ArgumentThis paper discusses the theory of motion of the philosopher Honoré Fabri (1608–1688), a senior representative of early modern Jesuit scientists. It argues that the consensus prevailing among historians – according to which Fabri's theory of impetus is diametrically opposed to Galileo's or Descartes' concept of inertia – is false. It shows: that Fabri carefully constructed his concept of impetus in order to easily incorporate the principle of linear conservation of motion (designated here as “limited inertia”), by adopting formal (rather (...) than efficient) causality between impetus and motion and by allowing impetus to act only along straight lines; that he explicitly deemed Aristotle's famous “inertial paradox” not as a paradox at all; and that linear conservation of motion was not limited to “counterfactual” circumstances but played a significant part in his discrete theory of free fall and constituted an integral component of his general physical (and even mathematical) philosophy. However, the paper also shows that Fabri's notion of inertia was restricted to one dimension only, and therefore should indeed be considered “limited.” In his analysis of horizontal projectiles, Fabri explicitly rejected Galileo's important principle of superposition, and thus revealed significant constraints to his “inertial” thinking. (shrink)

I consider Leibniz's thoughts about Hobbes's materialism, focusing on his less-discussed later thoughts about the topic. Leibniz understood Hobbes to have argued for his materialism from his imagistic theory of ideas. Leibniz offered several criticisms of this argument and the resulting materialism itself. Several of these criticisms occur in texts in which Leibniz was engaging with the generation of British philosophers after Hobbes. Of particular interest is Leibniz's correspondence with Damaris Masham. Leibniz may have been trying to communicate with Locke, (...) but ended up discussing Masham's version of the argument for materialism that Leibniz attributed to Hobbes. (shrink)

Spinoza attributes mentality to all things existing in nature. He claims that each thing has a mind that perceives everything that happens in the body. Against this panpsychist background, it is unclear how consciousness relates to the nature of the mind. This study focuses on Spinoza’s account of the conscious mind and its operations. It builds on the hypothesis that Spinoza’s panpsychism can be interpreted as a self-consistent philosophical position. It aims at providing answers to the following questions: what is (...) consciousness, for Spinoza, and what are the causes that determine its presence in nature? How can human and non-human individuals be distinguished on account of their mentality? How can Spinoza conceive of the human mind as consisting entirely of conscious perceptions? And how, according to Spinoza’s mind-body parallelism, is the content of consciousness determined so that it reflects in thought the order and connection of the actions and passions of the body? To address these questions, I first determine what Spinoza’s notion of “consciousness” is and how he uses it. Then, I investigate whether he has a theory of recognition capable of accounting for specifically human behaviour and mentality. Further, I examine his description of memory and the way in which memory shapes the framework of human conscious thought. Finally, I look for an account of discursive reasoning, capable of explaining the existence of activities of the mind that, by operating on the content provided by memory, preserve themselves through time and change. (shrink)

Philosophy becomes speculative when it raises questions about the ultimate nature of being and thought. What does it mean to be? What does it mean to think? How are being and thought related? What does it mean to ask these questions? These questions have occupied a central place in philosophy throughout history, but have led a shadow existence in twentieth-century thought, which has cut the tie between reason and these fundamental questions, leaving the questions in the twilight, and reason instrumentalised. (...) A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), one of the founders of analytic philosophy and co-author (with Bertrand Russell) of Principia Mathematica, is one of the few contemporary thinkers to have developed an explicit speculative philosophy. Unsurprisingly, his philosophy has played a marginal role in academic debates. In this study, the methodological foundation of Whitehead’s speculative thought is reconstructed. On the basis of a systematic and historical examination of the nature of the question of being, Whiteheads ontology of the event as the passage into novelty emerges in its full scope, allowing the reader to understand why and to what extent Whitehead has walked a different path than other contemporary thinkers. His philosophy contains a conception of reason that is not alien to newness and creativity while being more than procedural or pragmatic, and a mode of understanding existence that brings out the acuteness of freedom, value and legitimacy, as well as the unity of things, of thought and nature. In order to show what is really happening in this philosophy, the received interpretation of Whitehead’s ontology is radically dismantled. The central thought, that to be means to happen, is explained in a process of reiteration and gradual clarification, examining traditional philosophical problems in metaphysics and epistemology (on topics like: nature and matter, knowledge, categorical structure, freedom and necessity, truth and meaning, modality) from its perspective. What emerges is a philosophy in which the temporality of being, when taken seriously, changes the status of familiar problems and dualisms and offers possibilities for thought, which previously did not exist. Whitehead “hears” the classical questions of philosophy in a new way. Beyond the trenches of twentieth-century philosophy, Whitehead’s speculative thinking contains many elements that will be of value to those studying the foundations of thought today and looking for new directions. In a time when the dualism of nature and man is maintained cynically in our economies and dismantled, but only in a biologistic fashion and therefore only seemingly, as a cover-up, in science and philosophy, Whitehead’s new and creative way of hearing, and answering, old questions about ultimate concerns, when understood properly, is more up to date than ever before. (shrink)

Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...) potentiality. This rejection was motivated by an acute sense of the mind’s fallible subjectivity. While conditioned by recent historical events, the 17th century’s pervasive sense of subjectivity also reveals a heavy debt to Hellenistic philosophy, which had been recently rediscovered. But whereas Hellenistic thought, mistrustful of theoria, only reifies conscience, early modern thinking, more mistrustful of praxis and seeking its grounding in theoria, goes a step further and reifies consciousness. Partly modeled on theological ideas, the resulting concept of consciousness is plagued by paradoxes that have becomes notorious for their intractability. But essentially the same model of consciousness underwrites contemporary theory, embroiling contemporary debates in the same controversies that dominated the 17th century. Sidestepping these difficulties by returning to the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind would be a tall order, but it is not impossible. Alfred North Whitehead's theory of consciousness offers an example. His novel theory of time enables Whitehead to rehabilitate the Aristotelian concept of passive mind in a wholly naturalistic way. (shrink)

Als zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts der Realismus wieder ernst genommen wurde, gab es viele Philosophen, die sich mit der Ontologie der Wahrheit befaßten. Unabhängig von der Bestimmung der Wahrheit als Korrespondenzbeziehung wollten sie herausfinden, inwieweit zur Erklärung der Wahrheit von Sätzen besondere Entitäten herangezogen werden müssen. Einige dieser Entitäten, so zum Beispiel Bolzanos ‘Sätze an sich’, Freges ‘Gedanken’ oder die ‘propositions’ von Russell und Moore, wurden als Träger der Eigenschaften Wahrheit und Falschheit aufgefaßt. Einige Philosophen jedoch, wie Russell, Wittgenstein im (...) ›Tractatus‹ und Husserl in den ›Logischen Untersuchungen‹, argumentierten, zusätzlich zu den Wahrheitsträgern bzw. an ihrer Stelle müßten Entitäten angenommen werden, auf Grund deren Sätze und/oder ‘Propositionen’ wahr sind. Solchen Entitäten gab man verschiedene Namen, insbesondere ‘fact’, ‘Tatsache’, ‘state of affairs’ und ‘Sachverhalt’. 1 Wir wollen einer Entscheidung über die Angebrachtheit dieser Ausdrücke nicht vorgreifen und daher zunächst eine neutralere Terminologie verwenden: Alle Entitäten, die für diese zweite Rolle in Frage kommen, wollen wir ‘Wahrmacher’ nennen. (shrink)

This article discusses some reasons for taking a reconstructive approach to the argumentative structure of Leibniz’s metaphysics. One reason is the fragmentary nature of the countless notes and letters that constitute by far the largest part of Leibniz‘s philosophical output. Another reason is that conjecturing how the many isolated arguments proposed by Leibniz fit into a large-scale argumentative structure could yield insights into how Leibniz made use of the method of intuition – both in his analysis of mind and in (...) his analysis of matter. Contemporary critics have objected that the method of intuition leads to philosophical conservatism, arbitrary choices between conflicting intuitions, and a preoccupation with psychological facts rather than with reality. By contrast, reconstructing the methodology behind Leibniz’s metaphysics could indicate how intuitions could be used in a way that sidesteps these problems. Leibniz gives priority to intuitions concerning the structure of mental operations over intuitions concerning the structure of material objects; this is why intuitions concerning the structure of material objects can be replaced by innovative philosophical theories; these theories, however, make use of metaphysical concepts implied by the analysis of mind and, thereby, can capture facts both about psychology and about the structure of extra-mental reality. (shrink)

En la Antropología, en la sección referida a las facultades cognoscitivas superiores, se presenta la sagacidad como el don de la indagación. Con eso se indica que tiene un lugar en la investigación científica. En nuestro trabajo examinamos la función que se puede atribuir a la sagacidad en el método de investigación. La presencia de la sagacidad en un investigador es contingente, pero se la puede considerar como una condición que determina el alcance del método y sus límites. También determina (...) algunas características de los resultados de una investigación. Por eso, sugerimos que la sagacidad es una condición accesoria del método. La inteligencia personal del científico resulta así un elemento decisivo en la investigación, tanto en el planteo de los fines de ésta, como en el progreso del trabajo, y especialmente en las fases de diseño, de invención y de descubrimiento. (shrink)

