Neuroethics applies cognitive neuroscience for prescribing alterations to conceptions of self and society, and for prescriptively judging the ethical applications of neurotechnologies. Plentiful normative premises are available to ground such prescriptivity, however prescriptive neuroethics may remain fragmented by social conventions, cultural ideologies, and ethical theories. Herein we offer that an objectively principled neuroethics for international relevance requires a new meta-ethics: understanding how morality works, and how humans manage and improve morality, as objectively based on the brain and social sciences. This (...) new meta-ethics will simultaneously equip neuroethics for evaluating and revising older cultural ideologies and ethical theories, and direct neuroethics towards scientifically valid views of encultured humans intelligently managing moralities. Bypassing absolutism, cultural essentialisms, and unrealistic ethical philosophies, neuroethics arrives at a small set of principles about proper human flourishing that are more culturally inclusive and cosmopolitan in spirit. This cosmopolitanism in turn suggests augmentations to traditional medical ethics in the form of four principled guidelines for international consideration: empowerment, non-obsolescence, self-creativity, and citizenship. (shrink)

What are and where are the ethical limits of neuroeducation? The article reflects on a necessary question for the evolution of cognitive processes through critical deliberation, the delimitation of boundaries and the estimation of progress. On the one hand, it argues that the experimental turn could call into question the ethical and humanistic goal of education; on the other hand, it argues that a systematic renunciation of neuroscientific advances would also mean abandoning the quest for human flourishing. The humanities alone (...) do not provide the biopsychosocial approach from which we must understand our self-realisation. Thus, the first of the limits that is the origin of all the others arises from a scientific-humanist dilemma. The new boundaries to be delimited are the neuroscientific implications in themselves and how these are translated into educational, if they were to be valid in this field. Here neuromyths play an important role. It is precisely neuroethics as an applied ethics or branch of bioethics that takes up these aspects through neuroeducational ethics and educational neuroethics. In its fundamental branch, this discipline opens up the debate on moral neuroeducation. But the possibility of reducing morality and all that we are to our neural bases leads to new limits. To overcome them, he highlights the potential of a sociocultural and biological symbiosis with the notions of 'neuroculture' and 'proactive epigenesis'. Finally, the essay deliberates on the more speculative boundaries between what we are and our possibilities for understanding it on the basis of transhumanism. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________________________¿Cuále s son y dónde están los límites éticos de la neuroeducación? El artículo reflexiona sobre una cuestión necesaria para el devenir de los procesos cognitivos mediante la deliberación crítica, la delimitación de fronteras y la estimación del progreso. Su hilo argumental proyecta, por un lado, que el giro experimental podría poner en entredicho el objetivo ético y humanista de la educación; por otro lado, que una renuncia sistemática a los avances de las neurociencias supondría, igualmente, abandonar la búsqueda del florecimiento humano. Las humanidades solo no brindan el enfoque biopsicosocial desde el que hemos de entender nuestra autorrealización. Por ende, el primero de los límites que es origen de todos los demás surge dada una disyuntiva científico-humanista. Los nuevos confines a delimitar subyacen de las implicaciones neurocientíficas en sí mismas y de cómo estas se trasladan a la praxis escolar, si es que tuviesen validez en este campo. Aquí los neuromitos juegan un papel importante. Precisamente, la neuroética como ética aplicada o rama de la bioética recoge estos aspectos mediante la ética neuroeducativa y la neuroética educativa. En su rama fundamental, dicha disciplina abre el debate sobre la neuroeducación moral. Pero la posibilidad de reducir lo moral y todo lo que somos a nuestras bases neurales deriva en nuevos límites. Para superarlos, destaca el potencial de una simbiosis sociocultural y biológica con las nociones de ‘neurocultura’ y de ‘epigénesis proactiva’. Finalmente, el ensayo delibera sobre los límites más especulativos entre lo que somos y nuestras posibilidades para entenderlo en base al transhumanismo._____________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______HOW TO CITE / CÓMO CITAR: Castillo, P. (2023). Los límites éticos de la neuroeducación. Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria, 35(2), 191-208. (shrink)

Although the map of technology ethics is expanding, the growing subdomains within it may raise misgivings. In a recent and very interesting article, Sætra and Danaher have argued that the current dynamic of sub-specialization is harmful to the ethics of technology. In this commentary, we offer three reasons to diminish their concern about ethical proliferation. We argue first that the problem of demarcation is weakened if we attend to other sub-disciplines of technology ethics not mentioned by these authors. We claim (...) secondly that the logic of sub-specializations is less problematic if one does adopt mixed models (combining internalist and externalist approaches) in applied ethics. We finally reject that clarity and distinction are necessary conditions for defining sub-fields within ethics of technology, defending the porosity and constructive nature of ethical disciplines. (shrink)

