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  1. Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...)
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  • An Epistemic Lens on Algorithmic Fairness.Elizabeth Edenberg & Alexandra Wood - 2023 - Eaamo '23: Proceedings of the 3Rd Acm Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization.
    In this position paper, we introduce a new epistemic lens for analyzing algorithmic harm. We argue that the epistemic lens we propose herein has two key contributions to help reframe and address some of the assumptions underlying inquiries into algorithmic fairness. First, we argue that using the framework of epistemic injustice helps to identify the root causes of harms currently framed as instances of representational harm. We suggest that the epistemic lens offers a theoretical foundation for expanding approaches to algorithmic (...)
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  • A Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    What is it that we are doing when we make ethical claims and judgments, such as the claim that we morally ought to assist refugees? This dissertation introduces and defends a novel theory of ethical thought and discourse. I begin by identifying the surface features of ethical thought and discourse to be explained, including the realist and cognitivist (i.e. belief-like) appearance of ethical judgments, and the apparent close connection between making a sincere ethical judgment and being motivated to act on (...)
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  • Understanding What in Public Understanding of Science.Eleonora Montuschi & Baptiste Bedessem - 2024 - Perspectives on Science 32 (2):207-229.
    What should citizens understand about science to participate in democratic life? Against the prevailing approach, we argue that “what” a public understanding of science is about strongly depends on the specific epistemological nature of the science related issues considered in different contexts and circumstances. We identify three specific categories of such issues and show how, equally, specific models of public understanding are required to address them. Only by endorsing such an alternative approach will citizens arguably be able to form sound (...)
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  • Cognitive Peerhood, Epistemic Disdain, and Affective Polarisation: The Perils of Disagreeing Deeply.Victoria Lavorerio - 2023 - Episteme (3):1-15.
    Is it possible to disagree with someone without considering them cognitively flawed? The answer seems to be a resounding yes: disagreeing with someone doesn't entail thinking less of them. You can disagree with someone and not think that they are unreasonable. Deep disagreements, however, may challenge this assumption. A disagreement is deep when it involves many interrelated issues, including the proper way to resolve the disagreement, resulting in its persistence. The parties to a deep disagreement can hold neutral or even (...)
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  • Metatheories of disagreement: Introduction.Péter Hartl & Ákos Gyarmathy - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):337-347.
    This article introduces Metaphilosophy's special issue on metatheories of disagreement, with the aim of promoting discussion on the nature of disagreement on a metatheoretical level. The contributions to this issue cover the following key topics related to disagreement: faultless disagreement, metaontological disagreement, metalinguistic disagreement, responses to peer disagreement in philosophy, hinge epistemology and deep disagreement, disagreement asymmetry, factual and nonfactual disagreement, and defining disagreement or verbal dispute. This introduction also provides general background on four major topics in order to contextualize (...)
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  • Deep Disagreements on Values, Justice, and Moral Issues: Towards an Ethics of Disagreement.Manuel Knoll - 2020 - TRAMES 24 (3):315–338.
    Scholars have long recognized the existence of myriad widespread deep disagreements on values, justice, morality, and ethics. In order to come to terms with such deep disagreements, resistant to rational solution, this article asserts the need for developing an ethics of disagreement. The reality that theoretical disagreements often turn into practical conflicts is a major justification for why such an ethics is necessary. This paper outlines an ethics of deep disagreement that is primarily conceived of as a form of virtue (...)
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  • Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.
    Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hinge’ commitments that are unresponsive to (...)
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  • Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement.T. J. Lagewaard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1571-1592.
    Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement and epistemic injustice. When epistemic injustice comes into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. After considering a common definition of deep disagreement, it is proposed that the depth of disagreements is (...)
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  • Arrogance and deep disagreement.Andrew Aberdein - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 39-52.
    I intend to bring recent work applying virtue theory to the study of argument to bear on a much older problem, that of disagreements that resist rational resolution, sometimes termed "deep disagreements". Just as some virtue epistemologists have lately shifted focus onto epistemic vices, I shall argue that a renewed focus on the vices of argument can help to illuminate deep disagreements. In particular, I address the role of arrogance, both as a factor in the diagnosis of deep disagreements and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution.Jonathan Matheson - 2018 - Topoi (5):1-13.
