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  1. Comparing Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Mateusz Łełyk - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):255-286.
    The main aim of our paper was to present three formal tools for comparing various axiomatic theories of truth. In Section 2 we aimed at showing that there are indeed many different approaches to defining a set of axioms for the notion of truth. In Section 3 we introduced three different \measures of strength" of axiomatic theories of truth, i.e. three reflexive and transitive relations on the set of axiomatic theories of truth. We have explained the intuition behind each of (...)
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  • A Unified Theory of Truth and Paradox.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):209-254.
    The sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language. In this paper, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory of truth and paradox, that is a theory of truth that also provides a (...)
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  • Some Open Questions about Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the same condition. In this paper, we outline some results and questions around the degrees of paradoxicality and summarize recent progress.
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  • In praise of a logic of definitions that tolerates ω‐inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
    I argue that a general logic of definitions must tolerate ω‐inconsistency. I present a semantical scheme, S, under which some definitions imply ω‐inconsistent sets of sentences. I draw attention to attractive features of this scheme, and I argue that S yields the minimal general logic of definitions. I conclude that any acceptable general logic should permit definitions that generate ω‐inconsistency. This conclusion gains support from the application of S to the theory of truth.
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  • What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...)
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  • Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
    We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for (...)
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  • Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded.Eduardo Barrio & Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (1):122-139.
    A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...)
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  • Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes.Bruno Da Ré & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):611-629.
    Our main goal is to investigate whether the infinitary rules for the quantifiers endorsed by Elia Zardini in a recent paper are plausible. First, we will argue that they are problematic in several ways, especially due to their infinitary features. Secondly, we will show that even if these worries are somehow dealt with, there is another serious issue with them. They produce a truth-theoretic paradox that does not involve the structural rules of contraction.
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  • Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods.Ming Hsiung - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, (...)
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  • How to Express Self-Referential Probability. A Kripkean Proposal.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):680-704.
    We present a semantics for a language that includes sentences that can talk about their own probabilities. This semantics applies a fixed point construction to possible world style structures. One feature of the construction is that some sentences only have their probability given as a range of values. We develop a corresponding axiomatic theory and show by a canonical model construction that it is complete in the presence of the ω-rule. By considering this semantics we argue that principles such as (...)
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  • Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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  • One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox.Leon Horsten - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (6):1-15.
    This article contains an overview of the main problems, themes and theories relating to the semantic paradoxes in the twentieth century. From this historical overview I tentatively draw some lessons about the way in which the field may evolve in the next decade.
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  • Modality and axiomatic theories of truth I: Friedman-Sheard.Johannes Stern - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):273-298.
    In this investigation we explore a general strategy for constructing modal theories where the modal notion is conceived as a predicate. The idea of this strategy is to develop modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth. In this first paper of our two part investigation we develop the general strategy and then apply it to the axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. We thereby obtain the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. The theory Modal Friedman-Sheard is then discussed from three different perspectives. First, we (...)
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  • Notes on ω-inconsistent theories of truth in second-order languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
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  • Librationist Closures of the Paradoxes.Frode Bjørdal - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):323-361.
    We present a semi-formal foundational theory of sorts, akin to sets, named librationism because of its way of dealing with paradoxes. Its semantics is related to Herzberger’s semi inductive approach, it is negation complete and free variables (noemata) name sorts. Librationism deals with paradoxes in a novel way related to paraconsistent dialetheic approaches, but we think of it as bialethic and parasistent. Classical logical theorems are retained, and none contradicted. Novel inferential principles make recourse to theoremhood and failure of theoremhood. (...)
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  • Classes and truths in set theory.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2012 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (11):1484-1523.
    This article studies three most basic systems of truth as well as their subsystems over set theory ZF possibly with AC or the axiom of global choice GC, and then correlates them with subsystems of Morse–Kelley class theory MK. The article aims at making an initial step towards the axiomatic study of truth in set theory in connection with class theory. Some new results on the side of class theory, such as conservativity, forcing and some forms of the reflection principle, (...)
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  • Teorías de la verdad sin modelos estándar: Un nuevo argumento para adoptar jerarquías.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2011 - Análisis Filosófico 31 (1):7-32.
    En este artículo, tengo dos objetivos distintos. En primer lugar, mostrar que no es una buena idea tener una teoría de la verdad que, aunque consistente, sea omega-inconsistente. Para discutir este punto, considero un caso particular: la teoría de Friedman-Sheard FS. Argumento que en los lenguajes de primer orden omega inconsistencia implica que la teoría de la verdad no tiene modelo estándar. Esto es, no hay un modelo cuyo dominio sea el conjunto de los números naturales en el cual esta (...)
