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Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias

Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney

Synthese 200 (1):1-23 (2022)

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(1 other version)Temporal dynamism and the persisting stable self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Episodic Imagining, Temporal Experience, and Beliefs about Time.Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):528-547.details We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Can we turn people into pain pumps?: On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:1-32.details Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will be (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1717-1742.details Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
The role of causal manipulability in the manifestation of time biases.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Rasmus Pedersen & Danqi Wang - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-34.details We investigate the causal manipulability hypothesis, according to which what partly explains (a) why people tend to prefer negative events to be in their further future rather than their nearer future and positive events to be in their nearer future rather than their further future and (b) why people tend to prefer that negative events be located in their past not their future and that positive events be located in their future not their past, is that people tend to discount (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Can We Turn People into Pain Pumps? On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):593-624.details Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events to be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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