    The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumentation theory in a way that will advance the relevant debates. While these literatures can intersect in many ways, I will explore how some of views pertaining to deep disagreements in argumentation theory can act as an objection to a prominent view of the epistemology of disagreement—the Equal Weight View. To do so, I will explain the Equal Weight View of peer disagreement and show (...)
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  • The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...)
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  • Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.
    Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield’s prima facie promising attempt to answer the (...)
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  • The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):169-177.
    Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this (...)
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  • A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8).
    Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if we grant the very insights (...)
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  • The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2007 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...)
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  • (1 other version)Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question.Jonathan Matheson - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):201-217.
    In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemology: that some question-begging (...)
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  • Deep Disagreement in Mathematics.Andrew Aberdein - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-27.
    Disagreements that resist rational resolution, often termed “deep disagreements”, have been the focus of much work in epistemology and informal logic. In this paper, I argue that they also deserve the attention of philosophers of mathematics. I link the question of whether there can be deep disagreements in mathematics to a more familiar debate over whether there can be revolutions in mathematics. I propose an affirmative answer to both questions, using the controversy over Shinichi Mochizuki’s work on the abc conjecture (...)
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  • On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements.Eugen Octav Popa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-15.
    Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: All disagreements (...)
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  • Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.
    Deep disagreements concern our most basic and fundamental commitments. Such disagreements seem to be problematic because they appear to manifest epistemic incommensurability in our epistemic systems, and thereby lead to epistemic relativism. This problem is confronted via consideration of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology. On the face of it, this proposal exacerbates the problem of deep disagreements by granting that our most fundamental commitments are essentially arationally held. It is argued, however, that a hinge epistemology, properly understood, does not licence epistemic (...)
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  • ¿Puedo reconocer a un par distante? Una consecuencia del desacuerdo profundo entre pares epistémicos.Ignacio Madroñal - 2023 - Filosofia Unisinos 24 (2):1-14.
    Dos clases de desacuerdo han resultado de gran interés para la epistemología social durante las últimas décadas: los desacuerdos profundos, que tienen lugar cuando la disputa entre las partes es sistemática y particularmente difícil de resolver, y los desacuerdos entre pares epistémicos, ocasionados por el enfrentamiento entre agentes que tienen la misma evidencia y virtudes cognitivas respecto del tema en discusión. El propósito de este artículo es trabajar en la intersección de ellos, evaluando las consecuencias de que un desacuerdo entre (...)
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  • Science as Public Reason and the Controversiality Objection.Klemens Kappel - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):619-639.
    We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that when the pertinent facts are not in plain view they should be furnished by well-functioning scientific institutions. But how should liberal democracy respond when apparently sincere, rational and well-informed citizens object to coercive legislation because it is based on what they consider a misguided trust in certain parts of science? Cases are familiar, the most prominent concerning climate science and evolution, but one may also (...)
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  • Scientific Models and Metalinguistic Negotiation.Mirco Sambrotta - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):277.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that, at least, some metaphysical debates are ‘metalinguistic negotiations’. I will take the dispute between the dominant approaches of realism and the anti-realism ones about the ontological status of scientific models as a case-study. I will argue that such a debate may be better understood as a disagreement, at bottom normatively, motivated, insofar as a normative and non-factual question may be involved in it: how the relevant piece of language ought (...)
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  • Expressivism without Mentalism in Meta-Ontology.Mirco Sambrotta & Pedro Antonio García Jorge - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):781-800.
    ABSTRACTCarnap famously argued that there are two kinds of questions and claims concerning the existence or reality of entities: internal and external ones. We focus on Carnapian external ontological claims of the form: ‘Xs really exist’, where ‘X’ stands for some traditional metaphysical category, such as ‘substance’, ‘fact’ or ‘structure’. While Carnap considered them as meaningless, we consider them as faultlessly meaningful. However, in line with an expressivist guise, we do not claim that they have the meaning they have in (...)
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  • Understanding Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):301-317.