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  • Truth and Circular Definitions. [REVIEW]Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):124–129.
    This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” (...)
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  • Relative truth definability of axiomatic truth theories.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):305-344.
    The present paper suggests relative truth definability as a tool for comparing conceptual aspects of axiomatic theories of truth and gives an overview of recent developments of axiomatic theories of truth in the light of it. We also show several new proof-theoretic results via relative truth definability including a complete answer to the conjecture raised by Feferman in [13].
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  • Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  • Truth and reduction.Volker Halbach - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (1-2):97-126.
    The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.
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  • A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
    The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will (...)
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  • A guide to truth predicates in the modern era.Michael Sheard - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):1032-1054.
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  • Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
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  • Editorial introduction.Volker Halbach - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):3-20.
    I survey some important semantical and axiomatic theories of self-referential truth. Kripke's fixed-point theory, the revision theory of truth and appraoches involving fuzzy logic are the main examples of semantical theories. I look at axiomatic theories devised by Cantini, Feferman, Freidman and Sheard. Finally some applications of the theory of self-referential truth are considered.
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  • Classical Determinate Truth I.Kentaro Fujimoto & Volker Halbach - 2024 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 89 (1):218-261.
    We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory $\mathsf {CD}$ of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that $\mathsf {CD}$ is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances (...)
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  • Procedural Semantics and its Relevance to Paradox.Elbert Booij - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-24.
    Two semantic paradoxes, the Liar and Curry’s paradox, are analysed using a newly developed conception of procedural semantics (semantics according to which the truth of propositions is determined algorithmically), whose main characteristic is its departure from methodological realism. Rather than determining pre-existing facts, procedures are constitutive of them. Of this semantics, two versions are considered: closed (where the halting of procedures is presumed) and open (without this presumption). To this end, a procedural approach to deductive reasoning is developed, based on (...)
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  • Necessity predicate versus truth predicate from the perspective of paradox.Ming Hsiung - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-23.
    This paper aims to explore the relationship between the necessity predicate and the truth predicate by comparing two possible-world interpretations. The first interpretation, proposed by Halbach et al. (J Philos Log 32(2):179–223, 2003), is for the necessity predicate, and the second, proposed by Hsiung (Stud Log 91(2):239–271, 2009), is for the truth predicate. To achieve this goal, we examine the connections and differences between paradoxical sentences that involve either the necessity predicate or the truth predicate. A primary connection is established (...)
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  • The Copernican Multiverse of Sets.Paul K. Gorbow & Graham E. Leigh - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):1033-1069.
    We develop an untyped framework for the multiverse of set theory. $\mathsf {ZF}$ is extended with semantically motivated axioms utilizing the new symbols $\mathsf {Uni}(\mathcal {U})$ and $\mathsf {Mod}(\mathcal {U, \sigma })$, expressing that $\mathcal {U}$ is a universe and that $\sigma $ is true in the universe $\mathcal {U}$, respectively. Here $\sigma $ ranges over the augmented language, leading to liar-style phenomena that are analyzed. The framework is both compatible with a broad range of multiverse conceptions and suggests its (...)
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  • From Paradoxicality to Paradox.Ming Hsiung - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    In various theories of truth, people have set forth many definitions to clarify in what sense a set of sentences is paradoxical. But what, exactly, is _a_ paradox per se? It has not yet been realized that there is a gap between ‘being paradoxical’ and ‘being a paradox’. This paper proposes that a paradox is a minimally paradoxical set meeting some closure property. Along this line of thought, we give five tentative definitions based upon the folk notion of paradoxicality implied (...)
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  • Strong Homomorphisms, Category Theory, and Semantic Paradox.Jonathan Wolfgram & Roy T. Cook - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):1070-1093.
    In this essay we introduce a new tool for studying the patterns of sentential reference within the framework introduced in [2] and known as the language of paradox $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ : strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms. In particular, we show that (i) strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms between $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ constructions preserve paradoxicality, (ii) many (but not all) earlier results regarding the paradoxicality of $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ constructions can be recast as special cases of our central result regarding (...)
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  • Expressing logical disagreement from within.Andreas Fjellstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-33.
    Against the backdrop of the frequent comparison of theories of truth in the literature on semantic paradoxes with regard to which inferences and metainferences are deemed valid, this paper develops a novel approach to defining a binary predicate for representing the valid inferences and metainferences of a theory within the theory itself under the assumption that the theory is defined with a classical meta-theory. The aim with the approach is to obtain a tool which facilitates the comparison between a theory (...)