The neuroscience of ethics is allegedly having a double impact. First, it is transforming the view of human morality through the discovery of the neurobiological underpinnings that influence moral behavior. Secondly, some neuroscientific findings are radically challenging traditional views on normative ethics. Both claims have some truth but are also overstated. In this article, the author shows that they can be understood together, although with different caveats, under the label of ‘neurofoundationalism’. Whereas the neuroscientific picture of human morality is undoubtedly (...) valuable if we avoid neuroessentialistic portraits, the empirical disruption of normative ethics seems less plausible. The neuroscience of morality, however, is providing relevant evidence that any empirically-informed ethical theory needs to critically consider. Although neuroethics is not going to bridge the is-ought divide, it may establish certain facts that require us to rethink the way we achieve our ethical aspirations. (shrink)

Since its emergence in the early 2000s, neuroethics has become a recognized, institutionalized and professionalized field. A central strategy for its successful development has been the claim that it must be an autonomous discipline, distinct in particular from bioethics. Such claim has been justified by the conviction, sustained since the 1990s by the capabilities attributed to neuroimaging technologies, that somehow ‘the mind is the brain’, that the brain sciences can illuminate the full range of human experience and behavior, and that (...) neuroscientific knowledge will have dramatic implications for views of the human, and challenge supposedly established beliefs and practices in domains ranging from self and personhood to the political organization of society. This article examines how that conviction functions as neuroethics’ ideological condition of possibility. (shrink)

Fünfzehn Jahre nach ihrer Entstehung ist die Neuroethik ein internationales wissenschaftliches Feld mit enormer Dynamik. Innerhalb weniger Jahre wurden eigene Kongresse, Zeitschriften, Forschungsförderprogramme, Fachgesellschaften und Institute gegründet. Gleichwohl besteht erheblicher Dissens über die Definition und den Gegenstandsbereich dieses neuen Gebiets. Wir argumentieren hier für eine differenzierte Konzeption, wonach neben der Reflexion ethischer Probleme der Neurowissenschaft und ihrer überwiegend neurotechnologischen Anwendungen auch die ethische Reflexion neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung zur Moralität zur Neuroethik gehört. Dies umfasst zwar nicht neurowissenschaftliche oder neuropsychologische Studien zur Moralität, (...) wohl aber die Reflexion der Bedeutung dieser Forschung für die Ethik und das Recht. Wir geben einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Themen der Neuroethik, woraus deutlich wird, wie sehr in verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen, auch jenseits von Medizin und Gesundheitswesen, neuroethische Fragen relevant sind. Das Potenzial der Neuroethik als eines neuen Wissenschaftsfeldes liegt darin, durch eine Verknüpfung neurophilosophischer und medizinethischer Themen sowie eine breite interdisziplinäre Vernetzung neue Antworten auf gesellschaftlich drängende Fragen zu finden. (shrink)

As a discipline, neuroethics addresses a range of questions and issues generated by basic neuroscientific research, and its use and meanings in the clinical and social spheres. Here, we present Part 4 of a four-part bibliography of the neuroethics literature focusing on clinical and social applications of neuroscience, to include: the treatment-enhancement discourse; issues arising in neurology, psychiatry, and pain care; neuroethics education and training; neuroethics and the law; neuroethics and policy and political issues; international neuroethics; and discourses addressing "trans-" (...) and "post-" humanity. To complete a systematic survey of the literature, 19 databases and 4 individual open-access journals were employed. Searches were conducted using the indexing language of the U.S. National Library of Medicine. A Python code was used to eliminate duplications in the final bibliography. When taken with Parts 1-3, this bibliography aims to provide a listing of international peerreviewed papers, books, and book chapters published from 2002 through 2016. While seeking to be as comprehensive as possible, it may be that some works were inadvertently and unintentionally not included. We therefore invite commentary from the field to afford completeness and contribute to this bibliography as a participatory work-in-progress. (shrink)

