- Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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Rationality and Kinds of Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):386-392.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Rationalitätsforderungen als konstitutive Normen.Jonas Zahn - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (1):69-89.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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How Important Are Possessed Reasons?Jonathan Way - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):156-167.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.details
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Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6739-6765.details
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New Work for a Theory of Instrumental Rationality.Keshav Singh - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):537-551.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.details
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Rationality and Responsibility.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):379-385.details
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Knowledge and decision: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Moritz Schulz, Patricia Rich, Jakob Koscholke & Roman Heil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-13.details
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification.Moritz Schulz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2943-2972.details
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A brief history of rationality: Reason, reasonableness, rationality, and reasons.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):501-529.details
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Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
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Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):103-120.details
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A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.details
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Rationality and Supervenience: A Comment on Broome (and Lord).Hille Paakkunainen - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):321-331.details
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The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.details
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Emotion: More like Action than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.details
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Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.Giacomo Melis - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2065-2083.details
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Deliberative Authority and Representational Determinacy: A Challenge for the Normative Realist.Tristram McPherson - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.details
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All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
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Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):561-582.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Two roles for reasons: Cause for divorce?Wooram Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1993-2008.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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Rethinking Low, Middle, and High Art.Ting Cho Lau - 2022 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (4):1-12.details
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Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):332-342.details
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Can we outsource all the reasons?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (12):1-16.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.details
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Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding.Nathan Robert Howard - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1078.details
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Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.details
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How there Could be Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):667-680.details
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Dubious pleasures.Javier González de Prado - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):217-234.details
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Coherence as Joint Satisfiability.Samuel Fullhart & Camilo Martinez - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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