- Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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Undefeated dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.details
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The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology.Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):696-714.details
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Knowledge from Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-540.details
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Prospects for Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.details
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Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):691-714.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples.Matthew McGrath - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 225–247.details
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Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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Reasoning about knowledge using defeasible logic.Douglas Walton - 2011 - Argument and Computation 2 (2-3):131 - 155.details
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Understanding the Revisability Thesis.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195.details
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Dualism and the Problem of Individuation.Charles Taliaferro - 1986 - Religious Studies 22 (2):263 - 276.details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Pollock on defeasible reasons.Scott Sturgeon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):105-118.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.details
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Processing natural language arguments with the platform.Patrick Saint-Dizier - 2012 - Argument and Computation 3 (1):49 - 82.details
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Motivating the relevant alternatives approach.Patrick Rysiew - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):259-279.details
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An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments.Henry Prakken - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (2):93-124.details
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An appreciation of John Pollock's work on the computational study of argument.Henry Prakken & John Horty - 2012 - Argument and Computation 3 (1):1 - 19.details
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Part-Time Objects.Paolo Dau - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):459-474.details
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Infinitism and scepticism.Tim Oakley - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):108-118.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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A Logic for Best Explanations.Jared Millson & Christian Straßer - 2019 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (2):184-231.details
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Understanding undermining defeat.Giacomo Melis - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):433-442.details
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Is foundationalism indefinable?James A. Martin - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):128–142.details
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Defining Marriage: Classification, Interpretation, and Definitional Disputes.Fabrizio Macagno - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (3):309-332.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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II—Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Millar on the Value of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):83-99.details
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Inference, Explanation, and Asymmetry.Kareem Khalifa, Jared Millson & Mark Risjord - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 4):929-953.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Norman and truetemp revisited reliabilistically: A proper functionalist defeat account of clairvoyance.Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - Episteme 13 (1):89-110.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2019 - In John McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.details
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What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2007 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108.details
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It's still there!Benj Hellie - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer.details
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Reflexive A priori.Vanessa Isabel Morlock - unknowndetails
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.Alex Byrne - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The other kind of confirmation.Michael Strevens - manuscriptdetails
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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