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  • Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):739-789.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the binary sequences generated by the paradoxical sentences in revision sequence are always unstable. In this paper, we work backwards, trying to reconstruct the paradoxical sentences from some of their binary sequences. We give a general procedure of constructing paradoxes with specific binary sequences through some typical examples. Particularly, we construct what Herzberger called “unstable statements with unpredictably complicated variations in truth value.” Besides, we also construct those paradoxes with infinitely many finite primary (...)
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  • Unifying the Philosophy of Truth.Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández & Kentaro Fujimoto (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This anthology of the very latest research on truth features the work of recognized luminaries in the field, put together following a rigorous refereeing process. Along with an introduction outlining the central issues in the field, it provides a unique and unrivaled view of contemporary work on the nature of truth, with papers selected from key conferences in 2011 such as Truth Be Told, Truth at Work, Paradoxes of Truth and Denotation and Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Studying the nature of (...)
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  • Grim Variations.Fabio Lampert & John William Waldrop - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (3):287-301.
    Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of divine omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all truths—is false. In particular, we here have in mind to focus on two such arguments: the set theoretic argument and the semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run parallel to, respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful arguments against the (...)
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  • Unwinding Modal Paradoxes on Digraphs.Ming Hsiung - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):319-362.
    The unwinding that Cook, 767–774 2004) proposed is a simple but powerful method of generating new paradoxes from known ones. This paper extends Cook’s unwinding to a larger class of paradoxes and studies further the basic properties of the unwinding. The unwinding we study is a procedure, by which when inputting a Boolean modal net together with a definable digraph, we get a set of sentences in which we have a ‘counterpart’ for each sentence of the Boolean modal net and (...)
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  • Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-42.
    What is the property of being true like? To answer this question, begin with a Canberra-plan analysis of the concept of truth. That is, assemble the platitudes for the concept of truth, and then investigate which property might satisfy them. This project is aided by Friedman and Sheard’s groundbreaking analysis of twelve logical platitudes for truth. It turns out that, because of the paradoxes like the liar, the platitudes for the concept of truth are inconsistent. Moreover, there are so many (...)
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  • Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (4):815-855.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  • Inconsistency, Paraconsistency and ω-Inconsistency.Bruno Da Ré - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):171-188.
    In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to (...)
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  • VI—Nominalistic Adequacy.Jeffrey Ketland - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):201-217.
    Instrumentalist nominalism responds to the indispensability arguments by rejecting the demand that successful mathematicized scientific theories be nominalized, and instead claiming merely that such theories are nominalistically adequate: the concreta behave ‘as if’ the theory is true. This article examines some definitions of the concept of nominalistic adequacy and concludes with some considerations against instrumentalist nominalism.
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  • A System Of Complete And Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (3):311-327.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation φ/Tφ and conecessitation T φ/φ and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is w-inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give (...)
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  • The Paradox of the Knower revisited.Walter Dean & Hidenori Kurokawa - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):199-224.
    The Paradox of the Knower was originally presented by Kaplan and Montague [26] as a puzzle about the everyday notion of knowledge in the face of self-reference. The paradox shows that any theory extending Robinson arithmetic with a predicate K satisfying the factivity axiom K → A as well as a few other epistemically plausible principles is inconsistent. After surveying the background of the paradox, we will focus on a recent debate about the role of epistemic closure principles in the (...)
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  • An ordinal analysis for theories of self-referential truth.Graham Emil Leigh & Michael Rathjen - 2010 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 49 (2):213-247.
    The first attempt at a systematic approach to axiomatic theories of truth was undertaken by Friedman and Sheard (Ann Pure Appl Log 33:1–21, 1987). There twelve principles consisting of axioms, axiom schemata and rules of inference, each embodying a reasonable property of truth were isolated for study. Working with a base theory of truth conservative over PA, Friedman and Sheard raised the following questions. Which subsets of the Optional Axioms are consistent over the base theory? What are the proof-theoretic strengths (...)
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  • Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
    This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  • The Friedman—Sheard programme in intuitionistic logic.Graham E. Leigh & Michael Rathjen - 2012 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 77 (3):777-806.
    This paper compares the roles classical and intuitionistic logic play in restricting the free use of truth principles in arithmetic. We consider fifteen of the most commonly used axiomatic principles of truth and classify every subset of them as either consistent or inconsistent over a weak purely intuitionistic theory of truth.
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  • Reaching Transparent Truth.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):841-866.
    This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.
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  • A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation and conecessitation T and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is -inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give an analysis (...)
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  • On the probabilistic convention T.Hannes Leitgeb - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224.
    We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  • Empirical adequacy and ramsification.Jeffrey Ketland - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
    Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of (...)
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  • Weak and strong theories of truth.Michael Sheard - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101.
    A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.
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