    The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements – i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that (...)
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  • Truth, value and epistemic expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
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  • Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus.Leah Henderson - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):359-382.
    Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.
    Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are ‘deep disagreements’. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and (...)
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  • Can Truth Pluralism Preserve Substantive Truth?真理の多元主義は実質性を保てるか.Yuki Suda - 2020 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (1):1-24.
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  • Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.
    This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higher-order evidence is not defeated, then one (...)
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  • “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate.Justin B. Biddle - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (3):360-379.
    This article argues that the controversy over genetically modified crops is best understood not in terms of the supposed bias, dishonesty, irrationality, or ignorance on the part of proponents or critics, but rather in terms of differences in values. To do this, the article draws on and extends recent work of the role of values and interests in science, focusing particularly on inductive risk and epistemic risk, and it shows how the GMO debate can help to further our understanding of (...)
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  • Higher Order Evidence and Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1039-1050.
    In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as (...)
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  • Epistemic Authority, Philosophical Explication, and the Bio-Statistical Theory of Disease.Somogy Varga - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):937-956.
    Christopher Boorse’s Health care ethics: an introduction, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, pp 359–393, 1987; in Humber, Almeder, Totowa What is disease?, Humana Press, New York City, pp 1–134, 1997; J Med Philos, 39:683–724, 2014) Bio-Statistical Theory comprehends diseases in terms of departures from natural norms, which involve an objectively describable deviation from the proper physiological or psychological functioning of parts of the human organism. I argue that while recent revisions and additional considerations shield the BST from a number of issues (...)
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  • Learning from Scientific Disagreement.Bruno Borge & Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (3):375-398.
    The article addresses the question of how should scientific peers revise their beliefs (if at all) upon recognized disagreement. After presenting the basics of peer disagreement in sections 1 and 2, we focus, in section 3, on a concrete case of scientific disagreement, to wit, the dispute over the evidential status of randomized control trials in medical practice. The examination of this case motivates the idea that some scientific disagreements permit a steadfast reaction. In section 4, we support this conclusion (...)
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  • Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.
    Suppose we have a persistent disagreement about a particular set of policy options, not because of an underlying moral disagreement, or a mere conflict of interest, but rather because we disagree about a crucial non-normative factual assumption underlying the justification of the policy choices. The main question in the paper is what political legitimacy requires in such cases, or indeed whether there are defensible answers to that question. The problem of political legitimacy in fact-dependent policy disagreements has received almost no (...)
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  • Do Deep Disagreements Motivate Relativism?Victoria Lavorerio - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1087-1096.
    In his 2014 article “Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements”, Steven Hales argues that relativism is a plausible disagreement resolution strategy for epistemically irresolvable disagreements. I argue that his relativistic strategy is not adequate for disagreements of this kind, because it demands an impossible doxastic state for disputants to resolve the disagreement. Contrarily, Fogelin’s :1–8, 1985) theory of deep disagreement does not run into the same problems. Deep disagreements, according to Fogelin, cannot be resolved through argumentation because the (...)
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  • Deep Disagreement and the Virtues of Argumentative and Epistemic Incapacity.Jeremy Barris - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (3):369-408.
    Fogelin’s Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement as allowing no rational resolution has been criticized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemological perspectives. These criticisms typically do not recognize how his point applies to the very argumentative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions of deep disagreement make each position literally unintelligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolution. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme that it partly cancels its own meaning (...)
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  • Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Klemens Kappel & Karin Jønch-Clausen - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):371-384.
    Recently Robert B. Talisse has put forth a socio-epistemic justification of liberal democracy that he believes qualifies as a public justification in that it purportedly can be endorsed by all reasonable individuals. In avoiding narrow restraints on reasonableness, Talisse argues that he has in fact proposed a justification that crosses the boundaries of a wide range of religious, philosophical and moral worldviews and in this way the justification is sufficiently pluralistic to overcome the challenges of reasonable pluralism familiar from Rawls. (...)
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  • Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation” (Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 34(2), 277-295). [REVIEW]Mirco Sambrotta - 2022 - Theoria 37 (2):257-261.
    Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation”, 277-295).
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