrink)

This paper argues for two claims. (1) In his biological views, Kenelm Digby tries to reconcile aspects of an Aristotelian theory of composite substance with early modern corpuscularianism. (2) From a methodological point of view, he uses the Stoic-Epicurean epistemology of common notions in order to show the adequacy of his conciliatory approach. The first claim is substantiated by an analysis of Digby’s views on the role of mixture and homogeneity in the process of animal generation. The second claim is (...) substantiated by an analysis of Digby’s views on the role of the concept of quantity in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. Both arguments make use of the context of Digby’s philosophy: the first argument draws on his background in the work of early modern corpuscularian Aristotelians such as Daniel Sennert; the second argument draws on his background in the epistemology of Pierre Gassendi. (shrink)

Traditional natural philosophy with its bookish methods and basic indebtedness to Aristotle harbored innovations of many different kinds in the late Renaissance. I compare the modes of innovation and of adherence to tradition in the Universae naturae theatrum of Jean Bodin, who worked outside the university although his work was cited by German professors, and in the university teaching of Jean-Cecile Frey. I argue that authorial self-presentation and ideas about the proper relation of philosophy and religion played crucial roles in (...) making innovations palatable or not in different university contexts. (shrink)

This essay examines the provenance of a single, curious term that William James often used in connection with his own pragmatism. The term is Denkmittel, an uncommon German contraction of Denk and Mittel. James’s Central European sources for this now forgotten bit of philosophical jargon provide a small illustration of a bigger historical point that too often gets obscured. Pragmatism—James’s pragmatism, at least—was both allied with and inspired by a broader sweep of scientific instrumentalism that was already flourishing in fin (...) de siècle European philosophy. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article examines the conception of elements in the natural philosophy of Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) and explores the theological motivation that stands behind this conception. By some of his early modern readers, Taurellus may have been understood as a proponent of material atoms. By contrast, I argue that considerations concerning the substantiality of the ultimate constituents of composites led Taurellus to an immaterialist ontology, according to which elements are immaterial forms that possess active and passive potencies as well as motion (...) and extension. In Taurellus's view, immaterialism about elements provides support for the theological doctrine of creationex nihilo. As he argues, the ontology of immaterial forms helps to explicate a sense in which creatures are substances, not accidents of the divine substance. In particular, he maintains that immaterial forms stand in suitable relations of ontological dependence to God: creation dependence (since forms would not exist without the divine act of creation), but neither subsistence dependence (since forms continue to exist without continued divine agency) nor activity dependence (since forms are active without requiring divine concurrence). (shrink)