BackgroundAs a discipline, neuroethics addresses a range of questions and issues generated by basic neuroscientific research, and its use and meanings in the clinical and social spheres. Here, we present Part 4 of a four-part bibliography of the neuroethics literature focusing on clinical and social applications of neuroscience, to include: the treatment-enhancement discourse; issues arising in neurology, psychiatry, and pain care; neuroethics education and training; neuroethics and the law; neuroethics and policy and political issues; international neuroethics; and discourses addressing "trans-" (...) and "post-" humanity.MethodsTo complete a systematic survey of the literature, 19 databases and 4 individual open-access journals were employed. Searches were conducted using the indexing language of the U.S. National Library of Medicine. A Python code was used to eliminate duplications in the final bibliography.ResultsWhen taken with Parts 1-3, this bibliography aims to provide a listing of international peerreviewed papers, books, and book chapters published from 2002 through 2016. While seeking to be as comprehensive as possible, it may be that some works were inadvertently and unintentionally not included. We therefore invite commentary from the field to afford completeness and contribute to this bibliography as a participatory work-in-progress. (shrink)

In bioethics, the first decade of the twenty-first century was characterized by the emergence of interest in the ethical, legal, and social aspects of neuroscience research. At the same time an ongoing extension of the topics and phenomena addressed by neuroscientists was observed alongside its rise as one of the leading disciplines in the biomedical science. One of these phenomena addressed by neuroscientists and moral psychologists was the neural processes involved in moral decision-making. Today both strands of research are often (...) addressed under the label of neuroethics. To understand this development we recalled literature from 1995 to 2012 stored in the Mainz Neuroethics Database (i) to investigate the quantitative development of scientific publications in neuroethics; (ii) to explore changes in the topics of neuroethics research within the defined time interval; (iii) to illustrate the interdependence of different research topics within the neuroethics literature; (iv) to show the development of the distribution of neuroethics research on peer-reviewed journals; and (v) to display the academic background and affiliations of neuroethics Researchers ... (shrink)

It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and permeate our current (...) political, economic, and personal lives) against the threats to that equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement. (shrink)

This article outlines and develops the concept of ‘ethics work’ in social work practice. It takes as its starting point a situated account of ethics as embedded in everyday practice: ‘everyday ethics’. This is contrasted with ‘textbook ethics’, which focuses on outlining general ethical principles, presenting ethical dilemmas and offering normative ethical frameworks (including decision-making models). ‘Ethics work’ is a more descriptive account of ethics that refers to the effort people put into seeing ethically salient aspects of situations, developing themselves (...) as good practitioners, working out the right course of action and justifying who they are and what they have done. After identifying seven features of ethics work, including work on framing, roles, emotion, identity, reason, relationships and performance, each element is illustrated with reference to two case examples from social work practice. It is argued that the concept of ethics work, with its focus on the practitioners as moral agents in context, is an important antidote to the rules-based managerialism of much contemporary practice. (shrink)

In the last twenty years, there has been an enormous growth of scientific research concerning the process of human moral reasoning and moral intuitions. In contemporary descriptive ethics, three dominant approaches can be found – heuristic approach, dual-process theory, and universal moral grammar. Each of these accounts is based on similar empirical evidence combining findings from evolutionary biology, moral psychology, and neuroethics. Nevertheless, they come to different conclusions about the reliability of moral intuitions. The aim of this paper is to (...) critically investigate each of these approaches and compare them with recent scientific findings. Last chapter addresses implications of these findings for moral epistemology and normative ethics. The aim is to show that despite different interpretations of available data, we can reach a satisfying pragmatical conclusion which would be in compliance with the empirical evidence, yet it would not necessarily depend on it. (shrink)

An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations (...) has been advocated in various different specificities and scopes, and on various different levels. Second, the three kinds of evidence that have most often been appealed to by discussants of this hypothesis require additional arguments. And third, there is significant reasonable disagreement about what moral judgements essentially are. (shrink)

Abstract:An integrated and principled neuroethics offers ethical guidelines able to transcend conventional and medical reliance on normality standards. Elsewhere we have proposed four principles for wise guidance on human transformations. Principles like these are already urgently needed, as bio- and cyberenhancements are rapidly emerging. Context matters. Neither “treatments” nor “enhancements” are objectively identifiable apart from performance expectations, social contexts, and civic orders. Lessons learned from disability studies about enablement and inclusion suggest a fresh way to categorize modifications to the body (...) and its performance. The term “enhancement” should be broken apart to permit recognition of enablements and augmentations, and kinds of radical augmentation for specialized performance. Augmentations affecting the self, self-worth, and self-identity of persons require heightened ethical scrutiny. Reversibility becomes the core problem, not the easy answer, as augmented persons may not cooperate with either decommissioning or displacement into unaccommodating societies. We conclude by indicating how our four principles of self-creativity, nonobsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship establish a neuroethics beyond normal that is better prepared for a future in which humans and their societies are going so far beyond normal. (shrink)