In his unpublished freewill manuscripts, Ralph Cudworth seeks to complete the project that he begins in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) by arguing for an account of human liberty that avoids the opposing poles of necessitarianism and indifferency. I argue that Cudworth’s account rests upon a crucial distinction between the will and the power of freewill. Whereas we necessarily will the greater apparent good, freewill is a more fundamental power by which we endeavour to discern the greater (...) good before willing to pursue it. Cudworth thus opposes necessitarianism by arguing for a libertarian account of freewill while nonetheless rejecting the indifferentist claim that we can will contrary to the greater apparent good. (shrink)

Kako bi odgovorili na ovo pitanje, moramo pojasniti na što se odnosi. Moramo doznati može li se »globalizacija« semantički dovesti u vezu s ideologijom. Ideologija označava cjelokupnost naših osobnih stavova, ideja i nazora temeljenih na znanju, iskustvu i osjećajima kojima percipiramo i interpretiramo svijet, naš položaj u njemu i cijelo društvo. Ako gledamo iz prosvjetiteljske perspektive, ideologiju smatramo vrstom predrasude koja dominira razumom. Zašto je ovo važno u kontekstu globalizacije? Općenito govoreći, globalizacijom se smatra proces stalnog međunarodnog povezivanja i napretka (...) u gotovo svim područjima života kao što su npr. ekonomija, politika, kultura i komunikacija. Ovaj pogled uključuje implicitno iskustvo promjene koja zahvaća ne samo naš okoliš, društvo i njegove institucije nego i nacionalne države i njihove građane. Okoliš i njegovi resursi su preduvjet za globalizaciju. Zbog procesa konstantne liberalizacije tržišta resursi se mijenjaju i, konačno, uništavaju. U članku ćemo razmotriti imaju li političke mjere moć vršenja kontrole nad ovim dijalektičkim mehanizmom. (shrink)

Was ich mit dieser Artikel hier zu zeigen versuchen werde, ist eine gewisse Affinität zwischen Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schellings Konzeptionen und Auffassungen einer Naturphilosophie in den Jahren 1797-1801 und Hans Jonas‘ ontologisch-philosophische Biologie 1, die er in Organismus und Freiheit – Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie entwickelte. Die hier zu erwähnende Schellingsche Naturphilosophie ist die in der Zeit zwischen Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur vom Jahr 1797 und Ueber den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie und die richtige Art ihre Probleme (...) aufzulösen vom Jahr 1801 entwickelte Konzeption einer Philosophie der Natur.2 Damit schließe ich mich einer These Odo Marquards an: Schelling sei der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts ein Zeitgenosse inkognito. Nur wünsche ich der prominenten Reihe von Philosophen, die Marquard – zwei Jahre nach der Veröffentlichung von Organismus und Freiheit – im Jahr 1975 aufstellte, den Name ‚Hans Jonas‘ hinzufügen. Es soll somit versucht werden, die Möglichkeit dafür zu öffnen, dass die Naturphilosophie Schellings im Lichte der philosophischen Biologie Jonas‘ gesehen werden kann. Damit wünsche ich zu verdeutlichen, dass der Problembereich und frühen Philosophie Schellings durch Jonas‘ Philosophie einen Repräsentant finden, und dass sie mit der Problematik Jonas‘ eine gewisse Aktualität gewinnen könnte. (shrink)

Afin de répondre à cette question, nous devons clarifier ce à quoi elle fait référence. Nous devons déterminer si la « globalisation » peut être sémantiquement mise en rapport avec l’idéologie. L’idéologie signifie l’ensemble de nos attitudes personnelles, idées et points de vue fondés sur la connaissance, l’expérience et les sensations à travers lesquels nous percevons et interprétons le monde, la position que nous y occupons et la société toute entière. Dans la perspective des Lumières, l’idéologie est considérée comme une (...) sorte de préjugé qui domine la raison. Pourquoi cela est-il important dans le contexte de la globalisation ? De manière générale, la globalisation est considérée comme un processus d’interconnexion internationale permanente et de progrès dans presque tous les champs de la vie, tels que l’économie, la politique, la culture ou la communication. Ce point de vue implique l’expérience d’un changement qui touche non seulement notre environnement, notre société et ses institutions, mais aussi les États-nations et leurs citoyens. L’environnement et ses ressources sont un pré-requis à la globalisation. Le processus continu de libéralisation du marché entraîne la modification et, en définitive, la destruction des ressources. Dans cet article, nous examinerons si les mesures politiques ont la capacité d’exercer le contrôle de ce mécanisme dialectique. (shrink)