Common understandings of neuroethics, i.e., of its distinctive nature, are premised on two distinct sets of claims: (1) neuroscience can change views about the nature of ethics itself and neuroethics is dedicated to reaping such an understanding of ethics; (2) neuroscience poses challenges distinct from other areas of medicine and science and neuroethics tackles those issues. Critiques have rightfully challenged both claims, stressing how the first may lead to problematic forms of reductionism while the second relies on debatable assumptions about (...) the nature of bioethics specialization and development. Informed by philosophical pragmatism and our experience in neuroethics, we argue that these claims are ill-founded and should give way to pragmatist reconstructions. Namely, neuroscience, much like other areas of empirical research on morality, can provide useful information about the nature of morally problematic situations but it does not need to promise radical and sweeping changes to ethics based on neuroscientism. Furthermore, the rationale for the development of neuroethics as a specialized field need not to be premised on the distinctive nature of the issues it tackles or of neurotechnologies. Rather, it can espouse an understanding of neuroethics as both a scholarly and a practical endeavor dedicated to resolving a series of problematic situations raised by neurological and psychiatric conditions. (shrink)

Neil Levy (2011) argues that neuroethics as a new discipline distinct from bioethics provides methodological tools to evaluate the validity of our moral intuitions. This naturalistic claim that mor...

Human beings are subject to a range of cognitive and affective limitations which interfere with our ability to pursue our individual and social goals. I argue that shaping our environment to avoid triggering these limitations or to constrain the harms they cause is likely to be more effective than genetic or pharmaceutical modifications of our capacities because our limitations are often the flip side of beneficial dispositions and because available enhancements seem to impose significant costs. I argue that carefully selected (...) environmental interventions respect agents’ autonomy and are consistent with democratic decision making. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las consecuencias prácticas de una autocomprensión positivista de la neuroética aplicada. Esta ética se ocupa de los impactos éticos y sociales derivados de la utilización de los hallazgos neurocientificos, en especial de las neurotecnologías. La intención es mostrar que para realizar esta tarea la neuroética debe superar el paradigma neuropositivista dominante que solo le conduce a la disolución del ámbito moral y, en el terreno práctico, al silencio cómplice ante los problemas surgidos en (...) la aplicación de las neurociencias. Para este fin daremos los siguientes pasos. En primer lugar, analizaremos los rasgos básicos de toda ética aplicada y desde ellos el origen y los objetivos de la neuroética aplicada. En segundo lugar, veremos cómo las investigaciones neuroéticas confunden el ámbito social con el ámbito moral, eliminando así de entrada toda perspectiva ética. Por último, ejemplificaremos las consecuencias prácticas de esta disolución en el caso de las políticas públicas, analizando el papel que puede cumplir y no cumple la neuroética aplicada frente al neuropoder generado por las neurotecnologías. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analizan dos modos paradigmáticos en que en la actualidad se comprende la relación entre las disciplinas que se encuentran implicadas en la tarea de la neuroética, en su carácter de neurociencia de la ética. Particularmente se critica la forma que toma la interdisciplinariedad en estos dos modelos. En el primer caso se señala que la tarea de reflexión filosófica no da lugar a que la evidencia neurocientífica pueda modificar de modo importante los presupuestos teóricos en que (...) se funda tal reflexión. En el segundo caso, por el contrario, el papel dado al componente empírico, necesario a la neuroética, obtura la reflexión ético-filosófica.In this paper, I analyze two paradigmatic contemporary ways of understanding the relation between the disciplines involved in neuroethics. In particular, I criticize the form interdisciplinarity takes in these two models. It is pointed out that, according to one of these, the philosophical reflection does not allow neuroscientific evidence to influence in any significant way the theoretical presupositions of that reflection. According to the second model, on the contrary, the role of the empirical component, essential to neuroethics, rather blocks the ethical and philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Levy’s essay (2011) claims that some intuitions leading to one’s moral judgments can be unreliable, and he proposes the use of a more reliable, third party, empirical measure. It is commendable that Levy attempts to work beyond traditional bounds; however, the author’s use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data is questionable in supporting an argument about intentionality. As neuroscientists, we rely upon evidence-based thinking and conclusions to create generalizable knowledge, and while fMRI data can be informative in broad correlational (...) accounts of behavior, to rely upon these data as reliable measures of intuition is arguably just as speculative as the first-person account. It is of deep concern that society may attempt to apply these data in the manner Levy describes. Indeed, alarming misappropriation of fMRI and electroencephalography. (shrink)

In his target article, Neil Levy (2011) challenges the standard philosophical practice of taking a person's judgments about whether someone acts morally in particular (actual or imaginary) situatio...